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Introduction

The district court erred when it declared that the State owned title to the
bed of the Weber River through the section of river at issue here. The Utah
Stream Access Coalition (USAC) lacked standing to bring a title claim on behalf
of the State, and the district court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to declare title in
the State. The district court also plainly erred in failing to apply the statutory test
for navigability set out in HB 141. The state navigability test for recreational access
is based on present-day commercial use, whereas the federal navigability test for

title looks to the date of statehood. Finally, even if the statute had adopted the
federal test for navigability, the court erred when it ruled that the floating of logs
during temporary times of high water is enough to satisfy the federal test.
Argument
1.

The district court erred in declaring that fixed title to the streambed in
the State because USAC did not have standing to seek such a
determination and the trial court there£ore lacked jurisdiction to grant it

The district court, in its ruling of April 10, 2015, declared that (i) the public
is "entitled to use the riverbed of the Weber River at [the location of Landowner
Properties] for lawful recreational purposes," and (ii) "the State of Utah holds
sovereign land title to the bed ... at the location of the Landowner Properties."

(R. 892.) In its opening brief, Orange Street argued that the district court erred in
making the title-declaration because the State had made no claim for a title
determination and USAC lacked standing to seek one. Orange St. Opening Br. at

1
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29-33. In its response brief, the State agreed that the district court's title
declaration should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. State Resp. Br. at 22-29. As
the State noted, " [a] quiet title case would require a different plaintiff, a different
cause of action, and a different form of relief." Id. at 24.
USAC is ambivalent in its response to Orange Street's argument. Although
it originally asked the district court to determine title in its complaint, (R. 8-9.), it
later told the district court that it was not seeking a title determination. (R. 337.)
In its brief to this court, it repeatedly states that it is not seeking to have title
quieted in the State. USAC Resp. Br. at 18 n.4, 20, 26, 30. Yet USAC spends
considerable time briefing why it should have standing to raise the question of
title. Id. at 18-31. The reason seems to be USAC fears that if this court accepts
Orange Street's separate argument that HB 141 did not adopt the federal
navigability for title test, USAC, for some reason, will be denied standing to
claim an alternative right of recreational access under the Utah Constitution. Id.
at 18-19. Orange Street has made no such argument.
Orange Street's position is that members of the public who claim denial of
access to public waters to which they are entitled under HB 141 have standing to
bring an action to assert that right of access, if they meet the usual standing tests.
But no claim of a right of access should give standing to assert, on behalf of the
State of Utah, a claim to have title quieted in the State on grounds of navigability
for title. The concern that seems to prompt USAC to hedge its repeated

2
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disavowals of a right to seek a title determination is not grounded in any position
taken by Orange Street. 1 The relief of a title declaration that property belongs to
the State can only be given at the request of the State. A private party without
any associated interest does not have standing to make such a claim.
The district court's entry of a declaration of title in the State presents a
troubling precedent to private landholders. It permits parties without tangible
interests in property to obtain a title declaration that may remove certain of the
landowners' property rights with potentially far-ranging consequences. The
issue is similarly troublesome for the State, which is justifiably concerned about
the orderly administration of public property and land titles. This case is not
about title, but about access to public waters. Because USAC, who has no claim
to title, does not have standing to litigate the rights of the State to the bed of the
Weber River under HB 141, this court should vacate the district court's title
determ.ina tion for a lack of jurisdiction.

The reason for USAC' s hedging on the question of standing appears to be that it
separately contends its members have a constitutional right founded in article
XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution to access waters that qualify as navigable
under the federal title test, regardless of the Utah Legislature's enactment of HB
141. USAC Resp. Br. at 26, 30-31. But that issue was not addressed by the district
court and is not before this court in this case. This case only involves access
under HB 141. The article XX, section 1 issue is one of several before this court in
the separate case of Utah Stream Access Coalition v. VR Acquisitions, LLC, No.
20151048-SC.
1
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2.

The language of the navigation definition in HB 141 does not track the
federal test; this court should clarify the statutory test for access
Orange Street argued in its opening brief that the language of the

navigability test in HB 141 does not track the federal navigability for title test.
Orange St. Opening Br. at 33-38. HB 141' s navigability test reads in the present
tense. Utah Code§ 73-29-102(4). It requires a determination of the present
susceptibility of a water's use for commerce and as a public highway of
transportation. In contrast, the federal navigability test for title asks after the
susceptibility of a water's use for trade and travel at statehood. United States v.
Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931) ("In accordance with the constitutional principle of

the equality of states, the title to the beds of rivers within Utah passed to that
state when it was admitted to the Union, if the rivers were then navigable .... ");
Orange St. Opening Br. at 35-37. 2 The State and USAC acknowledge this critical
time difference in the text of HB 141, but argue that the intention of the drafters
as determined from the legislative history suggests that they intended to use the
federal navigability test for title. State Resp. Br. at 9-10; USAC Resp. Br. at 33.
This court has held that the text is primary when interpreting a statute.
Our evaluation of the statute's purpose must start with its text, not
the legislative history. Where the statute's language marks its reach
in clear and unambiguous terms, it is our role to enforce a legislative
purpose that matches those terms, not to supplant it with a narrower
Orange Street did not raise this issue below. But the plain error doctrine permits
this court to address it. Orange Street Opening Br. at 34-37. The variance between
the text and the test applied by the district court warrants this court's attention.
The consequences for owners of property along bodies of water require
clarification of the relevant test, either by this court or the legislature.
2

4
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or broader one that we might infer from the legislative history. That
history might identify a social problem that first sparked the
legislature's attention. But we cannot presume that the legislature
meant only to deal with that particular problem, as legislative bodies
often start with one problem in mind but then reach more broadly in
their ultimate enactment. And when they do, we cannot limit the
reach of their enactment to the ill that initially sparked their interest.

Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 2012 UT 40,

,r 17,285 P.3d 766 (citations omitted);

see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,374
(1986) ("Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at the expense of the
terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in
the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent."); Brogan v. United

States, 522 U.S. 398,403 (1998) ("[T]he reach of a statute often exceeds the precise
evil to be eliminated."). That a state legislature might adopt a state test of
navigability at odds with the federal navigability test for title is not unlikely.
Many have done precisely that for various reasons.3

If the court adopts the literal definition of "navigability" in HB 141, that
definition requires a showing of current susceptibility for use for commerce and
as a public highway of transportation. Orange St. Opening Br. 34-36. While there
...i)

was some slight reference to the susceptibility of these waters to modern boat
travel, there was no evidence of commerce. Id. at 36. This requires a reversal of
the district court's determination that USAC is entitled to access under HB 141.

Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 53 (2010) (includes an extensive appendix detailing
navigability laws in the western states) attached as Addendum A. Craig's article
includes an extensive appendix detailing navigability laws in the western states.
3
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3.

Neither log drives alone nor use during temporary high water satisfy the
federal navigability for title test

Assuming the federal navigability for title test is the test incorporated in
HB 141, this court has been presented with two straightforward questions about
how that test is satisfied. First, is evidence of occasional log drives only, without
evidence of use of watercraft for transportation, enough to show susceptibility to
use for commerce and transportation? 4 Second, is evidence of a water's
susceptibility to use for commerce during times of temporary high water enough
to satisfy the federal test?
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue,
though the inferences to be fairly drawn from its navigability for title cases
support Orange Street in answering both questions in the negative. Orange Street
Operung Br. at 39-43, 51-52. On the whole, the various lower court cases support
Orange Street's position, and those few seemingly against it are analytically
suspect. Id. at 44-54. The State has not addressed the issue on appeal, but
concluded in its trial brief that "the Weber River's relatively low flows, steep

Susceptibility of use does not require actual proof of use. "The evidence of the
actual use of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for
commercial purposes may be most persuasive, but, where conditions of
exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use,
the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily
proved." United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931). Present day use, while
helpful, "must be confined to that which shows the river could sustain the kinds
of commercial use that, as a realistic matter, might have occurred at statehood."
PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 1233 (2012).

4
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gradient, and short, inconsistent window of annual utility, raise questions
regarding whether it was navigable-in-fact in 1896." (R. 647)
Orange Street will not revisit arguments already made in the opening
briefs on the merits of the question. Instead, it will briefly address two points not
raised earlier, one legal and one practical. First, in PPL Montana v. Montana, the
U.S. Supreme Court said nothing about log floating as a basis for navigability,
even though the issue was briefed. 132 S.Ct. 1215 (2012). Instead, the Court
focused on the absence of boat travel in declaring the Missouri River nonnavigable through the Great Falls reach. Id. at 1232.
In PPL Montana, Montana argued that logs floating on the Madison River

were enough to establish susceptibility for commerce and to satisfy the federal
navigability test. Br. of Resp' t, State of Montana, p. 21, attached as Addendum B;
see also Br. of Amicus Curiae, Nat'l Wildlife Fed. et al., p. 25, attached as
Addendum C. In deciding that the Missouri River through the Great Falls reach
was not navigable at statehood, and in discussing the facts relevant to
determining the susceptibility of a waterway being used for trade and travel, the
Court never addressed the issue of the floating of logs. 5 PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct.
at 1232-33. Rather, it held that the fact that portages were required around the

5

In fact, no evidence of log floats on the Missouri River was presented to the

court. But this argument is not about whether log floats actually occurred on the
river, but whether the river was susceptible to log floats at statehood and was
that enough to satisfy navigability requirements.
7
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Great Falls reach defeated title for navigability purposes. Id. at 1232. Relying only
on the passage of watercraft, the court stated:
[T]he Court sees no evidence in the record that could demonstrate
that the Great Falls reach was navigable. Montana does not dispute
that overland passage was necessary to traverse the reach. Indeed,
the State admits the falls themselves were not passable by boat at
statehood. And the trial court noted the falls had never been
navigated.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, because
boats had to portage around the falls, the river was not navigable.

If susceptibility to floating logs was all that was required for navigability
for title, the outcome would have been different; logs can float over waterfalls
and rapids where boats cannot go. Nor was there an issue about low water. Boats
were able to be navigated above and below the Great Falls reach. The only
reason the Court concluded that the segment was non-navigable was because
"the falls themselves were not passable by boat at statehood." Id. Orange Street
urges this court to follow the Supreme Court's lead and hold that the use of boats
is necessary to establish navigability for title purposes.

Second, and practically, Orange Street notes that if susceptibility to the
floating of logs alone is enough to establish navigability for title purposes,
stretches of Utah's rivers previously determined non-navigable may be opened
up to a new navigability for title analysis. In other words, the stability of
landowners' previously decided entitlement or lack of entitlement to ownership
of beds may be brought into question. For example, in United States v. Utah, the

8
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Supreme Court decided navigability for title issues regarding the Green River,
Colorado River, and the Grand River (currently the Colorado River above its
confluence with the Green River). 283 U.S. 64 (1931). A section of the Colorado
River through Cataract Canyon was deemed non-navigable because of its rapid
descent and dangerous rapids. Id. at 80. The United States, as the owner of the
adjacent land in Cataract Canyon, therefore has title to the bed underlying that
non-navigable section. Id. at 74. Again, like the Missouri River in PPL Montana,
the decision was not based on insufficient water to carry watercraft. Sections
above and below Cataract Canyon were deemed navigable because boats had
been on those sections or they were susceptible to such use. Id. at 89-90. If a log
floating down the river is enough to make the water way susceptible to
commerce, then the United States' title in Cataract Canyon may very well be void
and Utah may own those beds.6
For these reasons, and the reasons stated in its opening brief, Orange Street
asks the court to reverse the district court's ruling and conclude that the one mile
._;,

stretch of the Weber River at issue in this case is not navigable.

6 Similarly, the San Juan River was determined to be non-navigable from Chinle
Creek (5 miles below the town of Bluff) to its confluence with the Colorado River,
a total of 133 miles. Utah, 283 U.S. at 74. Portions of this river are likely able to
float logs and thus be considered navigable under USAC's test. Adjacent
landowners include the United States, the Navajo Nation, and private interests in
the town of Mexican Hat. Instability of title would open up the possibility of
quiet title actions for all of these land owners.
9
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Conclusion

The district court erred in entering a ruling concluding that the State holds
title to the bed of the Weber River where it crosses Orange Street's property
because USAC lacks standing to challenge Orange Street's title. The district court
also plainly erred in not applying the statutory test for navigability set out in HB
141. Finally, even if the federal navigability for title test is the HB 141 test, the
district court failed to apply the proper test.
This court should vacate the title determination and reverse the finding of
navigability and of a right in USAC' s members to access Orange Street's
property for recreational purposes.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2016.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER
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A Comparative Guide to the
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines:
Public Values, Private Rights, and the
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust
Robin Kundis Craig*

This companion Article to the fall 2007 A Comparative Guide to the
Eastern Public Trust Doctrines explores the state public trust doctrinesemphasis on the plural-in the nineteen western states. In so doing, this Article
seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust
doctrine have a federal law basis, especially regarding state ownership of the
beds and banks of navigable waters, the details of how public trust principles
actually apply va,y considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other
words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other
forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of
the particular histories and the perceived needs and problems ofeach state.
This Article observes that, in the West, four factors have been most
important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines: (1) the severing of
water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine,· (2)
subsequent state declarations ofpublic ownership offresh water; (3) clear and
explicit perceptions of the scarcity of water and the importance of submerged
lands and environmental amenities; and (4) a willingness to consider water
and other environmental issues to be of constitutional importance and/or to
incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes. From these factors, two
important trends in western states' public trust doctrines have emerged: (1) the
extension ofpublic rights based on states' ownership of the water itself; and (2)
an increasing, and still cutting-edge, expansion of public trust concepts into
ecological public trust doctrines that are increasingly protecting species,
ecosystems, and the public values that they provide.

Copyright 0 2010 by the Regents of the University of California.
• Attorneys' Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs, The
Florida State College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. I may be reached for comment at
rcraig@law.fsu.edu.
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INTRODUCTION

In the arid West, balancing private needs for fresh water to consume
against the public values-recreational, aesthetic, and ecological-served by
leaving fresh water in situ has tended to favor the private use side. Evidence of
this result is both massive and minor, ranging from California's multi-billiondollar water transportation system, 1 to the routine de-watering of the Colorado
River so that little to no water reaches the Sea of Cortez, 2 to water-related
Endangered Species Act lawsuits in dozens of watersheds. 3
One of the legal tools that can re-balance private and public rights in water
in any particular state is that state's public trust doctrine. In 1970, Professor
Joseph Sax published his seminal article arguing for revitalization of the public
trust doctrine,4 and, ever since, academics, politicians, voters, and judges have
been exploring the potential value of the public trust doctrine for protecting
public values in water, including recreational and ecological values. 5
This Article is the second of two that explore what states are actually
doing with their public trust doctrines-emphasis on the plural. As I argued in
the first article, 6 which covered the thirty-one eastern states' public trust
doctrines, the states have progressed and diverged in interesting ways beyond
I. By September 30, 2006, the total construction costs of the CVP had reached approximately
$3.4 billion. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: REIMBURSEMENT OF
CALIFORNIA 's CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT CAPITAL CONSTRUCDON COSTS BY SAN LUIS UNIT
IRRIGATION WATER DISTRICTS 2 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08307r.pdf
2. ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RlvER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF
IMMENSITY 34 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water
Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 826-27, 897-98 (2008).
3. Craig, supra note 2, at 875-78.
4. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Ejfectil'e Judicial
Inten•ention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Marc R Poirer, Modified Pr;vate Property: New Jersey's Public Trust Doctrine,
Pr;,,ate Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural Resources, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J.
71 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Sen•ices and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working
Change.from Within, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006); Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, The Public
Trust Doctrine and Sustainable Ecosystems: A Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL.
L.J. 322 (2006); Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Public and Prfrate Property Rights: Regulatory and Physical
Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421 (2005).
6. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classification of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. I, 113
(2007).

Electronic
copy available
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter at:
Lawhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1405822
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2-CRAIG

3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

56

[Vol. 37:53

the precepts of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal discussion of the public trust
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. lllinois. 7
In some ways, what was true for the eastern states is also true for the
western states. A state's public trust doctrine outlines public and private rights
in water and submerged lands by delineating five components of those rights:
(1) the beds and banks of waters that are subject to state/public ownership; (2)
the line or lines dividing private from public title in those submerged lands; (3)
the waters subject to public use rights; (4) the line or lines in those waters that
mark the limit of public use rights; and (5) the public uses that the doctrine will
protect in the waters where the public has use rights. 8
In addition, prior discussions of western public trust doctrines are subject
to the same two general limitations I discussed for the eastern public trust
doctrines: "The first is a tendency to generalize all public trust law into a single
doctrine. The second and opposite tendency is to view each state's public trust
doctrine as unique." 9
Nevertheless, public trust doctrine law in the western states can be
differentiated from that in the eastern states in several respects. First, in the
eastern states, coastal access, coastal development, and coastal rights have
generally been of more pressing concern than public trust rights in fresh waters.
Because of the timing of their statehood, many eastern states' public trust
doctrines have been influenced in significant ways by the English "ebb-andflow" tidal test of navigability for purposes of state title. 10 In addition, many
eastern states recognize different public/private title lines along the sea coasts
and Great Lakes than they do in fresh water streams, rivers, and lakes and/or
protect more extensive sets of public rights in the ocean and Great Lakes. 11 In
contrast, most western states became states after the U.S. Supreme Court had
outlined most of its core principles regarding navigable waters, and far fewer of
them are coastal states----only Alaska, California, Hawai'i, Oregon, Texas, and
Washington. Partially as a result of this timing and geographical reality,
western states, in general, have paid far greater attention than eastern states to
public rights in fresh waters.
In addition, western states are more arid than eastern states, resulting in a
consciousness of the importance of fresh water that pervades many of these
states' public trust doctrines. The Hundredth Meridian, which runs through
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, is
generally considered the "water divide" of the United States--east of that line,
there is generally enough rainfall to support farming without irrigation; west of

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Craig. supra note 6. at 4.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 11-14.
Id. at 16-17.
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the line, there generally is not. 12 Survival in the west depends on access to
water, and water is generally viewed as being in short supply. As will be
discussed, this perception of shortage or potential shortage of fresh water has
influenced the public trust doctrine in many western states.
Further, the western states use a different system of water law than the
eastern states. Eastern states' water laws are founded on common-law
riparianism, 13 although many states have transitioned to regulated riparian
systems. 14 Riparianism incorporates notions of adjustable, correlative rights to
water among riparian property owners, with a general expectation--couched
originally in terms of a "natural flow" doctrine and more recently in terms of
"reasonable use"-that there is enough water to both serve human needs and
leave water in the natural system. In contrast, western states (with the notable
exception of Hawai'i) base their water law on prior appropriation, including
states like California that retain limited riparian rights. 15 Prior appropriation is
based on the principle of "frrst in time, first in right" and acknowledges through
its priority system that water supplies from a given source will sometimesmaybe often-be insufficient to meet all needs. Thus, prior appropriation as a
legal system acknowledges that fresh water is in short supply. In practice,
however, prior appropriation systems have allowed appropriators to drain
streams and rivers dry, making obvious the loss of public values such as
navigation, fishing and other recreation, aesthetics, species, biodiversity, water
quality, ecological health, an~ more recently, ecosystem services.
Finally, in almost all prior appropriation states, state water law includes a
declaration, constitutional or statutory, that the state or the public owns the
fresh water itself. Legally, these declarations dissociate control over the water
from land ownership, including submerged land ownership. For public trust
purposes, therefore, such declarations leave western states free to impress
waters with public trust protections entirely independently of state ownership of
the beds and banks of navigable waters, extending many state public trust
doctrines to non-navigable waters.
All of these features of prior appropriation water law have become
relevant to states' public trust doctrines in the West. Indee~ western public
trust common law reflects conscious struggles, often lacking in the eastern
states, regarding the legal relationship between private appropriative water
rights, on the one han~ and public rights and values in water, on the other.

12.
13.

HERBERT C. YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING WATER RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS 42 (2d ed. 2003).
George A. Gould, Water Rights Systems, in WATER RlGIITS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES

8-9 (Kenneth R Wright, ed., 1998).
14. Richard F. Ricci et al., Ball/es over Eastern Water, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 38, 38
(2006); Jeremy Nathan Jungreis, "Permit" Me Another Drink: A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water
Rights ofFederal Lands in the Regulated Riparian East, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. R.Ev. 369, 370-71 (2005).
15. Gould, supra note 13, at 7.
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This Article explores these and other features of western states' public
trust doctrines, identifying broad categories of how these nineteen states have
developed their common law regarding public rights in water. The Article is
both classificatory and comparative, first identifying categories of trends
among the western states and then comparing those approaches to demonstrate
the different ways that their public trust doctrines have developed.
At the same time, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the
broad contours of the public trust doctrine have a federal law basis, especially
regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the details
of how public trust principles apply vary considerably from state to state.
Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law.
Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public
trust doctrines in light of the particular histories and perceived needs and
problems of each state. As Professors Robert Abrams and Noah Hall have
observed more generally for all of water law, any given state's public trust
doctrine "evolves instrumentally in ways that support a society's most pressing
needs. The periods of greatest change in water law tend to be the ones where
serious and protracted shortage or unsatisfied demand is felt in one or more key
economic sectors." 16 Therefore, is it perhaps unsurprising that more robust
public trust doctrines have evolved in states such as Hawai'i, California, and
Montana where water- and environment-based tourism and recreation are
important contributors to the states' economies.
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the public trust doctrine,
including its development before the formation of the United States and
emphasizing its public rights nature. Part II outlines the federal contours of
state public trust doctrines, including the federal law of state title to navigable
waters, the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the public trust
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 17 and the Supreme Court's
further elaborations regarding states' authority to define rights to and in water.
Part III identifies and compares many of the trends in western states' public
trust doctrines, emphasizing moments when particular states' courts and, less
often, legislatures, acknowledge the evolving nature of public trust principles
and the need to protect public values recognized to be in short and decreasing
supply. The Article concludes with a short examination of the implications of
state public trust doctrines as a form of common law, arguing against the utility
of continuing to describe a single public trust "doctrine," particularly as
western states face unprecedented water supply pressures from climate change.

16. Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and Carbon
Constrained Environment, 49 NAT. REsOURCES l (2009).
17. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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HISTORICAL VIEWS OF PUBLIC INTERESTS IN WATER

As many writers have explained in varying degrees of detail, the public
trust doctrine has an extensive history dating back to Roman law. 18 A short
review of this history is useful to underscore the concern for the public interests
in water that the public trust doctrine has always addressed.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, "navigable waters uniquely
implicate sovereign interests." 19 It has traced the protections for public rights in
water to the fustitutes of Justinian, 20 which stated that '"[r]ivers and ports are
public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common .... "'21
Such principles also have a long history in English common law: 22 "[t]he
Magna Carta provided that the Crown would remove 'all fish-weirs ... from
the Thames and the Medway and throughout all England, except on the sea
coast."' 23
The recognition of public interests and rights in waters has led to the
division of title in navigable waters between thejus privatum andjus publicum.
The jus privatum is the naked legal title to submerged lands, which may in fact
end up in private ownership. 24 However, private title to such lands generally
excludes the difficult-to-alienate jus publicurn, which protects public access to
and rights to use navigable waters. 25 The jus publicum may be protected legally
I 8. For more ex1ensive discussions of the public trust doctrine's history, see Barton H. Thompson,
The Public Trust Doctrine: A Consen•ative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 50-54
(2006); Eric Nelson, 11,e Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OITTL0OK J.
131, 13µ0 (2006); George D. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, n,e Public Trust Doctrine and
Natural Law: Emanations within a Penumbra, 33 BOSTON C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 310-14 (2006);
Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 5, at 24-30; Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae.
and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL 'y F. 57, 61-86 (2005); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 7l IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-36 (1986);
Joseph L. Sax, supra note 4, at 475-78.
19. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,284 (1997).
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841 )).
22. "The special treatment of navigable waters in English law was recognized in Bracton's time.
He stated that '[a]II rivers and ports are public, so that the right to fish therein is common to all persons.
The use of river banks, as of the river itself, is also public."' Id. (quoting 2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGmus ET
CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 40 (S. Thome transl. 1968)).
23. Id. (quoting M. EVANS & R JAC~ SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTilVrI0NAL
HlsT0RY 53 (1984), and citing Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410-13 (1842) ("tracing
tidelands trusteeship back to Magna Carta")).
24. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' Exclusive Economic
Zone: Twenty-Fil•e Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust
Doctrine, 36 Ec0LOGY L.Q. I, 25, 42 (2009); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): /nstilhng a
Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 122-23 (2009); Charles G. Stevenson, Title of
Land under Water in New York, 23 YALE L.J. 397,399, 402-03 (I 914).
25. See Idaho ,,. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 284, 286 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 13 (1894)); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1934); Ill. Cent. RR Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387,458,466 (1892).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM

2-CRAJG

60

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 37:53

in a number of ways. For example, in 1838, the U.S Supreme Court concluded
that because
the Potomac river is a navigable stream, a part of the jus publicum, any
obstruction to its navigation would, upon the most established principles,
be what is declared by law to be a public nuisance. A public nuisance being
the subject to criminal jurisdiction, the ordinary and regular proceeding at
law is by indictment or information, by which the nuisance may be abated;
and the person who caused it may be punished. If any particular individual
shall have sustained special damage from the erection of it, he may
maintain a private action for such special damage; because to that extent he
has suffered beyond his portion of injury, in common with the community
at large. 26
Thus, according to the Court, the quintessential protection of the jus publicum
is a public nuisance lawsuit, preferably brought by the states themselves.
Private individuals may protect the jus publicum, but only to the extent that
they have suffered unusual private damages.
Building on this history, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 adopted the New
York courts' view that:
"The title to lands under tide waters, within the realm of England, were by
the common law deemed to be vested in the king as a public trust, to
subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for
commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his proprietary
interest, could grant the soil so that it should become private property, but
his grant was subject to the paramount right of public use of navigable
waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge....
"The principle of the common law to which we have adverted is
founded upon the most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and
navigable rivers are natural highways, and any obstruction to the common
right, or exclusive appropriation of their use, is injurious to commerce, and,
if permitted at the will of the sovereign, would be very likely to end in
materially crippling, if not destroying, it. The laws of most nations have
sedulously guarded the public use of navigable waters within their limits
against infringement, subjecting it only to such regulation by the state, in
the interest of the public, as is deemed consistent with the preservation of
the public right." 27

26. Mayor of City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co .• 37 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1838).
27. lll. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 458 (quoting People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71,
1877 WL I 1834, at •3 (1877)); see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 11 ("By the common law, both the title and
the dominion of the sea. and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the
lands below high-water mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of England. are in the king. Such
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of
ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are
public in their nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the
purpose of fishing by all the king's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privaturn, in such lands, as of waste
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Thus, as a matter of both public policy and international consensus, the
Supreme Court early on connected the overall protection of public rights in
navigable waters to the protection and promotion of commerce and economic
growth.
Moreover, the federal government's early conveyances of title to riparian
properties in federal patents also reflect these public values. Grants of land
bordering navigable streams generally conveyed title that extended only to the
stream, which remained a "public highway." 28 Grants of land bordering rivers
above tide-water conveyed exclusive right and title to the center of the stream,
unless otherwise specified, but the public retained an easement or right of
passage along navigable streams-waters navigable for "boats and rafts." 29 In
other words, in the tidally influenced navigable waters, private landowners
claiming title through federal patents had no property rights sufficient to
interfere with public rights of commerce and navigation. Moreover, the U.S.
Supreme Court extended this rule to federal patents of land bordering
navigable-in-fact waters. 30
Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that protecting public
rights in water, and limiting interfering private rights, promotes the overall
well-being of the nation by promoting navigation, trade, and commerce. These
and other public policy considerations remain relevant to the western states'
implementation of their public trust doctrines.

II.

FEDERAL LAW COMPONENTS OF STAlE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the submerged lands beneath navigable waters are subject to special
considerations because of their connections to sovereignty. However, the
sovereignty to which the Court usually refers, at least in the public trust
context, is state sovereignty. In 1842, the Court declared that "when the
(American] revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable

and unoccupied lands, belongs to the king. as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is
vested in him, as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.").
28. Saint Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. 272,287 (1868).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) (stating as a general rule that
private title to lands under navigable-in-fact waters extends only to the high-water mark); Shively, 152
U.S. at 11, 49-50 (adopting the English common law rule that federal conveyances go to the high-water
mark). In the most generalized sense, waters are ..navigable in fact" when they can actually be used for
navigation, regardless of their immediate connection to the sea. Thus, in the United States, the adoption
of a "navigable in fact" test reflected a need to move away from the English tidal test, where waters are
deemed ..navigable" only if they are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. That said, however, defining
"navigable in fact" has become a bit of an art in American water law, and several definitions potentially
apply, depending on the regulatory context. For a taste of these complications, see infra notes 46-58 and
the accompanying text.
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waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the
rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general government." 31
The Supreme Court's most explicit articulation of the public trust doctrine
is found in the 1892 case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jllinois. 32 The
decision had the effect of reifying the doctrine's existence in American law
while simultaneously adapting it to the particular conditions of the United
States. Moreover, Illinois Central Railroad provided an apparent federal law
basis for many later state pronouncements of their own public trust doctrines.
The legal basis-federal common law, federal constitutional law, or state
law-for some aspects of the Court's pronouncements regarding the public
trust doctrine, such as the alienability of public trust lands, is questionable. 33
Such haziness of source, however, did not prevent many western statesparticularly Arizona-from adopting the Supreme Court's statements as
binding federal law. As Richard Lazarus has observed, "[s]tate courts have
repeatedly turned to [ federal pronouncements] in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to justify rejecting or at least carefully scrutinizing
shortsighted or even corrupt legislative attempts to convey into private hands
critical coastal or inland waterway resources." 34
The states' implementations of their own public trust doctrines began with
the assertion of state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters. In
the context of title disputes between the federal and state governments (as
opposed to title disputes between state governments and private landowners),
the question of title to these beds and banks is clearly a matter of federal law. 35
Western states such as Oregon and Utah played pivotal roles in developing the
jurisprudence of "state title navigability," which uses one definition of
"navigable waters" to determine whether a state has title to the beds and banks
of-and hence control over-a given waterway, 36 further evidencing the
western states' interests in controlling their fresh waters.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that, once federal law has
conferred title to the beds and banks of navigable waters on a particular state,
that state has broad authority to redefine the property rights between itself and

31. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 4 IO (1842).
32. Ill. Cent. R.R, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
33. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 639-40 ("It is far from clear what source of law
the Court was drawing upon to reach its result."); Appleby v. City of New York. 271 U.S. 364, 395
(1926) (stating that the alienability ruling in Illinois Central was based on state law).
34. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 640.
35. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
36. Definitions of"navigable waters" vary among legal contexts. For example, "navigable waters"
are defined differently for: (1) state title purposes; (2) the federal Commerce Clause power; (3) federal
jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water Act; (4) federal jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors
Act; (5) federal jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act; and (6) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
JOSEPHJ. KALo ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 30 (3d ed. 2006).
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its citizens. 37 Similarly, the states have broad authority to define the public and
private rights in navigable waters themselves. 38

A.
1.

State Ownership and Control ofSubmerged Lands

The Basic Rules

The original thirteen states acquired title to beds and banks underlying
tidal and, as would later be confirmed, navigable-in-fact nontidal waters as a
result of their conquest of England. 39 All other states-including all of the
western states-acquired ownership of the beds and banks of these waters upon
their statehood as a result of the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which all
subsequent states were admitted with the same rights as the original thirteen. 40
A given state's title to tidal and navigable waters is fixed as of the date of its
admission to the United States. 41
Under federal law, the default rule and strong presumption is that a state
owns the beds of the navigable waters within its borders.42 Sovereign
ownership of tidal waters-waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tidearises as a direct adoption of English common law. 43 Moreover, the U.S.
Supreme Court clarified in 1988 that states own the beds of all tidal waters,
whether or not those waters are navigable-in-fact. 44 State title, however, is
"subject always to the paramount right of [C]ongress to control ... navigation
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations
and among the states. "45
37. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,380 (1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661,669 (1891); Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 40 (1894); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 370-72 (l977)(overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)).
38. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 176 (1918).
39. Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 317-18, ol'erruled on other grounds by Con•allis Sand &
Gral'e/ Co., 429 U.S. at 370-72; Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at IO; Den ex dem. Russell v. Ass'n of
Jersey Co., 56 U.S. 426, 432 (1853); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee,41 U.S. 367,410(1842).
40. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,272 (2001); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283-84 (1997); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544,551 (1981); Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 317-18; United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); Shively, 152 U.S. at 48-50; Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'ners, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873); Mumford v. Wardell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,436 (1867).
41. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 370-71 (citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
498 ( 1839)).
42. See Idaho,,. United States, 533 U.S. at 272-73; Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at
282; United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 34; Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193,
197-98 (1987); Montana,,. United States, 450 U.S. at 552; Shi,•ely, 152 U.S. at 26-50 (1894).
43. Ill. Cent RR Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435 (1892); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324, 336-38 (1876).
44. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1988).
45. See lll. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435; see also Pollard's Leesee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223
(1845).
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In contrast, state ownership of non-tidal "navigable-in-fact" waters was a
federal adaptation of English law to American realities. Thus, for example, the
Great Lakes "possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the
freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide,"
and hence "there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and
sovereignty over and ownership by the state of lands covered by tide waters
that is not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty
over lands covered by the fresh waters of these lakes."46 Even earlier decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a "navigable-in-fact" test for inland
rivers and streams. 47 However, waters must be navigable-in-fact as of the date
of the state's admission into the union. 48

2.

The Federal Test ofNavigability for Navigable-in-Fact Waters

As noted, state title to the beds and banks of navigable-in-fact waters is a
question of federal law, determined in accordance with the federal test of
navigability for state title. 49 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not been
uniformly consistent in how it defines "navigable" waters for these purposes.
Under the classic test of navigability from The Daniel Ball, waters
are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States
within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the
navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by
water. 50
The Daniel Ball test thus closely aligns navigability with usefulness in
interstate commerce, suggesting that waterways must be navigable by fairly
large boats and ships.

46. fl/. Cent. RR, 146 U.S. at 435-37.
47. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (holding that the English
common law tidal test has no applicability in the United States)~ Barney, 94 U.S. at 336 (stating that,
"[i]n this country, as a general thing, all waters are deemed navigable which are really so").
48. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28
(1894)~ Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367,410, 316-17 (1842)); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
49. Utah v. Uni1ed Slates, 403 U.S. at 10 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) at 563).
50. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563~ see also Utah,,. United States, 403 U.S. at 1011 (citing The Daniel Ball as the first important test of navigability for state title purposes and stating
that that test applies to all waters, not just rivers).
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However, the Supreme Court has also stated that a waterway is navigable
when it is useful for trade, agriculture, or commerce by any kind of vessel. For
example, in The Montello, the Court concluded:
It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was
capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated
as a public highway. The capability of use by the public for purposes of
transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of
a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its
natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what
mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes
in law a public river or highway. Vessels of any kind that can float upon the
water, whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or by the agency of
steam, are, or may become, the mode by which a vast commerce can be
conducted, and it would be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in
determining the navigability of a river. It is not, however, as Chief Justice
Shaw said, "every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe
can be made to float at high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order
to give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and
commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture." 51
Moreover, in the course of adjudicating the navigability of waterbodies in
western states, the Court has emphasized that the water need not be "part of a
navigable or interstate or international commercial highway" in order for the
state to take title to its bed. 52
Thus, depending on where a state court wants to focus its attention, the
U.S. Supreme Court's statements regarding navigability for state title purposes
allow for both liberal and stringent approaches to claiming title and, as a
consequence, asserting and protecting public rights. The Court itself, however,
attempted to reconcile its various definitions of navigability in two cases from
the 1930s involving allegedly navigable waters in Utah and Oregon. The 1931
Utah case resolved Utah's claims of title to the submerged lands beneath the
Green, Grand, and Colorado Rivers in Utah's favor. 53 The Court first reiterated
that states received title to the submerged lands of navigable waters, while the
federal government retained title to those beneath non-navigable waters, with
the question of title navigability to be resolved by federal law. 54 It then
established a definition of navigability that attempts to unify prior definitions

51.

The Montello, 87 U.S. (11 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).

52. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931);
United States l'. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14).
53. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 89.
54. Id. at 74. Given the last point, the Utah legislature's declaration that the three rivers were
navigable was ofno binding effect. Id. at 75 n.6.
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from The Daniel Ball, The Montello, and Holt State Bank. 55 After reviewing
previous holdings on navigability, the Utah Court explained that:
The extent of existing commerce is not the test. The evidence of actual use
of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for commercial
purposes may be most persuasive, but, where conditions of exploration and
settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily
proved. 56
As a result, the presence of sandbars that occasionally impeded navigation did
not make the three rivers non-navigable because the rivers were still generally
susceptible to use as channels of commerce. 57
Four years later, applying the same test, the Supreme Court determined
that Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Hamey Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef in
Oregon were not navigable. According to the Court's findings:
Neither trade nor travel did then [at statehood] or at any time since has or
could or can move over said Divisions, or any of them, in their natural and
or ordinary conditions according to the customary modes of trade and
travel over water; nor was any of them on February 14, 1859 (Oregon's
date of statehood] nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of
being used in the natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent
or other highways or channels for useful or other commerce. 58
In contrast, under the same consolidated federal test, the Great Salt Lake was
navigable, and its beds owned by Utah, because of its use as a channel of
commerce, despite its not being part of an interstate or international network. 59

55. United States v. Holt State Banlc, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). In Holt State Bank, the U.S. Supreme
Court detennined the navigability of Mud Lake in Minnesota. After emphasizing that the lower courts
erred in using a local state standard of navigability instead of a federal standard, id. at 55, the Court
applied the federal navigability test from The Montello. Specifically, the Court stated that:
The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution and laws of the
United States is that streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as
navigable in law~ that they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water, and further that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such use
is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of
occasional difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its
natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.

Id. at 56 (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. at 439).
56. Unites States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82.
57. Id. at 86.
58. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 15 (citing Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56; United States
v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 76; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922);
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113,
122-23 (1921); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899); The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
59. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971).
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Exceptions to State Title in the Western States

Although the presumption is that western states received title to the beds
and banks of the navigable rivers within their borders, most western states
existed as federal territories for some time before achieving statehood. As a
result, state title in the West, far more than in the East, is subject to prior
federal conveyances and reservations of title to navigable waters.
For example, when the federal government reserved navigable waters to
some federal purpose before the date of statehood ( or unappropriated waters
even after statehood), those navigable waters remain in federal ownership.
Many such reservations in the West benefit Indian tribes. For example, the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations own the bed under portions of the
Arkansas River in Oklahoma, 60 and the Osage Tribe owns the lands beneath
the Arkansas River flowing along the Osage Indian Reservation. 61 Similarly,
the United States holds title to Coeur d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River in
Idaho in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 62
Other reservations, however, serve other federal purposes. Thus, the State
of Alaska did not receive title to any of the submerged lands within the
boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve or the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge. 63
In addition, the federal government retains title to lands under some
waters, especially coastal waters, as an aspect of its fundamental sovereignty.
For example, Alaska does not have title to the submerged lands in the lower
inlet of Cook Inlet because the state could not show a sufficient exercise of
sovereignty historically to make these waters a "historic bay," leaving title to
the inlet in the federal government. 64
Finally, federal patents granted to private individuals before the date of
statehood can affect both a state's title to submerged lands and the application
of the state's public trust doctrine. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has
made clear that California cannot enforce any public trust easement over
tidelands that the federal government conveyed to private individuals pursuant
to the Act of 1851 if the federal patent makes no mention of a public
easement.65

60. Chocktaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 ( 1970)~ United States v. Cherokee
Nation ofOklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 70 I (I 987).
61. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co., 260 U.S. at 86-87.
62. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,272 (200 I).
63. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 36-46 (1997).
64. United States v. Alaska,422 U.S. 184, 200-04 (1975).
65. Summa Corp. v. Cal. ex rel. State Lands Comm'n. 466 U.S. 198, 20~9 (1984).
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Superiority ofthe Federal Interest in Navigation

Despite state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the
federal government retains a paramount interest in maintaining navigation in
the navigable waters. This interest is one of the most basic manifestations of the
federal government's Commerce Clause powers, but it can also serve to
reinforce the public values in navigable waters protected by the public trust
doctrine.
One aspect of this paramoW1t federal navigation interest is the federal
navigation servitude. The main import of the federal navigation servitude is that
government actions to maintain navigation do not require the government to
compensate private persons and entities for injuries to private property rights. 66
For example, as early as 1829 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that
[l]aws in relation to roads, bridges, rivers and other public highways, which
do not take away private rights to property, may be passed at the discretion
of the legislature, however much they may effect common rights; even
private rights, if they are not those of property, may be taken away, if it be
deemed necessary consequence of their construction, without making
compensation. 67
Thus, with respect to navigation, public values can intrude upon private.
Another aspect of the navigation interest is the federal government's
continuing right to regulate interstate commerce. This right, while
distinguishable from regulating navigation per se, nevertheless has substantial
overlaps with navigation concerns. 68 Moreover, W1der the Supremacy Clause,69
Congress's regulation of interstate commerce in navigable waters will trump
any conflicting state regulation. 70
Finally, in the context of water law, the federal government's paramount
interest in navigation may, in extreme cases, limit the rights of western
appropriators to destroy public values in any waters that become navigable,
even if they are not so at the point of diversion. In an 1899 case, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the propriety of the complete diversion of the Rio
Grande River in New Mexico, where it is not navigable. The Court concluded

66.
156-58,
67.
68.
69.

Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-76 (1897)~ Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141,
163-65 (1900).
Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 n. l ( 1829).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11-20, 64-69, 71-79 (1824).
The Supremacy Clause states:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
70. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 71-79, 89-96.
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that such upstream diversions could not interfere with the federal government's
downstream interest in maintaining navigability, for two reasons:
First, . . . in the absence of specific authority from [C]ongress, a state
cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right of the United States, as the
owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters,
so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the
government property; second, ... it is limited by the superior power of the
general government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all
navigable streams within the limits of the United States. In other words, the
jurisdiction of the general government over interstate commerce and its
natural highways vests in that government the right to take all needed
measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable water courses of the
country, even against any state action. 71
The Court has reaffirmed these potential limitations on the destruction of
downstream navigability in subsequent cases. 72

B.

The Supreme Court's Delineation of an American Public Trust Doctrine
and the Limitations the Doctrine Imposes on States 73

The U.S. Supreme Court most clearly announced the existence of a public
trust doctrine in American law in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jllinois. 74
According to that decisio~ a state holds title to submerged lands,
[b ]ut it is a title different in character from that which the state holds in
lands intended for sale .... It is a title held in trust for the people of the
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties. 75
Thus, the three public uses of waters that a public trust doctrine generally
protects are navigation, commerce, and fishing. 76
In addition, according to the Illinois Central Railroad Court, the doctrine
acts as a restraint on the state's ability to alienate the beds and banks of

71. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
72. See, e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 159-60 (1935).
73. As discussed supra, the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court based some of these
limitations-especially the restraint on alienation-on federal law that could preempt state law is highly
debatable. As a result, states vary in how "binding,., they consider the Court's articulations of public trust
doctrine restraints. although most have followed lllinois Central Railroad's restrictions.
74. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For discussions of the history of this case and its relationship to state
public trust doctrines, see generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill. The Origins of the
American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799
(2004); Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from lllinois Central
Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849 (2001); Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in
State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713 ( 1996).
75. lll. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453.
76. Id.; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 13 (1894) (emphasizing the public rights of
fishing and navigation).
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navigable waters or to abdicate regulatory control over those waters. The Court
described the trust as essentially prohibiting a state from abdicating its general
control over lands under navigable waters, such as by granting very large
parcels to development interests: "The control of the state for the purposes of
the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting
the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining." 77 This
restraint on alienation-and its perception as a federal law requirement-has
been important in several western states, notably Arizona. 78
C.

A Note on Federal Law, Prior Appropriation,
and Non-Navigable Waters in the West

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that western
states adopted prior appropriation as their dominant water law. In the Act of
July 26, 1866, Congress began to formally recognize prior appropriation's
ascendancy over riparian rights in the West. 79 In the Desert Land Act of
1877,80 as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it both subjected non-navigable
waters to prior appropriation and gave western states control over those waters.
The Desert Land Act applies to lands in California, Oregon, Nevada,
Colorado, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New
Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota that were public at the time of
enactment. 81 In other words, it applies to all states discussed in this Article
except Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Hawai'i, and Alaska. In the Act,
Congress recognized that reclamation, large-scale development, and movement
of fresh water would be necessary in order to settle the arid western lands. 82 As
a result, according to the Supreme Court, Congress both severed non-navigable
waters from the public lands, ending common-law riparian rights, 83 and gave
control over water rights in those waters to the states. 84
Thus, through the Desert Land Act and statutes like it, Congress allowed
western states to assert ownership and control over non-navigable waters as
well as navigable, even though the states did not own the beds and banks
77. III. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452-53.
78. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 726--28 (Ariz. App. 2001) (relying on
Illinois Central Railroad to conclude that the restraint on alienation of submerged lands is a commonlaw rule grounded in the Constitution that invalidates the Arizona legislature's attempts to disclaim or
restrict state ownership of those lands).
79. ActofJuly26, 1866,c.262,§9, 14Stat.251,251.
80. 43 u.s.c. § 321 (2008).
81. Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 165 (1935).
82. Id. at 157-58.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 163-64; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 n.5 (1976); Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,612 (1945); Ickes v. Fox., 300 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1937) (all confirming the import
of the Desert Land Act).
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beneath those waters. As will be discussed in more detail, this ability to declare
state ownership of all water has been an important component of many western
states' public trust doctrines.

III. WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES:
TRENDS AND APPROACHES TO PUBLIC RIGHTS IN WATER

In the western states, the Illinois Central Railroad Court's pronouncements
regarding the public trust doctrine have generally been interpreted as defining
the doctrine's minimal applicability in terms of waters covered, uses protected,
and restraints on state authority to eliminate the public trust. The courts in
several western states--especially Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and
Nebraska-have largely adhered to this "minimalist" public trust doctrine,
while Nevada courts simply lack sufficient public trust statutes to have effected
any state-law expansions of the doctrine.
The other thirteen western states, however, have added important state-law
dimensions to the scope of the public trust doctrine as it operates within their
respective borders. These states have used a variety of legal techniques to
protect and expand public rights in the waters of each state: redefining
"navigable" waters for state law purposes; expanding the list of protected
public uses beyond navigation, fishing, and commerce; and extending public
rights and public trust principles to all state waters, regardless of who owns the
beds and banks.
More recently, several states have extended the concept of a public trust in
waters to environmental protection-what this Article refers to as the
"ecological public trust." California and Hawai'i have most extensively
developed their ecological public trust doctrines, but nascent ecological public
trusts are detectable in several other western states as well.
In addition, as a result of the variety of elements on which state law might
operate-the definition of "navigable," the uses protected, extensions to all
water, and/or inclusion of ecological considerations-the western states' public
trust doctrines have become highly individualistic. Thus, the import of public
trust principles is now largely a matter of state common law, sometimes
supplemented by state statutes, rather than any kind of straightforward
application of the U.S. Supreme Court's statements from Illinois Central
Railroad.
A.

Adaptations ofthe Public Trust Doctrines to Particular State
Circumstances and Public Policies

Courts and, to a lesser extent, legislatures in western states often clearly
connect the state's public trust doctrine to larger issues of state public policy. In
states where these larger public policies include recognition of actual or
potential loss of the public values of fresh water, more robust public trust
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doctrines are often the result. In contrast, in states where public policies favor
private rights, more restricted public trust doctrines have been the norm.
Arizona, for example, is an example of the latter kind of state-so much so
that legislative attempts to restrict the state's public trust doctrine have
prompted repeated interventions by the Arizona courts. 85 By statute, Arizona
limits "navigable waters"-and its public trust doctrine-to those waters
subject to the federal equal footing doctrine. 86 In contrast, Hawai'i courts are
acutely aware of the scarcity of fresh water in the state and have subordinated
private water rights to the public interest in preserving the state's "natural
bounty." 87
States that seek to preserve the public interest in waters have used a
variety of legal techniques for doing so. For example,· the North Dakota
Supreme Court adapted the state's law regarding shifting rivers to protect the
public rights in those rivers:
The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would
receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by
1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands
and modify common law so that the state's title would follow the
movement of the bed of the river. This accords with underlying public
policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to
foster the public's right of navigation, traditionally the most important
feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to use that other
important aspects of the state's public interest, such as bathing, swimming,
recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water
supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new
riverbed, not the old. 88
To address a different threat to public rights in waters, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title purposes from
navigability for public use purposes. Using a pleasure boat test of navigability,
it protects its smaller rivers and the recreational and aesthetic amenities that

85. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. App. 2001); San Carlos Apache Tribe
v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999); Calmat of Ariz. v. State
ex rel. Miller, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. App. 1992); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v.
Hassell, 837P.2d 158, 162-73 (Ariz. App. 1991).
86. As such, a "navigable watercourse" for purposes of both state title and the application of the
public trust doctrine is
a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was
susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for commerce,
over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(5) (LexisNexis 2009). "Public trust lands" are limited to the beds of these
navigable watercourses. Id. § 37-1130(8).
87. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311-12 (Haw. 1982).
88. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D.
1988).
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they provide. It found, for instance, "that the Kiamichi River is one of the
beautiful streams of southeastern Oklahoma that has for many years been
known as one of the best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for
fishing, recreation, and pleasure" and extended legal protections to those public
uses and values. 89
More extensively, courts in California have explicitly and repeatedly
emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters "constitute a resource
which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the
ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state." 90
Moreover, the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to
be adaptable and evolving, noting that "[t]he objective of the public trust has
evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses
of waterways. " 91 It recognizes that the trust traditionally protects navigation,
commerce, and fishing, but also has expansively announced that public trust
rights "have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for
boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and
to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other
purposes. " 92
The Texas courts, similarly, have noted that "[t]he purpose of the State
maintaining title to the beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the
public's interest in those scarce natural resources."93 As such, "the State, as
trustee, is entitled to regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its
citizens' health and safety and to conserve natural resources. " 94
Oregon has used a variety of legal mechanisms to acknowledge and
protect the public interests in tidal and navigable-in-fact waters. Like in
California, the Oregon courts view the state's waters as a limited and precious
resource:
The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water
resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of
such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of

89. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969).
90. State v. Superior Court (Lyons). 625 P.2d 239,242 (Cal. 1981).
91. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)); see also Pers. Watercraft Coal. v. Marin County Bd. of
Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 437 (CaJ. Ct. App. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is "sufficiently
flexible to encompass changing public needs" (citations omitted)).
92. Marks, 491 P.2d at 379-80 (Cal. 1971); see also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d
362, 365 (Cal. 1980); Graf v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
93. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.2d 34, 49
(Tex. App. 2005).
94. Id. (citing Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see
also Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1983)
("The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for
navigation pwposes." (citing Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex. 1926))).
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the resources and its fundamental importance to our society and our
environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore,
the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries
once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public and,
accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public
trustee. 95
Thus, in applying the public trust doctrine, the Oregon courts have noted that
"lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and limited
resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their preservation
for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and recreation." 96 As a
result, "[u]nder the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of such
waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related
purposes. " 97
Moreover, like Oklahoma, 98 Oregon has refined its definition of
navigability to reflect the physical realities and public policy priorities of the
state. Thus, Oregon early on adopted a log floatation test for navigability
because that rule
best accords with common sense and public convenience, for these rapid
streams, penetrating deep into the mountains, are the only means by which
timber can be brought from these rugged sections, without great labor and
expense; and by their use large tracks of timber, otherwise too remote or
difficult of access, can be rendered of great value, as the country shall grow
and timber become scarce. 99
Finally, unusually (but not uniquely) 100 among states, Oregon has employed
the doctrine of custom to ensure public access to dry sand beaches not
protected by the public trust doctrine. 101 As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court
concluded that no taking of private property had occurred when the state denied
landowners permits to build sea walls. 102
Other states have also used some of these mechanisms to adapt the public
trust doctrine to the particular public interests and policies of that state. For
example, by statute, and for purposes of establishing public rights in waters,
Alaska defmes a "navigable water" to be:

95. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands. 581 P.2d 520. 524 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). affd, 590 P.2d 709
(Or. 1979).
96. Id. at 523.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 89 and accompanying te>..1.
99. Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455,458 (1869).
100. Because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai'i. that use "has ripened into a
customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court. favors extending to public use and ownership
as much of Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible." Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 6162 (Haw. I 973) (citing Oregon ex rel. Thorton v. Hay. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969)).
101. Oregon ex rel. Thornton. 462 P.2d at 673-78.
102. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach. 854 P.2d 449,451 (Or. 1993).
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any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek,
bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other
body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public
purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial
navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public
boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other
public recreational purposes .... 103
The public also has rights in "public waters," which by statute include not only
navigable waters, but also "all other water, whether inland or coastal, fresh or
salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for fish and
wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning of fish in
which there is a public interest ...." 104 These definitions and public rights
protections reflect Alaska's unique environmental and cultural circumstances.
Alaska, for example, is the only western state that explicitly identifies use of
waters by seaplanes as an important public use to be protected by law. In
addition, Alaska is a prime fishing state, and its statutory declarations of what
constitute public waters give special consideration to the use of waters not just
for fishing but also for spawning and migration, reflecting most obviously the
peculiarities of salmon life cycles; sahnon in Alaska are important to
commercial fishennen, recreational fishers and the recreation industry, and
Native Alaskans. 105 The public trust doctrines of Oregon 106 and Washington 107
similarly reflect the importance of salmon and shellfish, respectively, to those
states' citizens.

103. ALASKA STAT. ANN.§ 38.05.965(13) (2004).
I 04. Id. § 38.05.965(18).
I 05. Timothy J. Mullins, The Clean Water Initiar;l'es and the Proper Balance Between the Right to
Ballot /nUiatives and the Prohibition on Appropriations, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 135, 141, 168 (2009); Katy
Hansen, Rebecca Vernon, & Hana Bae, Supreme Court Preview, 56 FED. LAWYER 62, 62-63 (2009).
I 06. For example, Oregon's public trust responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As
a result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable ·waters violated the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in the Oregon Constitution. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065,
1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy, 47 P.2d 252,252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature
cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for salmon). Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over
navigable waters, it can regulate fishing. Oregon v. Nielsen, 95 P. 720, 722 (Or. 1908); Antony v.
Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Or. 1950). Specifically, fishing methods can be enjoined if they interfere
with the public's common right of fishing. Radich v. Frederckson, 10 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. 1932);
Johnson, 47 P.2d at 252.
107. "[I]n Washington, the public trust doctrine does not encompass the right to gather clams on
private property" because shellfish rights follow title to the submerged lands. Washington v. Longshore,
982 P.2d 1191, 1195-96 (Wash. App. 1999), aff'd, 5 P.3d 1256, 1259-03 (Wash. 2000) (en bane); see
also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Wash. State Dept of Natural Res., 101 P.3d 891, 895
(Wash. App. 2004) (noting that shellfish are not typical wildlife in Washington because they are
considered part of the land). However, state regulation of geoducks does not violate the public trust
doctrine.Id
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B. Public Ownership ofSubmerged Lands,
Public Ownership of Water, and Public Rights in Water

As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has most explicitly
connected public trust rights to navigable waters-that is, the waters in which
the state owns the beds and banks. Thus, in what might be called the stateproperty-based view of public trust doctrines, public rights follow state title to
submerged lands.
However, in the West, as noted, federal and state law both allow for-and
most states have declared 108-state or public ownership of the fresh waters
themselves, independent of ownership of submerged lands. This public aquatic
property right provides these states with another property law basis upon which
to recognize and expand public rights in water beyond those recognized in
traditional concepts of the public trust doctrine, as articulated in Illinois Central
Railroad. Thus, as was true for the eastern states, 109 most western states have
divorced public rights in waters from state or public ownership of the relevant
submerged lands, although the western states generally rely on different legal
mechanisms-such as state ownership of water-to do so.
Among the western states, Colorado and Idaho have most clearly adhered
to the strict and limited traditional view of public rights in their public trust
doctrines. Relying on the federal test of navigability, the Colorado Supreme
Court has declared almost all streams in Colorado to be non-navigable: "the
natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its territorial
limits, and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries,
and ... no stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries,
flows into or through this state." 1JO It then explicitly refused to follow the
"modem trend" and allow public rights in non-navigable rivers based on state
ownership of the water itself, concluding that the Colorado Constitution does
not preserve public recreation rights in such waters. 111 Instead, "[w]ithout
permission, the public cannot use such waters for recreation." 112
108. ALASKA CONST., art. VIII,§ 13; ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (2009); ARlz. REV. STAT.§ 4514l(A) (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. WATER CODE§ 1201 (2009); COLO. CONST., art. XVI, § 5; HAW.
CONST., art. XI, §§ J, 7; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (2009); MONT. CONST., art. IX, § 3(3); NEB.
CONST., art. XV,§ 5; NEV. REV. STAT.§ 533.025 (2008); N.M. CONST., art. XVI,§ 2; N.M. STAT.§ 721-J (2009); N.D. CONST., art. XI,§ 3; N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-01 (2009); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 537.010,
537.525 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 46-1-3 (2009); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.§ 11.02l(a) (Vernon
2009); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-1-1 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.03.010 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN.§
41-3-115(a) (2009).
109. Craig, supra note 6, at 14-16.
110. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220,222 (Colo. 1912), ol'erruled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); see also United States v.
Dist. Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of
the Colorado River, it is non-navigable).
111. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Colo. 1979).
112. Id. at 1029; see also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public
ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in
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In contrast, the Idaho courts until 1996 were following the western
"modem trend," indicating that water and "proprietary rights to use water . . .
are held subject to the public trust." 113 In 1996, however, Idaho's legislature
invalidated this line of cases, instead defining (and confining) the state's public
trust doctrine by statute. 114 These provisions declare that
[t]he public trust doctrine as it is applied in the state of Idaho is solely a
limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the
beds of navigable waters as defined in this chapter .... The public trust
doctrine shall not be applied to any purpose other than as provided in this
chapter, [especially not to' (t]he appropriation or use of water, or the
granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights ..
. or any other procedure or law applicable to water rights in the state of
Idaho [or to] [t]he protection or exercise of private property rights within
the state ofldaho. 115
Most other western states, however, have followed the "modem trend"
that the Colorado Supreme Court rejected. For example, according to the
Montana Supreme Court, "[t]he public trust doctrine in Montana's Constitution
grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of streams," and "[a]ll
waters are owned by the State for the use of its people." 116 As a result, "the
public has the right to use the water for recreational purposes and minimal use
of underlying and adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership
in water," even if the bed and banks are privately owned. 117 Nevertheless,
non-navigable streams; instead, the private landov.ner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative
rights can trump this common-law rule). Kansas takes the same approach:
Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of control of everything
above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions, and
regulations. Where the legislature refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in
non-navigable streams, courts should not alter the legislature's statement of public policy by
judicial legislation.
State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 136.µ:,5 (Kan. 1990). As a result, "[tJhe public has no right
to the use of nonnavigable water overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of
the landowner." Id. at 1365.
l 13. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983) (holding that "the public
trust doctrine takes precedence even over vested water rights.").
114. IDAHO CODE §§ 58-120 I to 58• 1203 (1996).
115. Id. §§ 58-1203(1), (2)(b), (c). These statutes define "navigable waters" as "those waters that
were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date of
statehood, under the federal test of navigability" and identify the line of "natural or ordinary high water
mark" as the boundary of the beds of navigable waters, in complete agreement with federal law. Id. §
58-1202(1).
116. Galt v. Montana, 731 P.2d 912,915 (Mont 1987) (emphasis added).
117. Id.; Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Mont. 1984)
(noting that underlying ownership of the bed does not matter for the public's recreational use right);
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that "under the
public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constirution, any surface waters that are capable of
recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for
nonrecreational purposes.").
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Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other
public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public
use rights. 118
New Mexico and North Dakota, similarly, have found constitutional and
statutory declarations that waters are publicly owned relevant to their public
trust doctrines. Thus, in 194 7, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared that all
waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated and that the public can
thus use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and fishing. 119 In 1976, North
Dakota declared that the public trust doctrine extends broadly to management
of the state's water resources, requiring the State Engineer to determine "the
potential effect of [a proposed] allocation of water on the present water supply
and future needs of this State," necessitating water resources planning. 120
More recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court decided to follow
"modern trend" decisions in Idaho (now overruled by statute), Montana, New
Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa to open all waters in
the state to public use. 121 As a result, the South Dakota Water Resources Act,
which governs allocation of appropriative water rights in the state, must now
work in tandem with the public trust doctrine:
[W]hile we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as
having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public
trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to
allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust
principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of
the public trust doctrine-"the people of the state have a paramount interest
in the use of all the water of the state," SDCL 46-1-1; "the state shall
determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and
underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit," SDCL
46-1-2; and "all water within the state is the property of the people of the
state." SDCL 46-1-3. 122
Moreover, when increased precipitation creates new lakes on private property,
"the State of South Dakota retains the right to use, control, and develop the
water in these lakes as a separate asset in trust for the public," and the public
trust doctrine applies independently of bed ownership. 123 In summary, "all
waters within South Dakota, not just those waters considered navigable under
the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the public." 124

118. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-11 l (2009).
119. State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 429-32 (N.M.
1947).
120. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461,
463 (N.D. 1976).
121. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 833-36 (S.D. 2004).
122. Id. at 838.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 838-39.
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Under Utah's statutes, waters are owned by the public, 125 and the Utah
Supreme Court has tied the need for public rights to water scarcity: water is "a
scarce and essential resource in this area of the country" that "is indispensable
to the welfare of all people; and the State must therefore assume the
responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the
people of the State as a whole." 126 Thus:
Under this "doctrine of public ownership," the public owns state waters and
has "an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed
beneath." In granting this public this easement, "state policy recognizes an
interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes."
This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within
the easement's scope. They include "the right to float leisure craft, hunt,
fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water." 127
Hence, bed ownership is irrelevant for the public's rights to use waters in the
state. 128 Moreover, "the scope of the public's easement in state waters provides
the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water
and does not limit the public to activities that can be perfonned upon the
water." 129 As a result, "the public has the right to touch privately owned beds
of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the
easement." 130
Finally, Wyoming, too, has extended public use rights to all waters based
on its ownership of the water itsel£ According to the Wyoming Supreme Court,
"the actual usability of the waters is alone the limit of the public's right to
employ them.")3] Except in federally navigable waters, "the exclusive control
of waters is vested in the state," and hence "[i]t follows that the state may lay
down and follow such criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or
nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and the state may also decide the ownership of
submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable or nonnavigable character of the
waters above them." 132 As a result, state ownership of the waters themselves
impresses those waters with a public trust. 133 The public can float craft down
any waters so usable, regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom,
disembark, and pull the craft over shoals. 134 Moreover, members of the public

125. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-1-J (2009).
126. JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
127. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co., 655 P.2d at
1137).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 901.
130. Id. at 901--02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users).
131. Dayv.Annstrong,362P.2d 137, 143(Wyo. 1961).
132. Id. at 143.
133. Id. at 145.
134. Id. at 14~6.
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can hunt or fish while floating. 135 However, public use rights do not give the
public the right to wade or walk on privately owned streambeds. 136

C.

The Emergence ofEcological Public Trust Doctrines in the West

As in eastern states, 137 most western states have expanded the protected
public rights in waters beyond the three acknowledged in Illinois Central
Railroad-navigation, fishing, and commerce-to recreation and other public
uses, including, in some states, aesthetics.1 38 Only Arizona (by statute) 139 and
Colorado (by case law 140) have intentionally limited public rights in waters,
Id. at 147.
Id. at 146.
137. Craig, supra note 6, at 17-19.
138. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN.§ 38.05.965(13) (2004) (defining "navigable waters" to include
waters that are usable for "floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping,
hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes"); Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (noting that public trust rights "have been held to include the
right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters
of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes");
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,448 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing broad public rights in
its waters, noting that "the trust has traditionally preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and
fishing" but also mentioning "a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, boating,
and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes"); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht
Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho 1983) (acknowledging recreation as a public trust right); Kansas
v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 640 (Kan. 1914) (protecting "the purposes for which [submerged land] has been
used from time immemorial, viz; the common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for
domestic, agricultural, and commercial purposes"); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322, 85-1111, 85-1-112, 85-16-102, 87-2-305 (2009) (codifying public rights of recreation, fishing, and
navigation); New Mexico ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 429-32
(N.M. 1947) (recognizing public rights of recreation, sports, and fishing); J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v.
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 1988) (recognizing bathing, swimming,
fishing, and irrigation as protected public interests); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla. 1969)
(acknowledging that the public can have rights of boating, recreation, and fishing in waters that are not
navigable under the federal title test); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App.
1978), aff'd, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979) (noting that public trust rights extend to recreation); Hillebrand v.
Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937) (listing sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking
water, and cutting ice as public uses)~ Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441,444 (Texas 1935)
(noting that public rights include hunting, fishing, navigation, "and other lawful purposes"); JJNP Co. v.
Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982) (noting that public rights include "the right to float leisure craft,
hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water"); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462
P.2d 232,239 & n.7 (Wash. 1969) (holding that in navigable waters, the public has rights of navigation,
"fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational" rights, which probably include
boating, bathing, fishing, fowling, skating, cutting ice, water skiing, and skin diving); Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137, 145-47 (Wyo. 1961) (holding that the public can float craft down any waters so usable,
regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over shoals and can
hunt or fish while floating).
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 37-1130(9) (LexisNexis 2009).
140. The Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado non-navigable.
Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), ove"uled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). In a non-navigable river, title
to the bed and banks belongs to the private landowner, giving the landowner exclusive control over the
vi.,ater and the right to exclude recreational users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing.
135.

136.
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although neither Nebraska nor Nevada has yet fully developed its public trust
law in this respect.
Such expanded public rights, however, still remain focused on public uses
of waters-not on the ecological and ecosystem services values of aquatic and
other ecosystems. Indeed, with the emergence of pervasive statutory
environmental and natural resources law in the 1970s and 1980s, both federal
and state, the need for broader public trust principles to protect ecological
values seemed highly questionable. Thus, Richard Lazarus concluded in 1986
that the day of "final reckoning" for the doctrine is here, or soon will be,
and reliance upon it is no longer in order .... [T]he law of standing, tort
law, property law, administrative law, and the police power have all
evolved in response to increased societal concern for and awareness of
environmental and natural resources problems and are weaving a new and
unified fabric for natural resources law. Whether these developments are
viewed as totally independent of the doctrine or, alternatively, as somehow
having subsumed the doctrine's principles does not matter. The conclusion
is the same from either perspective: much of what the public trust doctrine
offered in the past is now, at best, superfluous and, at worst, distracting and
theoretically inconsistent with new notions of property and sovereignty
developing in the current reworking of natural resources law. 141
Nevertheless, scholars continue to assert the need for expanded public
trust doctrines. For example, in 1991, Alison Rieser summarized the drive to
broaden public trust concepts as follows:
Due largely to recent decisions of the California courts, the notion that the
public has a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their
natural characteristics is finding its way into American law. Through
interpretation and expansion of the common law public trust doctrine, state
courts are identifying governmental duties to redefine existing private
property rights where such rights may threaten the ecological value of
natural areas. Courts have subjected to this special duty primarily
properties associated with navigable waters. Litigants and state agencies,
however, appear poised and willing to invoke the public trust doctrine with
respect to a number of other resources unrelated to navigation. Several
public trust commentators-including Professor Joseph Sax, the modem
doctrine's earliest and most prominent proponent-either urge or foresee a
continuing expansion in the doctrine's scope. Some predict that courts will
eventually apply public trust protections to all waterbodies, as well as to
such diverse resources as old growth forests, mountains, and wildlife. 142

People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for
floating down a non-navigable river).
141. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 658.
142. Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in
Search ofa Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. R.Ev. 393, 393-94 (1991). See generally Susan Morath Homer,
Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23
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More recently, Mary Christina Wood has argued for comprehensively
expanded public trust concepts in American environmental and natural
resources law to address emerging environmental crises and the impacts of
climate change. 143
Academic scholars' continuing revisitations of the public trust doctrine
suggest that the doctrine can provide remedies to perceived shortcomings in
environmental law and policy. Indeed, two drivers for these returns are
discernible in the literature. First, scholars often turn to the public trust doctrine
when they conclude that statutory law has not, in fact, been sufficient to protect
the full gamut of public interests in the environment. 144 For example, in light of
the acknowledged weaknesses in U.S. ocean and coastal law, 145 scholars with
interests in these areas have repeatedly suggested the public ·trust doctrine as a
means of better protecting coastal and marine resources. 146 Similarly, the
public trust doctrine has been of interest to scholars promoting the relatively
new-and hence statutorily slighted-conception of ecosystem services,

(2000); Gary D. Meyers, Variations on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 728-35 (1989).
143. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sol'ereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Enl'ironment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a
Pardign1 Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 43-45, 65-84 (2009).
144. "Under the system of environmental statutory laws enacted in the United States over the past
three decades, agencies at every jurisdictional level have gained nearly unlimited authority to manage
natural resources and allow their destruction by private interests through permit systems." Id. at 44; see
also id at 54--61 (discussing the failed paradigm of environmental law).
145. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2004); PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR
SEA CHANGE (May 2003).
146. See, e.g., Madeleine Reed, Seawalls and the Public Trust: Nal'igating the Tension between
Private Property and Public Beach Use in the Face ofShoreline Erosion, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
305 (2009); Turnipseed et al., supra note 24, at 1; F. Patrick Hubbard, The Impact of Lucas on Coastal
Development: Background Principles, The Public Trust Doctrine, and Global Warming, 16 SE. ENVTL.
L.J. 65 (2007); Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride
'Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007); Kevin J. Lynch, Note, Application of the Public
Trust Doctrine to Modern Fishery Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285 (2007); Ewa M.
Davison, Note, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington's Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of
Pedestrian Passage Over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV. 813 (2006); Kim Diana Connolly,
Bridging the Dil'ide: Examining the Role of the Public Trust in Protecting Coastal and Wetland
Resources, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2006); J.C. Sylvan, How to Protect a Coral Reef The Public Trust
Doctrine and the Law of the Sea, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 32 (2006); Kristen M. Fletcher,
Regional Ocean Governance: The Role of the Public Trust Doctrine, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
·187 (2006); Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property Rights
and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317 (2006); Monserrat Gorina-Yserri, World Ocean
Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries After Grotius-Towards a New Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 645 (2004); Donna R. Christie, Marine Resen•es, the Public Trust Doctrine and
Intergenerational Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427 (2004); Robin Kundis Craig, Mobil Oil
Exploration, Enl'ironmental Protection, and Contract Repudiation: It's Time to Recogni=e the Public
Trust in the Outer Continental Shelf. 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,104 (2000).
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acknowledging that ecosystems provide economically valuable services to
human beings. 147
Second, and more importantly, the articulation of a "public trust"
encapsulates a more general values system for the environment and its
ecosystems-an environmental ethos, if you will-that is longer-term in focus,
more comprehensive in its considerations, and more willing to preserve purely
public values than regulatocy law. Wood, for example, has recently argued that
there is a need for a fundamental paradigm shift in environmental and natural
resources law and has focused on the public trust doctrine as her model because
it is "the most compelling beacon for a fundamental and rapid paradigm shift
towards sustainability." 148 Moreover, the public trust doctrine provides one
well-grounded legal mechanism for re-balancing private and public rights in the
environment, and scholars increasingly perceive such a rebalancing to be
necessary. 149 Thus, the legal recognition of a "public trust" provides both a
rhetorically resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact and
functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to
act for the long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental
values-what I have termed the ecological public trust. 150
In many ways, however, the western states have anticipated these
scholarly calls for the expansion of public trust concepts to the environment
generally. While California is widely acknowledged to have evolved its public
trust doctrine into an ecological public trust (at least when navigable waters are
affected), it is not alone. Hawai'i has, if anything, an even broader ecological
public trust doctrine than California, and other western states are more
cautiously using public trust principles to expand the legally cognizable public
values in the environment.
The emergence of these ecological public trust doctrines represents the
leading edge of public trust common law. However, the ecological public trust
doctrines are also highly individualistic, underscoring the need for scholars to

147. See, e.g., Patrick J. Connolly, Note, Saving Fish to Save the Bay: Public Trust Doctrine
Protection/or Menhaden's Foundational Ecosystem Sen•ices in the Chesapeake Bay, 36 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 135 (2009); J.B. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, at 223.
148. Wood, supra note 143, at 45.
149. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 24, at 117 (arguing that "thirty years of statutory law has produced
an imbalanced picture in which public property rights are simply not in the equation," but that "public
trust law springs from the property realm and forces an adjustment of private property rights and
expectation to protect the people's property rights in common, vital assets"); see also Christine A. Klein,
The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155,
1158-67 (2007) (in the context of a nuisance law article, tracing the "supersizing.., of private property
rights and the demonization of public rights, interests, and values in the environment in law, policy, and
rhetoric to argue that public and private rights have become unbalanced in American culture and law).
150. Professor Wood has called this "Nature's Trust." Wood, supra note 143, at 65-84. In the
second of her two articles on this subject, she has discussed in detail the governmental obligations to
protect natural resources that she would impose through this expanded public trust. See Wood, supra
note 24, at 93-116.
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acknowledge public trust doctrines in the plural and to actively discern and
compare the common law evolutions of those doctrines in and among particular
states.

1.

California

It is no accident that Rieser tied the conception of an ecological public
trust to California. In the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney, the California
Supreme Court announced:
There is growing public recognition that one of the most important public
uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the
preseivation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. 151
In connection with Lake Tahoe litigation, the court soon extended its
recognition of ecological values to nontidal submerged lands as well,
underscoring the human-created scarcity and fragility of these resources. It
noted that "the [fresh water] shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its
original size in this state by the pressures of development. Such lands now
cover less than one half of I percent of the state ...." 152 Moreover,
The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the
environment necessary for the suivival of numerous types of fish (including
salmon, steelhead, and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species:
the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife
and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they
provide a gene pool for the preseivation of biological diversity. In addition,
the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of
good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and
erosion. 153
Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to "environmental .
purposes." 154
California courts have extended public trust concepts not just to aquatic
wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself, 155 creating "two distinct public
trust doctrines" in the state. 156 Wildlife "are natural resources of inestimable
151. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted).
152. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981 ).
153. Id.
154. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982).
155. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596-98 (Cal. a.
App. 2008) (citing Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Therrnalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989)).
156. According to the California Supreme Court:
First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government's "affirmative duty to take
the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources . . . ." The

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM

2-CRAIG

2010]

WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

85

value to the community as a whole. Their protection and preservation is a
public interest that is now recognized in numerous state and federal statutory
provisions," 157 and those statutes generally define the contours of the public
trust obligation regarding wildlife. 158 Members of the general public can sue to
enforce the wildlife public trust as well as the navigable water public trust,
because the public trust doctrine "places a duty upon the government to protect
those resources." 159
Within the navigable waters trust, moreover, public trust interests can
extend California's authority and duties beyond the navigable waters. For
example, "[t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or
otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated or
accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom of passage to and
from the public fishing grounds of the state." 160 Similarly, in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the "Mono Lake case"), 161 the California
Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could restrict or
require modifications in established water rights even in non-navigable
tributaries of navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake's
tributaries were imperiling "both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of
Mono Lake . . . ." 162 As a result, the public trust doctrine required

second is a public trust duty derived from statute, specifically Fish and Gatne Code section
711.7, pertaining to fish and wildlife: "The fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the
people of the state by and through the department." There is doubtless an overlap between
the two public trust doctrines - the protection of water resources is intertwined with the
protection of wildlife.... Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is
primarily statutory.
Envtl. Prot. & Infonnation Ctr. v. Cal. Dept of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 2008)
(quoting and citing Nafl Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983))~ see also Cal.
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (establishing
that Fish and Grune Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting "that it does not follow from
the application of the tenn 'public trust' to the state's interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that
all of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to nonnavigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based
upon a public trust fishery interest.").
157. Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598.
158. Id. at 599-600.
159. Id. at 600-01.
160. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 840; see also People v. Truckee Lumber Co.,
48 P. 374, 399-401 (Cal. 1897) (noting that "the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the
common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the
common law" and asserting that the state's authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in
navigable waters~ "[t]o the extent that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing
over lands entirely subject to private ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and
subject to all laws of the state regulating the right of fishery"); Cal. Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (concluding "that a public trust interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a
fishery").
161. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
162. Id. at 711.
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modifications in the prior appropriation system. 163 Specifically, "the public
trust doctrine ... protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of
non-navigable tributaries," 164 and "when the public trust doctrine clashes with
the rule of priority, the rule of priority must yield." 165
Nevertheless, despite its reputation as the vanguard of the ecological
public trust doctrine movement, California does limit the breadth of its
doctrine. In particular, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water
withdrawals from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on
navigable waters.1 66 Similarly, the California courts have declined to extend
the National Audubon doctrine to groundwater. 167 Thus, despite having
recognized a second, largely statutory, wildlife public trust doctrine, California
maintains a connection between its ecological public trust doctrine and the
traditional American source of public trust rights: state ownership of the beds
and banks of navigable waters.

2.

Hawai'i

Like California, Hawai'i recognizes two different public trust doctrinesin Hawaii's case, the navigable water public trust doctrine and a unique public
trust growing out of Hawaii's complex history and Native Hawaiian rights,
known as the water resources public trust. Both have contributed to a broad
ecological public trust perspective in the state that favors public rights over
private.
The Hawai'i water resources public trust doctrine has largely superseded
the navigable waters public trust in the context of water rights and fresh waters.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai'i, the
right to water was reserved to the people for their common good in all land
grants, and ownership of the water remained at all times in the people. 168 This
sovereign reservation imposed a public trust on the water itself, similar to but
different from the navigable waters public trust doctrine. 169

163. Id. at 712, 727-28.
164. Id. at 721.
165. El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468,490 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006).
166. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836,839 (1989).
167. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868,884 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); Cal. Water Network v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, Civil Nos. B177978, B181463, 2006 WL
726882, at * 11 (Cal. App. Dep 't Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not apply
to groundwater or non-navigable waterways, absent some impact on navigable waters).
168. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310-11 (Haw. 1982).
169. In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 9 P.3d at 441; Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310 (noting that
this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; "[t]he nature of this ownership is thus
akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways").
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Given the limited availability of fresh water resources in Hawai'i,
reassertion of this traditional water resources trust has been deemed critical,
both as against assertions of riparian rights and in light of the Hawai'i Water
Code and water use permits. With respect to riparian rights:
The reassertion of donnant public interests in the diversion and application
of Hawaii's waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the
resource and recognition of the public's interests in the utilization and flow
of these waters. . . . [W]hile there indeed exist relative usufructory rights
among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are
absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state. 170
Instead, "underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there
always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty." 171 Thus, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court has clearly re-balanced public and private interests in
these scarce resources in favor of the public.
With respect to the Hawai'i Water Code, "[t]he public trust in the water
resources of this state, like the navigable waters trust, has its genesis in the
common law .... The [State Water] Code does not evince any legislative intent
to abolish the common law public trust doctrine. To the contrary, . . . the
legislature appears to have engrafted the doctrine wholesale in the Code." 172 As
a result, the Hawai'i Water Code "does not supplant the protections of the
public trust doctrine," and "the public trust doctrine applies to all water
resources without exception or distinction," including ground waters. 173
As in California, Hawai' i may "revisit prior diversions and allocations,
even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust," in
implementing its water law. 174 Moreover,
the constitutional requirements of "protection" and "conservation," the
historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public
rights, and the common reality of the "zero-sum" game between competing
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment ...
175

As a result, the state water agency's decisions in favor of private uses of water
are subject to "higher scrutiny." 176 Finally, the state agency must consider the

170. Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311.
171. Id. at 312.
172. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 443 (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 445.
174. Id. at 409,452 (citations omitted).
175. Id at 454.
176. Id.~ see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93 P.3d 643,650,657 (Haw. 2004) (noting
that "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this
court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's
decisions" and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water).
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cwnulative impacts of diversions and "implement reasonable measures to
mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources." 177
Importantly, according to the Hawai'i Supreme Court, "the maintenance
of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct 'use' under the water
resources trust." 178 Thus, this public trust doctrine encompasses ecological
protection and preservation. To underscore that point, in expounding the water
resources trust, the Hawai'i Supreme Court explicitly has followed the
California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon Society. 179
Unlike in California, however, both of Hawaii's two water-based public
trusts are incorporated into the state's much broader constitutional public trust
doctrine. 180 The Hawai' i Constitution provides that:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all
natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources,
and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a
manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the selfsufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the
State for the benefit of the people. 181
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has indicated that these more general
constitutional public trust concepts extend to environmental and biodiversity
protection, such as regulation of the Palila, an endangered bird. 182 In 2006,
moreover, it explicitly connected the constitutionally incorporated navigable
waters public trust doctrine to environmental protection when it held that the
doctrine applies to the Hawai'i Department of Health's implementation of the
federal Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups asserted that the
Department violated the public trust doctrine by failing to prevent a developer
from violating state water quality standards for coastal waters, the court
concluded that state issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are subject to the public trust
doctrine and that the Department must ensure that water quality measures are
actually being implemented. l 83
3.

Other States

Other states besides California and Hawai'i have incorporated public trust
principles into resource management and ecological conservation, although not
177. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 409, 455 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 448.
179. Id. at 452 (adopting the reasoning ofNat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983)).
180. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1002 (Haw. 2006).
181. HAW. CONST., art. XI,§ 1.
182. Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005).
183. Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1009, 101 I.
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so extensively. For example, according to the Alaska Supreme Court, "(t]he
public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as
wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use and that government
owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such resources for the common good of the
public as beneficiary." 184 Moreover, while that court has made it clear that the
navigable waters public trust doctrine per se does not extend to wildlife
management, the state does have a duty under the Alaska Constitution to
manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people's benefit, "to
guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and to divest the
[government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources." 185 Thus, according
to the Alaska Supreme Court:
We have frequently compared the state's duties as set forth in Article VIII
to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as
fish, wildlife, and water in "trust" for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of
recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses per se, we have
noted that "the common use clause was intended to engraft in our
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife,
and water resources of the state." 186
Nevertheless, in general, the State of Alaska cannot be liable in damages under
the public trust doctrine for allowing the destruction of natural resources, such
as when beetles destroy trees. 187
There are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic
life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil
Court of Appeals declared:
The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic
life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs
subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this
State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish and
Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and
aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people ... , and pollution of
streams and water courses is condemned .... The Constitution of Texas,
Art. 16, § 59(a) ... designates rivers and streams as natural resources,
184. Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998). Nevertheless, mining is not an activity
protected by the public trust. Commercial uses protected under the Illinois Central Railroad decision are
commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over navigable waters, a
meaning which does not include mining. Most importantly, a mining claim is not a "public
use," but rather an exclusive, depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We
believe that even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust easements
would not include private mining enterprises.
Hayes v. A.J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1993).
185. McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1, 16 (Alaska 1989).
186. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (citation omitted). But see Pullen v.
Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish,
wildlife, and water resources, including salmon).
187. Brady v. Alaska, 965 P.2d I, 17 (Alaska 1998).
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declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature
with the preservation and conservation of such resources. 188

In 2005, moreover, the court indicated that the public trust doctrine allows the
state to "conserve natural resources." 189
Washington has also flirted with applying some version of a public trust
doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington Court of
Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the Washington
Department of Natural Resources' regulation of shellfish, such as geoducks. 190
Nevertheless, the Department's regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest
did not violate the public trust doctrine despite the public right to fish, because:
(1) the state must "balance the protection of the public's right to use resources
on public land with the protection of the resources that enable these activities";
(2) the Department had not given up its control over the state's geoduck
resources; and (3) the regulation facilitated sustainable geoduck harvesting and
natural regeneration of the resource, serving the public interest. 191 These
conclusions thus fairly clearly suggest that Washington is beginning to connect
public trust principles to sustainable development.
Similarly to Washington, North Dakota has considered the role of the
public trust doctrine with regard to more general ecological considerations but
has nevertheless continued to confine the doctrine's application to water
resources. The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged as early as 1976
that "[i]t is evident that the Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding
role in environmental law." 192 The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all
development, and hence the State Engineer can grant permits to drain wetlands,
especially when he studied the consequences, imposed permit conditions, and
was subject to a public interest requirement. 193 Nevertheless, the public trust
doctrine does limit the state's discretionary authority "to allocate vital state
resources," as enunciated in Illinois Central Railroad. 194 Nor is the doctrine
restricted to conveyances of submerged lands; "[t]he State holds the navigable
waters, as well as the lands beneath them, in trust for the public," as provided in
188. Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534,535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
189. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17. 175 S.W.2d 34, 49
(Tex. App. 2005).
190. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass•n v. Wash. State Dept. of Natural Res .• 101 P.3d 891,895
(Wash. App. 2004). But see Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. Washington. 103 P.3d 203,205
(Wash. App. 2004) ("No Washington case has applied the public trust doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or
resources. But we need not decide whether the public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial
hunting and trapping] because, even if it does, Citizens' challenge fails." (emphasis added)).
191. Wash. State Geoduck Han,est Ass 'n, 101 P.3d at 895, 896-97.
192. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463
(N.D. 1976).
193. In the Matter of the Application for Permits to Drain Related to Stone Creek Channel
Improvements and White Spur Drain, 424 N.W.2d 894, 901 (N.D. 1988) (citing United Plainsmen
Ass 'n, 247 N.W.2d at 463 (quoting Payne v. Kassab. 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Cmwlth 1973))).
194. United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d at 460.
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the North Dakota Constitution and refined by statute. 195 As a result, "protecting
the integrity of the waters of the State is a valid exercise of the [North Dakota
Water Commission's] duties," allowing it, for example, to control the drainage
of a lake. 196
More general-but also more embryonic-discussions of an ecological
public trust have also surfaced in South Dakota and Utah. The South Dakota
Supreme Court has determined that the state's Environmental Protection Act
embodies a broader public trust doctrine than the navigable waters public trust
alone would allow. 197 This Act "authoriz[es] legal action to protect 'the air,
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution,
impairment or destruction."' 198 Utah also appears to be extending its public
trust doctrine to ecological protection, because, according to the Utah Supreme
Court, "[t]he 'public trust' doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of
public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at
large." 199
CONCLUSION

In contrast to the many discussions over the years seeking to accurately
describe "the" public trust doctrine, this Article argues that the contemporary
power of public trust concepts lies not in tracing their historical bases but rather
in embracing their status as varying and evolving state common law. Like any
other category of state common law, such as early landlord/tenant law, tort law,
or contract law, state public trust doctrines both reflect historic concerns and
public policies-specifically, the particular public concerns regarding water in
particular locations of the United States-and provide the states with an
"ability to adapt to emerging societal needs. " 200 State courts on both sides of
the Hundredth Meridian have celebrated the flexible and evolutionary nature of
their public trust doctrines, 201 but scholars have been reluctant to embrace the
rich mixture of approaches to balancing public and private rights in water and
other natural resources that has emerged. 202

195. Id. at 461 (also noting that "[w]e believe that§ 61-01-01, NDCC, expresses the Public Trust
Doctrine.").
196. N.D. State Water Comrn'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254,258 (N.D. 1983).
197. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004).
198. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34A-10-1 (1973)).
199. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,919 (Utah 1993).
200. Wood, supra note 143, at 78.
201. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)~ Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355,365 (N.J. 1984).
202. See, e.g., David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Em•ironmental Hwnan Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 713-20 (2008) (laying out a singular public
trust doctrine). See generally James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 1 (2007) (discussing at length the "mythical"
history ofa singular American public trust doctrine).
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The western states, ranging from Hawai' i and California on one end of a
complex spectrum to Arizona and Colorado on the other, provide a particularly
instructive diversity of approaches to the recognition (or not) of public rights
in, and the public values of, water and other aspects of the environment. In
comparing the public trust doctrines of the western states, moreover, four
factors emerge as most important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines.
First, the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian
rights doctrine freed these states from one set of potentially confining private
property rights. Second, subsequent state declarations of public ownership of
fresh water allow western states' public trust doctrines to operate independently
of state title to submerged lands and federal pronouncements regarding "the"
public trust doctrine. Third, perceptions of shortages of fresh water, submerged
lands, and environmental amenities have prompted increased interest,
compared to the East, in preserving the public values in these resources.
Finally, the willingness of most western states to raise water and other
environmental issues to constitutional status and/or to incorporate broad public
trust mandates into statutes has encouraged their courts to evolve water-based
public trust principles into expanding ecological public trust doctrines.
As the most recent cases demonstrate, and despite occasional limiting
interventions by states legislatures (as in Idaho), the evolution of western state
public trust doctrines is not slowing. Instead, in true common law fashion, state
courts are using state public trust doctrines to respond to particular and
emerging state needs-the loss of native species and critical need to protect
coastal waters in Hawai'i; profound conflicts between appropriators, species,
and ecological values in California; and the perhaps climate-change driven
appearance of new publicly usable water resources in South Dakota. While
such evolutions and expansions complicate the identity-indeed, the very
existence-of any unitary, national, perhaps Constitution-based public trust
doctrine, they also provide place-based balancings of public and private needs
and values in that most basic of natural resources-fresh water-that may
better serve the long-term interests of the nation as a whole.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARIES OF INDNIDUAL STATE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

ALASKA
Date of Statehood:

1959

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

Alaska Constitution: Alaska has constitutionalized some of the access and
use rights guaranteed by the public trust doctrine. Article VIII of the Alaska
Constitution governs natural resources, including waters and submerged lands.
Relevant provisions of this Article include:
•
§ I: "It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement of its
land and the development of its resources by making them available
for maximum use consistent with the public interest."
•

§ 2: "The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development,
and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State,
including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people."

•

§ 3: "Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and
waters are reserved to the people for common use."

•

§ 5: "The legislature may provide for facilities, improvements, and
services to assure greater utilization, development, reclamation, and
settlement of lands, and to assure fuller utilization and development
of fisheries, wildlife, and waters."

•

§ 6: "Lands and interests therein, including submerged and tidal
lands, possessed or acquired by the State, and not used or intended
exclusively for governmental purposes, constitute the state public
domain. The legislature shall provide for the selection of lands
granted to the State by the United States, and for the administration
of the state public domain."

•

§ 8: "The legislature may provide for the leasing of, and the
issuance of permits for exploration of, any part of the public domain
or interest therein, subject to reasonable concurrent uses. Leases and
permits shall provide, among other conditions, for payment by the
party at fault for damage or injury arising from noncompliance with
terms governing concurrent use, and for forfeiture in the event of
breach of conditions."

•

§ 9: "Subject to the provisions of this section, the legislature may
provide for the sale or grant of state lands, or interests therein, and
establish sales procedures. All sales or grants shall contain such
reservations to the State of all resources as may be required by
Congress or the State and shall provide for access to these resources.
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Reservation of access shall not unnecessarily impair the owners'
use, prevent the control of trespass, or preclude compensation for
damages."
•

§ 13: "All surface and subsurface waters reserved to the people for
common use, except mineral and medicinal waters, are subject to
appropriation. Priority of appropriation shall give prior right. Except
for public water supply, an appropriation of water shall be limited to
stated purposes and subject to preferences among beneficial uses,
concurrent or otherwise, as prescribed by law, and to the general
reservation of fish and wildlife."

•

§ 14: "Free access to the navigable or public waters of the State, as
defined by the legislature, shall not be denied any citizen of the
United States or resident of the State, except that the legislature may
by general law regulate and limit such access for other beneficial
uses or public purposes."

•

§ 15: "No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be
created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section
does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery
for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress
among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood
and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the
State."

Alaska Statutes:
•

203.
204.
205.

38.04.062: In general, "the state owns all
submerged land underlying navigable water to which title passed to
the state at the time the state achieved statehood under the equal
footing doctrine" or under the federal Submerged Lands Act of
1953.203 The Commissioner must make a list of all waters deemed
navigable or nonnavigable by state or federal agencies or courts, but
"[w]ater not included on the lists . . . is not considered either
navigable or nonnavigable until the commissioner has made a
determination as to its navigability at the time the state achieved
statehood." 204 However, submerged lands that the state conveyed
pursuant to state statute are not governed by this section. 205
"Navigable water," for purposes of this statute, is "water that, at the
time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was susceptible of
being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for commerce
over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or
ALASKA STAT. §

ALASKA STAT.§ 38.04.062(a) (2009) (referencing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1953)).
Id § 38.04.062(b), (c), (d).
Id. § 38.04.062(f).
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potential use does not need to have been without difficulty,
extensive, or long and continuous .... " 206

•

ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.126: This statute recognizes the public trust
doctrine in Alaska, declaring that: (a) "[t]he people of the state have
a constitutional right to free access to and use of the navigable or
public water of the state"; (b) "that state holds and controls all
navigable or public water in trust for the use of the people of the
state"; (c) "(o]wnership of land bordering navigable or public water
does not grant an exclusive right to the use of the water and a right
of title to the land below the ordinary high water mark is subject to
the rights of the people of the state to use and have access to the
water for recreational purposes or other public purposes for which
the water is used or capable of being used consistent with the public
trust"; and (d) nothing in this statute "a:ffect[s] or abridge[s] valid
existing rights or create a right or privilege of the public to cross or
enter private land."

•

ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.127: Before the state can sell, lease, grant, or
otherwise dispose of lands adjacent to water, the Commissioner
must determine whether the water is a navigable water, a public
water, or neither. If the water is navigable or public, the state must
"provide for the specific easements or rights-of-way necessary to
ensure free access to and along the body of water, unless the
commissioner finds that regulation or limiting access is necessary
for other beneficial uses or public purposes."

•

ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.128: No person may obstruct a navigable
water or interfere with others' use of that water unless authorized by
state or federal law. "An unauthorized obstruction or interference is
a public nuisance and is subject to abatement." Moreover, "[f]ree
passage or use of any navigable water includes the right to use land
below the ordinary high water mark to the extent reasonably
necessary to use the navigable water consistent with the public
trust," and "[f]ree passage or use of any navigable water includes
the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water mark
as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on
the water ...."

•

ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.825: "Unless the commissioner finds that the

public interest in retaining state ownership of the land clearly
outweighs the municipality's interest in obtaining the land, the
commissioner shall convey to a municipality tide or submerged land
requested by the municipality that is occupied or suitable for
occupation and development," so long as the land is within or
contiguous to the municipality and "use of the land would not
unreasonably interfere with navigation or public access."
206.

Id.§ 38.04.062(g).
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ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.965: This statute defines "navigable water"
for purposes other than state title and also distinguishes "navigable
water'' and "public water." "Navigable water" is "any water of the
state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, bay, sound,
estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other body
of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful
public purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for
commercial navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of
aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic
animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes . . . . "207
"Public water" is "navigable water and all other water, whether
inland or coastal, fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public
use and utility, habitat for fish and wildlife in which there is a public
interest, or migration and spawning of fish in which there is a public
interest . . . ."208 The statue also includes other definitions of
relevance to the state public trust: "shoreland" is "land belonging to
the state which is covered by nontidal water that is navigable under
the laws of the United States up to ordinary high water mark";
"submerged land" is "land covered by tidal water between the line
of mean low water and seaward to a distance of three geographical
miles or further as may hereafter be properly claimed by the state";
and "tideland" is "land that is periodically covered by tidal water
between the elevation of mean high water and mean low water ...
,,209

•

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.010-46.15.270: Alaska Water Use Act.
"Wherever occurring in a natural state, the water is reserved to the
people for common use and is subject to appropriation and
beneficial use and to reservation of instream flows and levels of
water, as provided in this chapter."210 Reservations are allowed for
fish. 211 Appropriations are subject to a public interest review, which
includes "the effect on fish and game resources and on public
recreational opportunities" and "the effect upon access to navigable
or public water."212 Moreover, the Act allows reservations of water
or instream flows to "protect ... fish and wildlife habitat, migration,
and propagation," for "recreation and park purposes," for
"navigation and transportation purposes," and for "sanitary and
water quality purposes."213

Id. § 38.05.965(13).
Id § 38.05.965(18).
Id. § 38.05.965(20), (22), (23).
Id§ 46.15.030.
Id § 46.15.035(c).
Id.§ 46.15.080(b)(3), (8).
Id. § 46.15.145(a).
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Definition of "Navigable Waters":
By statute, Alaska has adopted the federal title definition of "navigable
water" to identify the waters for which the state owns the bed and banks. Thus,
"navigable water" for state title purposes is
water that, at the time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was
susceptible of being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for
commerce over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or potential
use does not need to have been without difficulty, extensive, or long and
continuous ....214
For other purposes, including public rights in waters, a "navigable water" is
any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek,
bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other
body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public
purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial
navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public
boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other
public recreational purposes ....215
In addition, the public has rights in "public waters," which by statute include
not only navigable waters but also "all other water, whether inland or coastal,
fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for
fish and wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning
of fish in which there is a public interest .... " 2 16
Because of federal reservations, however, Alaska did not acquire title to
the submerged lands within the boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve or
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 217 Nor does Alaska hold title to the lower
inlet of Cook Inlet. 218

Rights in "Navigable Waters":

In general, the state owns the beds of the navigable waters "up to the
ordinary high-water mark." 219 However, the public has rights of access and use

Id.§ 38.04.062(g).
Id. § 38.05.965(13).
216. Id§ 38.05.965(18).
217. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. l, 36-46 (1996).
218. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 200-04 (1975).
219. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res. v. Panlcratz, 538 P.2d 984, 988 (AJaska 1975); see also Panlcratz
v. Alaska Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 68, 73 (Alaska 1982) (noting that "it is clear that a state has title
to land underlying navigable waters up to the mean high water mark").
214.

215.
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to both state-defined navigable and public waters, even if the landowner owns
below the high-water mark. 220
In its case law regarding public uses, Alaska remains closely aligned with
the principles set forth in Illinois Central Railroad. For example, tidelands "are
subject to the public's right to use tidelands for navigation, commerce, and
fishing." 221 However, by statute, Alaska deems state "navigable waters" to
include waters that are usable for "floating of logs, landing and takeoff of
aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals,
fishing, or other public recreational purposes,"222 suggesting that these uses are
also protected under the state public trust doctrine. No person may obstruct a
navigable water or interfere with others' use of that water unless authorized by
state or federal law,223 and "[a]n unauthorized obstruction or interference is a
public nuisance and is subject to abatement."224 Moreover, "[f]ree passage or
use of any navigable water includes the right to use land below the ordinary
high water mark to the extent reasonably necessary to use the navigable water
consistent with the public trust," and "[f]ree passage or use of any navigable
water includes the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water
mark as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on the
water ...." 225
Also in line with Illinois Central Railroad, conveyances of tidelands to
private owners generally convey only "naked title," and the tidelands remain
subject to the public trust unless the conveyance meets the Illinois Central
Railroad criteria-"first, whether the conveyance was made in furtherance of
some specific public trust purpose and, second, whether the conveyance can be
made without substantial impairment of the public's interest in state
tidelands."226 No such intent is present in § 38.05.820 of the Alaska statutes,
especially in light of Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska Constitution, so those
conveyed tidelands remain subject to the public trust. 227 Moreover, even
conveyances of tidelands to municipalities pursuant to § 38.05.825 remain
subject to the public trust; "[t]he conveyance transfer to the municipality the
state's right to use and manage the tidelands, but does not confer the right to
sell of dispose of the lands or exempt them from the public trust doctrine." 228
In terms of resource protection, "[t]he public trust doctrine provides that
the State holds certain resources (such as wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in
trust for public use and that government owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such
220. ALASKA STAT.§ 38.05.126.
221. City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res., 137 P.3d 261,263 n.8 (Alaska 2006).
222. ALASKA STAT.§ 38.05.965(13).
223. Id.§ 38.05.128.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Alaska 1988).
227. City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res., 137 P.3d 261 (Alaska 2006).
228. Id.
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resources for the common good of the public as bene:ficiary." 229 Nevertheless,
mining is not an activity protected by the public trust. Commercial uses
protected under the Illinois Central Railroad decision are
commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over
navigable waters, a meaning which does not include mining. Most
importantly, a mining claim is not a 'public use,' but rather an exclusive,
depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We believe that
even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust
easements would not include private mining enterprises. 230
The public trust doctrine per se does not extend to wildlife management,
although the state does have a duty under Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska
Constitution to manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people's
benefit, "to guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and
to divest the [government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources."231
According to the Alaska Supreme Court:
We have frequently compared the state's duties as set forth in Article VIII
to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as
fish, wildlife, and water in "trust" for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of
recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses per se, we have
noted that "the common use clause was intended to engraft in our
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife,
and water resources of the state." 232
Access rights are equal for both personal and professional fishing. 233 However,
in general, the state cannot be liable in damages under the public trust doctrine
for allowing the destruction of natural resources, such as when beetles
destroyed trees.234
ARIZONA
Date of Statehood:

1912

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

Arizona Constitution: Article XVII of the Arizona Constitution governs water
rights. Relevant provisions include:

229. Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998).
230. Hayes v. A.J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1993).
231. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 16 (Alaska 1989).
232. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (citation omitted). But see Pullen v.
Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish,
wildlife, and water resources, including salmon).
233. Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 497 (Alaska 1988).
234. Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1, 17 (Alaska 1998).
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•

§ 1: "The common law doctrine of riparian water rights shall not
obtain or be of any force or effect in the State.''

•

§ 2: "All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in the State
for all useful or beneficial purposes are hereby recognized and
confirmed."

Arizona Statutes:

•

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 37-1130 to 37-1156: State Claims to
Streambeds. These provisions establish the Arizona Navigable
Stream Adjudication Commission, which acts as an advocate for the
public trust. 235 The Commission issues a determination of
navigability after a public hearing and issues a report on the public
trust values of any navigable stream or watercourse. 236 Its
determinations are subject to judicial review. 237 A determination of
non-navigability relinquishes the state's claims to the bed and
banks. 238 The state can appropriate water "to maintain and protect
public trust values," but only by complying with the normal
requirements for an appropriation.239 The statute also provides for
refunds of taxes and purchase prices, and compensation for
improvements to landowners who "lose" title to the beds of waters
determined to be navigable.24 Finally, the statutes provide a
petition process to release public trust status. 241 In these provisions,
"navigable watercourse" "means a watercourse that was in existence
on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was susceptible
to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for
commerce, over which trade and travel were or could have been
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."242
The state generally owns the beds and banks of navigable
watercourses to the ordinary high watermark.243 "Public trust land"
is "the portion of the bed of a watercourse that is located in this state
and that is determined to have been a navigable watercourse as of
February 14, 1912. Public trust land does not include land held by
this state pursuant to any other trust."244 "Public trust purposes" and
"public trust values" are "commerce, navigation, and fishing." 245

°

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Aruz. REV. STAT.§ 37-1121 (LexisNexis 2009).
Id. § 37-1128.
Id. § 37-1129.
Id.§ 37-1130.
Id.
Id.§ 37-1132.
Id. § 37-1151.
Id. § 37-1101(5).
Id.§ 37-1101(6).
Id.§ 37-1101(8).
Id § 37-1101 (9).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM

2-CRAIG

2010)

WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

101

"Watercourse" does not include man-made water conveyance
systems. 246

•

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-101 to 45-343: Department of Water
Resources and Appropriation. "The waters of all sources, flowing in
streams, canyons, ravines, or other natural channels, or in definite
underground channels, whether perennial or intermittent, flood,
waste or surplus water, and of lakes, ponds and springs on the
surface, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation and
beneficial use as provided in this chapter."247 Arizona's water law
creates a hierarchy of the relative value of uses of water: (1)
domestic and municipal; (2) irrigation and stock watering; (3) power
and mining; (4) recreation and wildlife, including fish; and (5)
nonrecoverable water storage. 248 In the 1995 laws discussing these
provisions, "the legislature declares that it does not intend to create
an implication that the public trust doctrine applies to water rights in
this state. "249

Definition of "Navigable Waters":

By statute, Arizona limits "navigable waters"-and its public trust
doctrine-to those waters subject to the federal equal footing doctrine. As such,
a navigable watercourse for purposes of both state title and the application of
the public trust doctrine is
a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time
was used or was susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural
condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel were or
could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water. 250
"Public trust lands" are limited to the beds of these navigable watercourses.251
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the
Colorado River in Arizona is navigable, and that Arizona owns the beds and
banks of that river. 252

Id.§ 37-1101(11).
Id.§ 45-14l(A).
248. Id. § 45-157(B).
249. 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 9, § 25(B).
250. AR!Z. REV. STAT.§ 37-1101(5).
251. Id. § 37-1101(8).
246.

241.

252. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313,319 (1973) (noting that Arizona holds title to the
bed of the Colorado River), overruled on other grounds, Or. ex rel. State Lands Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 452-54 (1931) (holding
that the Colorado River below Black Canyon is navigable).
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Rights in "Navigable Waters":

The state's title to the beds and banks of navigable waters, like the
Colorado River, extends up to the ordinary high water mark. 253 This line is
defined by soil and vegetation, 254 but is not "the line reached by the water in
unusual floods. " 255
By statute, Arizona limits "public trust purposes" and "public trust values"
to the three uses recognized in Illinois Central Railroad: commerce, navigation,
and fishing. 256 Moreover, while the state can appropriate water to promote
these uses, it must follow the normal appropriation requirements and does not
receive any preference in priority. 257 However, the Arizona Court of Appeals
recently emphasized in connection with the Central Arizona Water
Conservation District that landowners take their properties subject to existing
and initiated water rights, 258 suggesting that the public trust doctrine can
insulate the state from regulatory takings claims.
Like many western states, Arizona manages groundwater under a different
regulatory regime-the Groundwater Management Act of 1980-than it
manages surface water rights. The Arizona courts have determined that the
state public trust doctrine does not apply to the Groundwater Management
Act. 259 As a result, the public trust doctrine cannot influence the establishment
of rights to pump groundwater in Arizona.
Since 1987, Arizona's legislature has engaged in numerous efforts to
restrict the public trust doctrine's application in the state, only to be thwarted
repeatedly by the Arizona courts. The controversy began in 1985, when
Arizona officials began asserting state ownership rights in the beds of the
state's navigable waters based on the federal equal footing doctrine; until that
time, the Colorado River had been the state's only equal footing/public trust
claim. 260 In 1987, the legislature responded with H.B. 2017, which attempted
to relinquish most of Arizona's title claims through an "uncompensated
quitclaim of the state's equal footing interest in all watercourses other than the
Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and in all lands formerly within those

253. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 495 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Ariz. 1972).
254. Id. at 1314.
255. Id. at l3l 5.
256. AruZ. REV. STAT.§ 37-1101(9).
257. Id.§ 37-1130.
258. S. W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. Arizona Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1, 4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008); W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2001).
259. Seven Springs Randt, Inc. v. State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Water Res., 753 P.2d 161, 165-66
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
260. For additional information about the controversy, see Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 AruZ. L. R.Ev. 1053, 1059-78 (1996).
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rivers but outside their current beds." 261 The Arizona Court of Appeals held
many of the relevant provisions unconstitutional. 262 It declared that every
future land patent includes the equal footing interest, that the standard of
navigability is federal, and that navigability is established as of the date of
statehood. 263 Relying on Illinois Central Railroad, moreover, the Court of
Appeals declared that "the state's responsibility to administer its watercourse
lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood itself," and
"the state must administer its interest in lands subject to the public trust
consistently with trust purposes. "264
In 1995, the legislature amended Arizona's water law to include a
provision stating:
The public trust is not an element of a water right in an adjudication
proceeding held pursuant to this article. In adjudicating attributes of water
rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a determination as to
whether public trust values are associated with any or all of the river
system or resource. 265

The Arizona Supreme Court found these provisions unconstitutional.266
Finally, in 1998, after fact-finding by the Arizona Navigable Stream
Adjudication Commission pursuant to 1994 amendments to Arizona's water
law, the Arizona legislature enacted S.B. 1126. This statute "disclaim[ed] the
state's 'right, title, or interest based on navigability and the equal footing
doctrine' to the bed lands of the Agua Fria, New, Hassayampa, and Lower Salt
Rivers, as well as Skunk Creek" and Verde River, based on an overly
constricted definition of "navigable."267 The Arizona Court of Appeals found
that S.B. 1126 violated both the gift clause in Arizona's Constitution and the
public trust doctrine. 268 Moreover, with respect to the public trust, the court
held that the legislature had to apply the navigability test from The Daniel
Ba//, 269 to determine what qualified as a "navigable water," and that the
legislature had constructed a much more constrained test for navigability than
the Daniel Ball standard. 270 Because federal law under the equal footing
doctrine presumes that the state has title to beds and banks of navigable waters,
federal law preempted S.B. 1126.271
261. Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991).
262. Id. at 173.
263. Id. at 163-65.
264. Id at 168.
265. ARiz. REV. STAT.§ 45-263(B) (LexisNexis 2009).
266. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999).
267. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
268. Id. at 729.
269. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) 557 (1870).
270. Id. at 730-37.
271. Id. at 737.
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This litigation made clear that the Arizona courts view the public trust
doctrine as a federal constitutional issue because the equal footing doctrine is
grounded in the U.S. Constitution272 :
The public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power
to give away resources held by the state in trust for its people. The
Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doctrine inapplicable to
these or any other proceedings.... It is for the courts to decide whether the
public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by
legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority .273
As such, the state has a duty to assert its ownership interest in navigable or
potentially navigable waters, and the courts will remand cases where the state
has not done so. 274 For example, estoppel may not be asserted to defeat the
public interest in navigable waters. 275
CALIFORNIA

Date of Statehood:

1850

Water Law System: California Doctrine-mostly prior appropriation, but
with recognition of some riparian rights
California Constitution: Several provisions of the California Constitution
embody or are otherwise relevant to the state's public trust doctrine. Article X,
for example, governs water, Article XA governs water resources development,
and Article XB contains the Marine Resources Protection Act of 1990.
Especially relevant provisions of these and other articles include:
•
Art. I, § 25: "The people shall have the right to fish upon and from
the public lands of the State and in the waters thereof, excepting
upon lands set aside for fish hatcheries, and no land owned by the
State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in the
people the absolute right to fish thereupon; and no law shall ever be
passed making it a crime for the people to enter upon the public
lands within this State for the purpose of fishing in any water
containing fish that have been planted therein by the State;
provided, that the Legislature may by statute, provide for the season
when and the conditions under which the different species of fish
may be taken."
•

Art. X, § 1: "The right of eminent domain is hereby declared to exist
in the State to all frontages on the navigable waters of this State."

272. See Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d 158, 161-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
273. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999) (citing Arizona Ctr.for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d at 166-68).
274. Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
275. Id. at 1021.
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Art. X, § 2: "It is hereby declared that because of the conditions
prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of
which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the
conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
e>..1end to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of
use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in
a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of
the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this
section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made
adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided,
however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as
depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water of the
stream to which the owner's land is riparian under reasonable
methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of
water to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled."

•

Art. X, § 3: "All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city,
city and county, or town in this State, and fronting on the water of
any harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet used for the purposes of
navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private persons,
partnerships, or corporations; provided, however, that any such
tidelands, reserved to the State solely for street purposes, which the
Legislature finds and declares are not used for navigation purposes
and are not necessary for such purposes may be sold to any town,
city, county, city and county, municipal corporations, private
persons, partnerships or corporations subject to such conditions as
the Legislature determines are necessary to be imposed in
connection with any such sales in order to protect the public
interest."

•

Art. X, § 4: "No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or
possessing the frontage or tide lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary,
or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude
the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public
purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water;
and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most
liberal construction of this provisions, so that access to the
navigable waters of this State shall always be attainable for the
people thereof."

105
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•

Art. X., § 5: "The use of all water now appropriated, or that may
hereafter be appropriated, for sale, rental, or distribution, is hereby
declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and control
of the State, in the manner to be prescribed by law."

•

Art. XA, § 3: "No water shall be available for appropriation by
storage in, or by direct diversion from, any of the components of the
California Wild and Scenic River System, as such system exists on
January 1, 1981, where such appropriation is for export of water
into another major hydrologic basin of the state, _ . . unless such
export is expressly authorized prior to such appropriation be: (a) an
initiative statute approved by the electors, or (b) the Legislature, by
statute passed in each house by roll call vote entered in the journal,
two-thirds of the membership concurring."

•

Art. XB, § 14: "Prior to January 1, 1994, the Fish and Game
Commission shall establish four new ecological reserves in ocean
waters along the mainland coast. Each ecological reserve shall have
a surface area of at least two square miles. The commission shall
restrict the use of these ecological reserves to scientific research
relating to the management and enhancement of marine reserves."

•

Art. XB, § 15: "This article does not preempt or supersede any other
closures to protect any other wildlife, including sea otters, whales,
and shorebirds."

California Statutes:

•

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6301 to 6369.3: Administration and
Control of Swamp, Overflowed, Tide, or Submerged Lands, and
Structures Thereon. These provisions give "exclusive jurisdiction
over all ungranted tidelands and submerged lands owned by the
State" to the State Lands Commission.276 Any exchanges of lands
that are subject to the public trust doctrine must ensure that the lands
acquired "will provide a significant benefit to the public trust" and
that "the exchange does not substantially interfere with public rights
of navigation and fishing. " 277

•

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200 to 1248: Appropriation. "All water
flowing in any natural channel, excepting so far as it has been or is
being applied to useful and beneficial purposes upon, or in so far as
it is or may be reasonably needed for useful and beneficial purposes
upon lands riparian thereto, or otherwise appropriated, is hereby
declared to be public water of the State and subject to appropriation
in accordance with the provisions of this code." 278 These provisions

276.
277.
278.

CAL. Pus. R.Es. CODE§ 6301 (2009).
Id § 6307.
CAL. WATER CODE§ 1201 (2009).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2-CRAIG

2010]

3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM

WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

107

allow for protections of flows to "protected areas,"279 and establish
that "[t]he use of water for recreation and preservation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of
water." 280

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

•

CAL. Gov'r CODE§ 39933: "All navigable waters situated within or
adjacent to a city shall remain open to the free and unobstructed
navigation of the public. Such waters and the water front of such
waters shall remain open to free and unobstructed access by the
people from the public streets and highways within the city."

•

CAL. Gov'r CODE § 56740: "No tidelands or submerged lands ...
which are owned by the State or by its grantees in trust shall be
incorporated into, or annexed to, a city, except lands which may be
approved by the State Lands Commission." For purposes of this
provision, "'submerged lands' ... includes, but is not limited to,
lands underlying navigable waters which are in sovereign ownership
of the State whether or not those waters are subject to tidal
influence."

•

CAL. Gov'r CODE§§ 66478.1 to 66478.14: Public Access to Public
Resources. These public access provisions apply to navigable
waters. 281 "The Legislature further finds and declares that it is
essential to the health and well-being of all citizens of this state that
public access to public natural resources be increased. It is the intent
of the Legislature to increase public access to public natural
resources. " 282

•

CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 36: '"Navigable waters' means waters
which come under this jurisdiction of the United States Anny Corps
of Engineers and any other waters with the state with the exception
of those privately owned."

•

CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE §§ 90 to 153: Navigable Waters .
"Navigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport
the products of this country are public ways for purposes of
navigation and such transportation. " 283 However, navigable waters
do not include floodwaters. 284 These provisions also expressly list
several watercourses as navigable waters and public ways, 285 and
they define California's coastline. 286

Id.§§ 1215-1216.
Id. § 1243.
CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 66478.1 (2009).
Id.§ 66478.3.
CAL. ll.a.RB. & NAV. CODE§ 100 (2009).
Id.
Id. §§ 101-106.
Id. § 107.
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CAL. HEALTII & SAFETY CODE § 117510: '"Navigable waters'
means all public waters of the state in any river, stream, lake,
reservoir, or other body of water, including all salt water bays,
inlets, and estuaries within the jurisdiction of the state."

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
The California courts recognize the differences between various
definitions of"navigable waters." For example, in 1976 the California Court of
Appeals acknowledged that there were two relevant federal definitions of
navigability: the Commerce Clause definition and the state title definition.
Further, the state title test from Utah v. United States detennines the waters for
which California holds title to the bed and banks as a result of its admission to
the Union. 287 However, the court also recognized that for non-federal matters,
the states are free to use different definitions of "navigable waters" to
determine rights. 288
Under these rules, "[w]aters which are subject to tidal influence are
subject to the public trust regardless of whether they are navigable." 289
Although the boundary between public and private ownership in littoral waters
is the low-water mark, 290 in tidal waters, the "lands between the mean high tide
and mean low tide are owned by the public. " 291 "Tidelands" can cover both
true tidelands and submerged lands more generally. 292
In addition, California has explicitly rejected arguments based on
traditional English common law that state ownership of submerged lands is
limited to tidal waters. 293 Instead, the California Supreme Court has
emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters "constitute a resource
which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the
ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state." 294
Upon its admission to the Union, California received title to the beds and
banks of federally defined navigable waters "to the high-water mark. " 295
Nevertheless, an 1872 statute conveyed title to properties bordering these lands
to the low-water mark. 296 Even so, the public trust doctrine applies to the lands
287.
1976).
288.
289.
Ct. App.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App.

Id. at 835.

Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 n.3 (Cal.
1989).
County of Lake v. Smith, 278 Cal. Rptr. 809, 819-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239,241 (Cal. 1981).
City ofBerkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363 n. l (Cal. 1980).
California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d at 242-45.
294. Id. at 242.
295. Id. at 246.
296. Id. at 245, 248~ Bess v. County of Humboldt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 401-02 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
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between the low- and high-water marks, although the landowner "may utilize
them in any manner not incompatible with the public's interest in the
property. ,,297
For purposes of state-Jaw public trust rights, a stream that can only float
logs is not navigable. 298 Landowners can obstruct non-navigable waters at
will.299
Nevertheless, "all waters are deemed navigable which are really so." 300
"A waterway usable only for pleasure boating is nevertheless a navigable
waterway and protected by the public trust." 301 Moreover, "[t]here is no
authority, or at least none cited to use, for the proposition a river must be
designated 'non-navigable' because it may be navigated only seasonally."302
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Sacramento River in
California is navigable and that private landowners along that river received
title only to the high water mark. 303 In addition, and supported by the fact that
California legislatively deemed the Klamath River in California non-navigable,
the Supreme Court held that title to the Klamath River's beds in California
remained with the United States and became part of the Hoopa Valley
Reservation. 304
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

Article X of the California Constitution constitutionalizes the public trust
doctrine in California. 305 California acquired title to the navigable waterways
and tidelands by virtue of her sovereignty when admitted to the Union in
1850. 306 The traditional uses that the trust protects are navigation, commerce,

297. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d at 252; Golden Feather Community Ass'n v.
Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct App. 1989).
298. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 488,450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (citing American
River Water Co. v. Amsden, 6 Cal. 443, 443-46 (1856)).
299. Id.
300. Churchj)) Co. v. Kingsbury, 174 P. 329, 330-31 (Cal. 1918).
301. Nat') Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720 n. 17 (Cal. 1983) (citing People ex
rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Baker, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
448); see also Golden Feather, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 n.2; People v. Weaver, 197 Cal. Rptr. 521, 524
n.2 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983); Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal.
Rptr. 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Baker, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (all asserting the same
pleasure/recreational boating test).
302. Bess v. County of Humboldt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); accord
Hitchings, 127 Cal Rptr. at 837.
303. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 666-68, 672-73 (1891).
304. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 260-64 (1913).
305. See, e.g., Younger, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (holding that public access to the South Fork of the
American River for whitewater rafting is protected by the California Constitution).
306. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 n.5 (Cal. 1971) (citing Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935)).
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and fishing. 307 More expansively, public trust rights "have been held to include
the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation
purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the
navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes." 308 hnportantly,
the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to be adaptable
and evolving, noting that "[t]he objective of the public trust has evolved in
tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses of
waterways." 309
"The power of the state to control, regulate and utilize its navigable
waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when acting within the terms of
the trust, is absolute, except as limited by the paramount supervisory power of
the federal government over navigable waters." 310 Specifically, "[p]reservation
of the public trust in the shorezone will allow the state flexibility in
determining the appropriate use of such land so that, for example, areas which
are endangered by overuse can be closed to certain activities," because "[t]he
exercise of the police power has proved insufficient to protect the
shorezone." 311 No estoppel is available against the government with respect to
public trust interests, 312 and exercise of the public trust doctrine is not an
unconstitutional taking of private property. 313 However, "the public trust
doctrine as codified in the California Constitution does not prevent the state
from preferring one trust use over another" in particular situations. 314
Moreover, the state can delegate its regulatory authority over particular public
trust lands to state agencies and municipalities. 315
In early parts of California's history, the state extensively conveyed public
trust lands to private individuals for a variety of purposes. For example, about
one-quarter of the original San Francisco Bay was conveyed into private
ownership and filled for development. As a result, California recognizes
different public trust rights in different public trust lands. Nevertheless, the
public generally retains its public trust rights even when the state has conveyed
tidelands and lands under navigable waters to private owners, unless the state

307. Id.
308. Id. at 380 (citations omitted); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal.
1980); Grafv. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
309. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing Marks, 491
P.2d at 374); see also Personal Watercraft Coal. v. Bd. of Supervisors. 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 437 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is "sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs"
(citations omitted)).
310. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 {citations omitted); Graf, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1228-29, 1231-32.
311. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256,260 (Cal. 1981).
312. Id. at 258-59.
313. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 723.
314. Carstens v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 346,360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
315. Graf, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1231-32.
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conveyed the lands in furtherance of navigation or commerce. 316 Thus, the
public trust applies to the "lands between high and low water in nontidal
navigable lakes,'' even if that land in is private ownership. 317 Especially since
the public trust amendments to the California Constitution in 1879, public trust
lands "may be conveyed to private persons only to promote trust uses," 318 and
statutes purporting to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed;
the intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied; and
if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would retain
the public's interest in the tidelands, the court must give the statute such an
interpretation. 319
When trust lands have been conveyed to private individuals, "the interests
of the public are paramount in property that is still physically adaptable for
trust uses, whereas the interests of the grantees and their successors should
prevail insofar as the tidelands have been rendered substantially valueless for
those purposes." 320 However,
there is no legal obligation on the part of a landowner subject to the public
trust doctrine to inspect or warn of natural hazards in navigable waters
subject to recreational use abutting the property, or to make such water safe
for recreational uses by trespassers or those on the water by means other
than access over abutting land.3 21
As a result, landowners along navigable waters who do not alter those waters
are entitled to the tort liability protections in the California Civil Code. 322
Under the public trust doctrine, owners of property along public trust
waters are entitled to natural accretions, because "[t]he state has no control over
nature; allowing private parties to gain by natural accretion does not harm to
the public trust doctrine." 323 In contrast, "to allow accretion caused by artificial
means to deprive the state of trust lands would effectively alienate what may
not be alienated." 324
Unlike most states, California has extended its public trust doctrine,
beginning in 1971, to the preservation of the natural environment and

316. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363-67 (Cal. 1980); San Diego County
Archeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786, 787-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People v.
Sweetser, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378-79 (Cal.
1971).
317. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Cal. 1982) (citing
California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981); California v. Superior Court (Fogerty),
625 P.2d at 256).
318. City ofLos Angeles, 644 P.2d at 793-94.
319. City ofBerkeley, 606 P.2d at 369.
320. Id. at 373.
321. Charpentier v. Von Geldem, 236 Cal. Rptr. 223,239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
322. Id. (discussing CAL. CML CODE§ 846 (1980)).
323. State ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. Superior Court, 900 P.2d 648, 661-62 (Cal. 1995).
324. Id.
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ecosystems as well as to public uses of the navigable waters and tidelands. In
the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court announced:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to
encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not
burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization
over another. There is growing public recognition that one of the most
important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the
tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so
that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space,
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. It is not
necessary here to define precisely all the public uses which encumber
tidelands. 325
The recognition of the ecological value of submerged lands extends to non tidal
submerged lands as well. As the California Supreme Court stated in connection
with Lake Tahoe litigation:
[T]he shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its original size in this
state by the pressures of development. Such lands now cover less than one
half of 1 percent of the state; a further reduction by 15 percent was
projected for 1980. Some authorities have warned that at the present rate of
destruction nearly all riparian vegetation on the Sacramento River could be
eliminated in the next 20 years.
The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the
environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish (including
salmon, steelhead, and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species:
the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife
and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they
provide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity. In addition,
the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of
good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and
erosion. 326
Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to "environmental .
purposes," 327 and encompasses "the right to preserve the tidelands in the
natural state as ecological units for scientific study." 328
California courts have also extended the public trust doctrine not just to
aquatic wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself. 329 "These are natural

325. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted).
326. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981).
327. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982).
328. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362,363 (Cal. 1980) (citing Marks, 491 P.2d at
374).
329. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596-98 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (citing Golden Feather Comty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989)).
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resources of inestimable value to the community as a whole. Their protection
and preservation is a public interest that is now recognized in numerous state
and federal statutory provisions ... _,mo Those statutes generally define the
contours of the public trust obligation regarding wildlife. 331 Members of the
general public can sue to enforce the wildlife public trust as well as the
navigable water public trust, because the public trust doctrine "places a duty
upon the government to protect those resources. " 332
The California Supreme Court clarified in 2008 that California has "two
distinct public trust doctrines":
First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government's
"affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of water resources . . . ." The second is a public trust duty
derived from statute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7,
pertaining to fish and wildlife: "The fish and wildlife resources are held in
trust for the people of the state by and through the department." There is
doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrines-the protection
of water resources is intertwined with the protection of wildlife. . . .
Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is
primarily statutory. 333
Given this statutory focus, an incidental take permit did not violate the
common-law public trust doctrine. 334
Public trust interests can extend the state's authority and duties beyond the
navigable waters. For example, "(t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited
to navigable or otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish
are habitated or accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom
of passage to and from the public fishing grounds of the state. " 335
330. Id. at 598.
33 l. Id. at 599-600.
332. Id. at 600.
333. Envtl. Prot. & Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep't ofForestry & Fire Prot., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28, 73 (2008)
(quoting Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728-29 (1983)); see also Cal. Trout,
Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 138,212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (establishing that Fish
and Game Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting "that it does not follow from the
application of the tenn 'public trust' to the state's interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that all
of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to nonnavigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based
upon a public trust fishery interest.").
334. Enwl. Prot. & Info Ctr., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
335. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass 'n v. Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); see also People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 399-400, 400--01 (Cal. 1897) (noting
that "the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the common use and benefit is one of the
recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the common law" and asserting that the
state's authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in navigable waters; "[t]o the e>..1ent
that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing over lands entirely subject to private
ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and subject to all laws of the state
regulating the right of fishery"); Cal. Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (concluding "that a public trust
interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a fishery").
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Similarly, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 336 the
California Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could
restrict or modify established water rights even in non-navigable tributaries of
navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake's tributaries were
imperiling "both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake ...
." 337 As a result, the public trust doctrine could require modifications in the
prior appropriation system:
In our opinions, the core of the public trust doctrine is the state's authority
as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the
navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying those waters. This
authority applies to the waters tributary to Mono Lake and bars DWP or
any other party from claiming a vested right to divert waters once it
becomes clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the
public trust. ... Approval of such diversions with considering public trust
values ... may result in needless destruction of those values. Accordingly,
we believe that before state courts and agencies approve water diversions,
they should consider the effect of such diversion upon interests protected
by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any
harm to these interests. 338
As such, "the public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm
caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries."339 The state retains the
authority to review and reconsider water rights when harm becomes evident,
particularly if it did not consider public trust values in the original granting of a
water right. 340 Moreover, "in determining whether it is 'feasible' to protect
public trust values like fish and wildlife in a particular instance, the [State
Water Resources Control] Board must determine whether protection of those
values, or what level of protection, is 'consistent with the public interest. "'341
"[W]hen the public trust doctrine clashes with the rule of priority, the rule of
priority must yield. [Nevertheless,] every effort must be made to preserve water
right priorities to the extent those priorities do not lead to violation of the public
trust doctrine," and "the subversion of water right priority is justified only if
336. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (the "Mono Lake case"). For discussions of the Mono Lake dispute,
see generally Timothy J. Conway, Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: 77ze Expanding
Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617 (1984); Kevin M. Raymond, Protecting the People's Waters:
The California Supreme Court Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water,

59 WASH. L. REV. 357 (1984); Martha Guy, Comment, 11,e Public Trust Doctrine and California Water
Law: National Audubon Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653 (1982). For a
more recent discussion of subsequent developments, see generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Litigation's
Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 14
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1177 (2008).
337. Nat'/ Audubon Soc y, 658 P.2d at 711.
338. Id. at 712; see also id. at 727-28.
339. Id. at 721.
340. Id. at 728.
341. State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (involving
water rights and salmon protection in the Bay Delta).
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enforcing that priority will in fact lead to the unreasonable use of water or
result in harm to values protected by the public trust." 342
However, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water withdrawals
from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on navigable
waters. 343 "The public trust doctrine is based upon public access and usage of
navigable waters and pursuant to that doctrine the public has an easement and
servitude upon such waters. But the public has never had common access and
usage of nonnavigable streams .... " 344 Similarly, the California courts have
declined to extend the National Audubon doctrine to groundwater. 345
\Vhile the California public trust doctrine protects a variety of natural
resources as well as public uses of water, it does not extend to everything. For
example, as a result of California's complicated history, California did not
acquire title to--and the public trust doctrine does not apply to--"lands which
were the subject of a prior Mexican land grant and later patented by the United
States government in accordance with its obligations under the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo." 346 Less uniquely, "(t]he public trust doctrine applicable to
beaches owned by the sovereign does not apply to hotels located on land which
is privately owned. Although hotel owners have certain common law
obligations to travelers, hotels are by no means owned in public trust like
public beaches." 347 Instead, "[t]he doctrine has been restricted to tidelands,
navigable waters, and situations where the government or public in general own
the property"-situations where "the state holds or held title because it was
important the land be available to all. It does not involve private property
except where the state has conveyed the land into private hands. It does not
cover artifacts located on private property." 348 The public trust doctrine does
not apply to public employment contracts, 349 or to formal trusts. 350

342. El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 489-90 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006).
343. Golden Feather Comty. Ass'n v. Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal Ct.
App. 1989).
344. Id. at 840; accord Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club. Inc., 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 909, 916 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
345. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868,884 (Cal. a. App.
2003); Cal. Water Network v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, Civil Nos. B177978, B181463, 2006 WL
726882, at • 11 (Cal. App. Dep 't Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not apply
to groundwater or non-navigable waterways, absent some impact on navigable waters).
346. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 253 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Com.m'n, 466 U.S. 198, 205-09 (1984).
347. Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 140 Cal. Rptr. 599,603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
348. San Diego County Archeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 145 Cal. Rptr. 786, 787-89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978); see also Pitt River Tribe v. Donaldson, No. C05 l 902, 2007 WL 1874323, at •7 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that a transfer of tribal remains to private parties, when ''there is no allegation that
the remains in question were located on navigable waters in tidelands," did not constitute a claim under
the public trust doctrine).
349. Lucasv. Santa Maria Pub. Airport Dist., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
350. Hardman v. Feinstein, 240 Cal. Rptr. 483,486 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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COLORADO
Date of Statehood:

1876

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

Colorado Constitution: Several provisions of Colorado's constitution relate to
water, but the state does not have a constitutionalized public trust doctrine,
despite state ballot initiatives in the mid- l 990s that repeatedly sought to amend
Article XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution to require the state to "adopt and
defend a strong public trust doctrine," even for nonnavigable waters. 351
Important water-related and other relevant provisions include:
•
Art. IX, § 10: Selection and Management of Public Trust Lands.
This section identifies state school lands as public trust lands, to be
managed in accordance with Colorado Revised Statutes § 36-1101.5.
•

Art. XVI, § 5: "The water of every natural stream, not heretofore
appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be
the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided."

•

Art. XVI, § 6: "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of
appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the
water for the same purpose; but when waters of any natural stream
are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the
same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the
preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those
using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over
those using the same for manufacturing purposes."

•

Art. XXVII: Great Outdoors Colorado Program. In § 1 of this
Article, the Colorado Constitution dedicates lottery money "to the
preservation, protection, enhancement and management of the
state's wildlife, park, river, trail and space heritage ...." Section 2
establishes a trust fund. However,§ 7 declares that "[n]othing in this
article shall affect in any way whatsoever any of the provisions
under Article XVI of the State Constitution of Colorado, including

351. See, e.g.• Matter of Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted April 6,
1994, by Title Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative on Water Rights, 877 P.2d 321, 326--29 (Colo.
1994) (en bane) (upholding the initiative); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause,
and Summary Adopted April 5, 1995 by the Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative "Public Rights in
Water II," 898 P.2d 1076, 1078-80 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (holding the initiative invalid because it
contained more than one subject); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and
Summary Adopted March 20, 1996, by the Title Board Pertaining to Proposed Initiative "1996-6," 917
P.2d 1277, 1279-82 (Colo. I 996) (en bane) (upholding the initiative).
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those provisions related to water, nor any of the statutory provisions
related to the appropriation of water in Colorado."

Colorado Statutes:
•

COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-80-101 to 37-80-120: State Engineer.

•

COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-81-101 to 37-81-104: Diversion of Waters.

•

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-82-101 to 37-82-106: Appropriation and
Use of Water.

•

COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-83-101 to 37-83-106: Exchange of Water .

•

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-84-101 to 37-84-125: Responsibility of
User or Owner.

•

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-85-101 to 37-85-1 I I: Charge for Delivery
of Water.

•

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-86-101 to 37-86-113: Rights of Way and
Ditches.

•

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-87-101 to 37-87-125: Reservoirs. Section
37-87-102(1) defines "natural stream" and "ordinary high
watennark."

•

COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-88-101 to 37-88-110: State Canals and
Reservoirs.

•

COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-89-101 to 37-89-104: Offenses.

•

COLO.REV. STAT.§§ 37-90-101 to 37-90-143: Underground Water.

•

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 37-92-602: Water Right
Detennination and Administration. Colorado relies on a judicial
system rather than a pennitting system for its water rights.

•

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to 38-6-216: Condemnation of
Water Rights.

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Colorado retains a "commercial use" definition of "navigable waters." 352
However, the Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado
non-navigable: "the natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable
within its territorial limits, and practically all of them have their sources within
its own boundaries, and . . . no stream of any importance whose source is

352.

People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo. 1979).
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without those boundaries, flows into or through this state." 353 As a result, there
is almost no case law further explicating the definition of "navigable water."

Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Article XVI, § 5, of the Colorado Constitution establishes the state's
property right to the water in natural streams. 354 Nevertheless, in a nonnavigable river, title to the bed and banks is in the private landowner, giving the
landowner exclusive control over the water and the right to exclude recreational
users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing. 355
The Colorado Supreme Court refused to follow the "modem trend"-as
represented by Wyoming's interpretation of similar provisions in its
constitution-and al1ow public rights in non-navigable rivers, concluding that
Art. XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not preserve public recreation
rights. 356 Instead, "[w]ithout permission, the public cannot use such waters for
recreation. " 357
One early case notes that in navigable waters, the riparian landowner owns
to the thread, or center, of the stream. 358

HAWAl'I
Date of Statehood:

1959

Water Law System: Combination of Native Hawaiian rights with elements
of both riparianism and prior appropriation
Hawai'i Constitution: "[T]he people of this state have elevated the public
trust doctrine to the level of constitutional mandate .... We therefore hold that
article XI, section 1, and article XI, section 7 adopt the public trust doctrine as a

353. Stock.man v. Leddy, 129 P. 220,222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); see also United States v.
Dist. Court. 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of
the Colorado River, it is non-navigable).
354. Stockman, 129 P. at 222.
355. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for floating down a nonnavigable river); see also Heimbecher v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.2d 280,281 (Colo. 1932) (noting
that the general presumption at common law is that title to land riparian to a non-navigable stream
ex1ends to the center of the river); More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (Colo. 1977) (same).
356. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027-28.
357. Id. at 1029; see also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public
ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in
non-navigable streams; instead, the private landowner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative
rights can trump this common-law rule).
358. Hanlon v. Hobson, 51 P. 433,435 (Colo. 1897).
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fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawai'i." 359 The Hawai'i
Constitution constitutionalizes many public trust rights, including the
traditional public trust doctrine and a water rights public trust. Relevant
provisions include:
•
Art. IX, § 8: "The State shall have the power to promote and
maintain a healthful environment, including the prevention of any
excessive demands upon the environment and the State's resources."

•

Art. XI, § I : "For the benefit of present and future generations, the
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect
Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land,
water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the
development and utilization of these resources in a manner
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the selfsufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust
by the State for the benefit of the people."

•

Art. XI, § 2: "The legislature shall vest in one or more executive
boards or commissions powers for the management of natural
resources owned or controlled by the State, and such powers of
disposition thereof as may be provided by law; but land set aside for
public use, other than for a reserve for conservation purposes, need
not be placed under the jurisdiction of such a board or commission."

•

Art. XI, § 6: "The State shall have the power to manage and control
the marine, seabed and other resources located within the
boundaries of the State, including the archipelagic waters of the
State, and reserves to itself all such rights outside state boundaries
not specifically limited by federal or international law. All fisheries
in the sea waters of the State not included in any fish pond, artificial
enclosure or state-licensed mariculture operation shall be free to the
public, subject to vested rights and the right of the State to regulate
the same; provided that mariculture operations shall be established
under guidelines enacted by the legislature, which shall protect the
public's use and enjoyment of the reefs. The State may condemn
such vested rights for public use."

•

Art. XI, § 7: "The State has an obligation to protect, control and
regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of its
people. The legislature shall provide for a water resources agency
which, as provided by law, shall set overall water conservation,
quality and use policies; define beneficial and reasonable uses;
protect ground and surface water resources, watersheds and natural
stream environments; establish criteria for water use priorities while
assuring appurtenant rights and existing correlative and riparian uses

359. In re Water Use Pennit Applications. 9 P.3d 409, 443-44 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted); see
also Morgan v. Planning Dep't, 86 P.3d 982, 993 n.12 (Haw. 2004).
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and establish procedures for regulating all uses of Hawaii's water
resources."
•

Art. XI, § 9: "Each person has the right to a clean and healthful
environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality,
including control of pollution and conservation, protection and
enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this
right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal
proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as
provided by law."

•

Art. XI, § 11 : "The State of Hawaii asserts and reserves its rights
and interest in its exclusive economic zone for the purpose of
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources,
both living and nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil, and
superadjacent waters."

•

Art. XII, § 4: Public Trust: "The lands granted to the State of
Hawaii by Section 5(b) of the Admission Act and pursuant to
Article XVI, § 7 of the State Constitution ... shall be held by the
State as a public trust for native Hawaiians and the general public."

•

Art. XII, § 5: "There is hereby established an Office of Hawaiian
Affairs. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall hold title to all the real
and personal property now or hereafter set aside or conveyed to it
which shall be held in trust for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians."

•

Art. XII, § 6: "The board of trustees of the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs shall exercise power as provided by law: to manage and
administer the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of the
lands, natural resources, minerals and income derived from
whatever sources for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, including all
income and proceeds from that pro rata portion of the trust referred
to in section 4 of this article for native Hawaiians; to formulate
policy relating to affairs of native Hawaiians and Hawaiians; and to
exercise control over real and personal property set aside by state,
federal or private sources and transferred to the board for native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians."

•

Art. XII, § 7: "The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights,
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and
religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian
Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate
such rights."

•

Art. XVI, § 7: Compliance with Trust: "Any trust provisions which
the Congress shall impose, upon the admission of this State, in
respect of the lands patented to the State by the United States or the
proceeds and income therefrom, shall be complied with by
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appropriate legislation. Such legislation shall not diminish or limit
the benefits of native Hawaiians under Section 4 of Article XII."

Hawai'i Statutes:
•

HAW. REV. STAT.§ 7-1: "The people shall have a right to drinking
water, and running water, and the right of way. The springs of
water, running water, and roads shall be free to all, on lands granted
in fee simple ...."

•

HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-l(a): Incorporates the trust for Native
Hawaiians into the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.

•

HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-1: The public lands include submerged
lands.

•

HAW. REV. STAT.§ 171-2: This provision defines the public lands.

•

HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-3: The Department of Land and Natural
Resources "shall manage, administer, and exercise control over
public lands, the water resources, ocean waters, navigable streams,
coastal areas, and minerals and all other interests therein .... "

•

HAW. REV. STAT.§ 171-18: Public trust lands for schools.

•

HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-36(a)(9): The public has the right to use
piers.

•

HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-53: Reclamation of submerged lands is
prohibited without the state's permission.

•

HAW. REv. STAT. ch. 174C: State Water Code. Section l 74C-2(a)
"recognize[s] that the waters of the State are held for the benefit of
the citizens of the State" and "declare[s] that the people of the State
are beneficiaries and have a right to have the waters protected for
their use." In addition, the Code requires the "protection of
traditional and customary Hawaiian rights, the protection and
procreation of fish and wildlife, the maintenance of proper
ecological balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and
enhancement of waters of the State for municipal uses, public
recreation, public water supply, agriculture, and navigation. Such
objectives are declared to be in the public interest."360

•

HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 174C-31 to 174C-32: Hawaii Water Plan. The
Commission must "[i]dentify rivers or streams, or a portion of a
river or stream, which appropriately may be placed within a wild
and scenic rivers system, to be preserved and protected as part of the
public trust." 361

360.
361.

HAW. R.Ev. STAT.§ l74C-2(c)(2009).
Id.§ 174C-3l(c)(4).
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•

HAW. REV. STAT.§ 174C-41 to 174C-63: Regulation of Water Use.
Before the State ofHawai'i can regulate water use in a given area, it
must designate a water management area.

•

HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-66 to 174C-71: Water Quality. These
statutes provide protection of instream uses. 362

•

HAW. REV. STAT.§ l 74C-101: Native Hawaiian Water Rights.

•

HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 190D-1 to 190D-36: Oceans and Submerged
Lands Leasings.

•

HAW. REV. STAT. § 200-6: Permits are required for structures or
moorings in ocean waters or navigable streams.

•

HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 205A-l to 205A-71: Coastal Zone
Management.

Definition of "Naviga hie Waters":
The Hawaiian courts are well aware of the convoluted nature of the
"navigable waters" definition. 363 "Navigable waters" in Hawai'i include all
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, whether navigable or not, and
waters that are navigable-in-fact, even if not tidal. 364 Hawai'i has long accepted
the tidal test of navigability. 365
Perhaps because of its water resources trust (see below) and its island
nature, Hawai'i does not have well-developed law for non-tidal navigable-infact waters. Nevertheless, for public trust purposes, Hawai'i appears to have
adopted the pleasure boat test for navigability: "Navigable waters, including
both those navigable by larger vessels and those navigable by rowboats and
other small craft, are public highways. The right of navigation includes the
right to travel on the waters not only for business purposes but also in pursuit of
pleasure." 366

Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Relying on Illinois Central Railroad, the Hawai'i Supreme Court declared
in 1899 that "[t]he people of Hawaii hold the absolute rights to all its navigable
waters and the soils under them for their own common use. The lands under the
navigable waters in and around the territory of the Hawaiian Government are

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id.§ 174C-71.
In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977).
Id.
In re Bishop, 35 Haw. 608 (Haw. Terr. 1940).
Kuramoto v. Hamada, 30 Haw. 841,845 (Haw. Terr. 1929).
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held in trust for the public uses of navigation." 367 Traditionally in Hawai'i, the
right of navigation supersedes the right of fishery. 368
More recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has described the public trust
as "a dual concept of sovereign right and responsibility." 369 Hawai'i recognizes
broad public rights in its waters, noting that "the trust [has] traditionally
preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing. Courts have
further identified a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming, boating, and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes." 370
Moreover, given Hawaii's history, "the exercise of Native Hawaiian and
traditional and customary rights [is] a public trust purpose." 371 In contrast, "the
public trust has never been understood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for
private commercial gain. Such an interpretation, indeed, eviscerate( d] the
trust's basic purpose[-]of reserving the resource for use and access by the
general public without preference or restriction." 372 Thus, "[a]s commonly
understood, the trust protects public waters and submerged lands against
irrevocable transfer to private parties, or 'substantial impairment,' whether for
private or public purposes ...." 373
"[T]he ultimate authority to interpret and defend the public trust in Hawaii
rests with the courts," and "[j]ust as private trustees are judicially accountable
to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive
branches are judicially accountable for dispositions of the public trust." 374
Moreover, "(t]he beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present
generations but those to come."3 75
In general, "beachfront title lines run along the upper annual reaches of the
waves, excluding storm and tidal waves." 376 Similarly, although "Hawaii's
land laws are unique in that they are based on ancient tradition, custom,
practice and usage," the boundary designated "ma ke kai" "is along the upper

367. King v. Oahu Ry & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717, 725 (Haw. Terr. 1899) (citations omitted); see
Carter v. Territory, 14 Haw. 465, 1902 WL 1419, at •3, •10 (Haw. Terr. 1902) (announcing a
public trust for navigation and fishing but allowing exclusive rights of sea fisheries to be acquired by
grant or prescription, although the presumption is against the claimant). For a comprehensive
examination of Hawaii's public trust doctrine, see generally Denise E. Antolini, Water Rights and
also

Responsibilities in the Twenty-First Century: A Forward to the Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on
Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. I (2001); Symposium, Proceedings of
the 2001 Symposiwn on Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 21 (2001).
368. Kuramoto, 30 Haw. at 845.
369. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,448 (Haw. 2000).
370. Id. at 448.
371. Id. at 449.
372. Id. at 450.
313. In re Wai'ola O Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664,692 (Haw. 2004) (citations omitted).
374. Id at 684-85.
375. Id. at 685.
376. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977).
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reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidence by the edge of vegetation or by
the line of debris left by the wash of waves ...." 377
The public trust doctrine can invalidate any attempts to extend property
boundaries beyond the high-water mark:
In Hawaii, the public trust doctrine, recognized in our case law prior to the
enactment of our land court statute, can similarly be deemed to create an
exception to our land court statute, thus invalidating any purported
registration of land below the high water mark. . . . [L ]and below high
water mark is held in public trust by the State, whose ownership may not be
relinquished, except where relinquishment is consistent with certain public
purposes. 378
Moreover, because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai'i, that use
"has ripened into a customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court,
favors extending to public use and ownership as much of Hawaii's shoreline as
is reasonably possible. " 379 Finally, for similar public policy reasons, "lava
extensions vest when created in the people of Hawaii, held in public trust by
the government for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of all the people," and
therefore "the State as trustee has the duty to protect and maintain [this] trust
property and regulate its use. " 380
Most recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has suggested that the public
trust doctrine extends to environmental and biodiversity protection. For
example, in 2005, it suggested that the public trust doctrine applies, via Article
XI, § I of the Hawai'i Constitution, to regulation of the Palila, an endangered
bird. 381 The following year, it explicitly held that the Department of Health and
counties are bound by the public trust doctrine when implementing the federal
Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups sued the Department of
Health asserting that the Department had violated the public trust doctrine by
failing to prevent a developer from violating state water quality standards for
coastal waters, the court concluded that state issuance of National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are
subject to the public trust doctrine and that the Department of Health must
ensure that water quality measures are actually being implemented. 382 In

377. In re Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968) (citing Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2
Haw. 514 (Hawaii Terr. 1862)); see also Territory v. Kerr, 16 Haw. 363, 1905 WL 1327, at *4 (Haw.
Terr. 1905) (holding that grants of property "along the sea" go to the high water mark); In re Sanborn,
562 P.2d at 776 n.6 (noting that title to non-tidal navigable-in-fact waters goes to the high-water mark).
378. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d at 776; see also Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 63 (Haw.
1973) (noting that, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, land below the high water mark belongs to the
public).
379. Hawaii County,,. Sotomura, 517 P.2d at 61-62 (citing Oregon ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462
P.2d 671 (Or. 1969)).
380. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977).
381. Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005).
382. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1011 (Haw. 2006).
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addition, under Article XI, § I of the constitution, counties have public trust
duties as well, and they "have an obligation to conserve and protect the state's
natural resources." 383
Public trust principles in Hawai'i extend to water rights through a unique
water resources trust akin to, but of different origin from, the navigable waters
public trust. Emphasizing the 1978 amendments to the Hawai'i Constitution
that constitutionalized the public trust doctrine, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has
noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai' i, the right to water was reserved to the
people for their common good in all land grants, and ownership of the water
itself remained at all times in the people. 384 This sovereign reservation imposed
a public trust on the water itself, similar to, but different from, the public trust
doctrine that arises as a result of state title to the beds and banks of navigable
waters. 385
Given Hawaii's water situation, the reassertion of this traditional water
resources trust has been deemed critical, both as against assertions of riparian
rights and in light of the State Water Code and water use permits. With respect
to riparian rights,
[t]he reassertion of donnant public interests in the diversion and application
of Hawaii's waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the
resource and recognition of the public's interests in the utilization and flow
of these waters .... [W]hile there indeed exist relative usufructory rights
among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are
absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state. 386
Instead, "underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there
always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty." 387
With respect to the State Water Code:
The public trust in the water resources of this state, like the navigable
waters trust, has its genesis in the common law.... The [State Water] Code
does not evince any legislative intent to abolish the common law public
trust doctrine. To the contrary, ... the legislature appears to have engrafted
the doctrine wholesale in the Code. 388
As a result, the State Water Code "does not supplant the protections of the
public trust doctrine," and "the public trust doctrine applies to all water
resources without exception or distinction," including ground waters. 389 In

383. Id. at 1004-05.
384. In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310-1 l (Haw. 1982) (giving same history).
385. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 441; Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310 (noting that
this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; .. [t]he nature of this ownership is thus
akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways").
386. Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311.
387. Id. at 312.
388. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 443 (citations omitted).
389. Id. at 445.
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addition, "the maintenance of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct
'use' under the water resources trust." 390
Similarly, "a reservation of water constitutes a public trust purpose." 391 As
a result, the Department of Hawaiian Home Land's
reservations of water throughout the State are entitled to the full panoply of
constitutional protections afforded other public trust purposes .... To hold
otherwise would undermine the public trust doctrine, which is a state
constitutional doctrine, and the relevant policy declarations set forth in the
[State Water] Code. 392
"The state water resources trust embodies a dual mandate of 1) protection
and 2) maximum reasonable and beneficial use."393 Specifically, the state has a
"duty to ensure the continued availability and existence of its water resources
for present and future generations," but also a "duty to promote the reasonable
and beneficial use of water resources in order to maximize their social and
economic benefits to the people of this state." 394 With respect to the water
resources trust, moreover, the Hawai'i Supreme Court explicitly followed
California's decision in the Mono Lake case, suggesting that the water
resources trust is more protective than the navigable waters public trust
doctrine. 395 Indeed, the water resources trust "precludes any grant or assertion
of vested rights to use water to the detriment of public trust purposes." 396 As in
California, moreover, the state may "revisit prior diversions and allocations,
even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust." 397
While the Commission may have to balance public and private interests in
water,
the constitutional requirements of 'protection' and 'conservation,' the
historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public
rights, and the common reality of the 'zero-sum' game between competing
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment ...
398

390.

Id. at 448.

391. In re Waiola O Moloka~ Inc., 83 P.3d 664,694 (Haw. 2004).
392. Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Matter of the Contested Case Hearing on the Water Use
Permit Application Filed by Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 174 P.3d 320,329,330 (Haw. 2007) (affirming that
the public trust doctrine is a constitutional doctrine and the Department of Hawaiian Home Land's water
reservations are public trust uses).
393. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 451.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 452.
396. Id. at 453.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 454.
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Moreover, the Commission's decisions in favor of private commercial uses are
subject to "higher scrutiny. " 399 Moreover, the Commission must consider the
cumulative impacts of diversions and "implement reasonable measures to
mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources." 4oo

IDAHO
Date of Statehood:

1890

Water Law Svstem:

Prior appropriation

Idaho Constitution: Idaho has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine.
However, its constitution does establish water rights. Relevant provisions of the
Idaho Constitution include:
•
Art. XV, § 1: "The use of all waters now appropriated, or that may
hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, or distribution; also of all
water originally appropriated for private use, but which after such
appropriation has heretofore been, or may hereafter be sold, rented,
or distributed, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to
the regulations and control of the state in the manner prescribed by
law."
•

Art. XV, § 3: "The right to divert and appropriate the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall
never be denied, except that the state may regulate and limit the use
thereof for power purposes. Priority of appropriation shall give the
better right as between those using the water ...."

•

Art XV,§ 7: "[T]he State Water Resource Agency shall have power
to formulate and implement a state water plan for optimal
development of water resources in the public interest ...."

Idaho Statutes: Idaho has codified its public trust doctrine in Idaho Code
Annotated §§ 58-1201 to 58-1203, which generally limits the public trust
doctrine and its potential impact on appropriated rights. In codifying the
doctrine, the Idaho Legislature made the following findings:
( 1) Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the title to the beds
of navigable waters became state property, and subject to its jurisdiction
and disposal under the equal footing doctrine. According to the United
States [S]upreme [C]ourt's decision in Shively v. Bowlby, the state has the
right to dispose of. the beds of navigable waters, "in such manner as [it]
399. Id.; .see also In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 93 P.3d 643,650, 657 (Haw. 2004) (noting
that "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this
court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's
decisions" and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water).
400. In re Water U.se Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 455 (citations omitted).
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might deem proper ... subject only to the paramount right of navigation
and commerce." The state has the right to determine for itself "to what
extent it will preserve its rights of ownership in them, or confer them on
others." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 56 (1893); and
(2) Since the admission of the state of Idaho into the union, article XV of
the constitution of the state of Idaho has governed the appropriation and use
of the waters of Idaho. Pursuant to article XV of the constitution of the
state of Idaho, the legislature of the state of Idaho has enacted a
comprehensive system of laws for the appropriation, transfer and use of the
waters of Idaho, which addresses the public interest therein; and
(3) Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the state was
granted certain lands by the United States government as an endowment for
designated institutions. Article IX of the constitution of the state of Idaho,
and laws enacted pursuant thereto [related to public school lands], establish
a comprehensive system of laws for the management of state endowment
lands, which addresses the public interest therein; and
(4) The common law doctrine known as the public trust doctrine, adopted
by inference in section 73-116, Idaho Code, had guided the alienation or
encumbrance of the title to the beds of navigable waters held in trust by the
state. The public trust doctrine has been used in court decisions and
pleadings in ways that have created confusion in the administration and
management of the waters and endowment lands; and
(5) The public's interest in the environment is protected in other parts of
Idaho's constitution or statutory law; and
(6) The purpose of this act is to clarify the application of the public trust
doctrine in the state of Idaho and to expressly declare the limits of this
common law doctrine in accordance with the authority recognized in each
state to define the extent of the common law.401
The legislation goes on to declare that "[t]he public trust doctrine as it is
applied in the state of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to
alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defined in this
chapter."402 Further, "[t]he public trust doctrine shall not be applied to any
purpose other than as provided in this chapter,"403 and it does not apply to
"[t]he appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer, administration, or
adjudication of water or water rights . . . or any other procedure or law
applicable to water rights in the state of Idaho" or to "[t]he protection or
401. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1201 (2009). For discussions of this legislation and its impacts on
Idaho's common-law public trust doctrine, see generally Michael C. Blurnm, Renouncing the Public
Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 EcOLOGY L.Q. 461 ( 1997);
James M. Kearney, Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates? Idaho's Statutory Limitation on the Public
Trust Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 91 (1997); Lisa Lombardi, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in Idaho,
33 IDAHO L. REV. 231 (1996).
402. IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 58-1203(1).
403. Id.§ 58-1203(2).
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exercise of private property rights within the state of ldaho."404 Finally, these
statutes define "navigable waters" as "those waters that were susceptible to
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date
of statehood, under the federal test of navigability" and identify the line of
"natural or ordinary high water mark" as the boundary of the beds of navigable
waters. 405
Other relevant statutes in Idaho include:

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

•

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-246: No prescriptive easements for
overflows are allowed in the beds of navigable waters.

•

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1601: This provision defines a "navigable
stream" to be "(a]ny stream which, in its natural state, during
normal high water, will float cut timber have a diameter in excess of
six (6) inches or any other commercial or floatable commodity or is
capable of being navigated by oar or motor propelled small craft for
pleasure or commercial purposes .... " 406 It provides for.public use
rights in "(n]avigable rivers, sloughs or streams within the meander
line or, when not meandered, between the flow lines of ordinary
high water thereof, and all rivers, sloughs and streams flowing
through any public lands of the state," which "shall be open to
public use as a public highway for travel and passage, up or
downstream, for business or pleasure, and to exercise the incidents
of navigation-boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and all
recreational purposes.',4o7 However, this right of use does not
include a right of access over private property, except that the public
can portage around irrigation dams and other private
obstructions.408

•

IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-101 to 42-114: Appropriation of Water.

•

IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-501 to 42-505: Appropriations by the
Bureau of Land Management of the US Department of Interior.

•

IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-602 to 42-619: Distribution of Water
Among Appropriators.

•

IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-701 to 42-715: Headgates and Measuring
Devices.

•

IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-1101 to 42-1108: Rights of Way .

•

IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1201 to 42-1209: Maintenance and Repair
of Ditches.

Id.§ 58-1203(2)(b), (c).
Id.§ 58-1202(1 ). (3).
Id.§ 36-1601(a).
Id.§ 36-I60l(b).
Id. § 36-160 l(c).
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§§ 42-1401 to 42-1418: Water Rights

Adjudications.
•

IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-1501 to 42-1508: Minimum Stream Flow.

•

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 42-3801: "The legislature of the state ofldaho

hereby declares that the public health, safety, and welfare requires
that the stream channels of the state and their environments be
protected against alteration for the protection of fish and wildlife
habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality.
No alteration of any stream channel shall hereafter be made unless
approval therefor has been given as provided in this act."

•

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1302: This provision defines a "navigable

lake" to be "any permanent body of relatively still or slack water,
including man-made reservoirs, not privately owned and not a mere
marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating boats or
canoes. " 409

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
By 1916, the Idaho Supreme Court had rejected the English tidal test of
navigability in favor of the navigability-in-fact test. 410 Until January 1, 1977,
Idaho Code § 36-907 (1976) defined navigability for public fishing purposes to
include any stream supporting log or timber floatation during the high water
season. 411 This older statute codified the holding of Mashburn v. St. Joe
Improvement Co. 412 However, on January 1, 1977, Idaho Code§ 36-1601 took
effect, codifying the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Southern Idaho Fish &
Game Ass 'n v. Picabo Livestock, lnc., 413 which established a log floatation test
for both state title and public fishing purposes and recognized that this test was
less restrictive than the federal test articulated in The Daniel Bal/414 and Utah

v. United States. 415
Idaho has codified the standard federal title test of "navigable waters"that is, "those waters that were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce on the date of statehood, under the
federal test ofnavigability"-for its public trust doctrine. 416 Under this test, the

409. Id. § 58-1302(a).
410. N. Pac. Railway Co. v. Hirzel, 161 P. 854, 858-59 (Idaho 1916) (adopting McManus vs.
Carmichael, 3 Idaho 1 (1856)).
411. Ritter v. Standal, 566 P.2d 769, 770-71 & n. l (Idaho 1977).
412. 113 P. 92, 95 (Idaho 1911); see also Ritter, 566 P.2d at 770-71 (citations omitted).
413. 528 P.2d 1295, 1297-98 & n.1 (Idaho 1974).
414. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
415. 403 U.S. 9(1971).
416. IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 58-1201(3) (2009).
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Salmon River is a navigable water and owned by the state, 417 as are the Snake
and Clearwater Rivers. 418
The public retains the right to use a broader category of "navigable
streams" that are defined in terms of log floatation and pleasure boating.419
Finally, Idaho defines a "navigable lake" to be "any permanent body of
relatively still or slack water, including man-made reservoirs, not privately
owned and not a mere marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating
boats or canoes. " 420
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Snake River in Idaho is
navigable. 421 However, as a result of federal reservations, Idaho does not have
title to the beds of Coeur d'Alene Lake or the St. Joe River; instead, the United
States hold title to those two waters in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 422
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

Although some early cases suggested that a landowner owns the beds of
non-tidal navigable-in-fact rivers, 423 according to current case law and statutes,
a riparian owner on a navigable stream or river or a littoral owner on a
navigable lake takes title to the natural or ordinary high water mark. 424 The
natural or ordinary high water mark is "the line that water impresses on the soil
by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the soil of its vegetation and
destroy its value for agricultural purposes." 425
'" [T]he State owns in trust for the public title to the bed of a navigable
water below the OHWM [ordinary high water mark] as it existed at the time the
State was admitted into the Union. "'426 Landowners cannot exclude the public
from using dry land below the OHWM, although they retain a concurrent right
of access. 427 "Granting the Lakeshore Owners the right to exclude the public
from this portion of state lands would be inconsistent with the public trust
doctrine," which preserves the beds of navigable waters for public use. 428

417. Callahan v. Price, 146 P. 732, 734-35 (Idaho 19 I 5).
418. N. Pac. Railway Co. v. Hirzel, 161 P. 854,859 (Idaho 1916).
419. IDAHO. CODE ANN.§ 36-1601(a), (b).
420. Id § 58-1302.
421. Moss v. Ramey, 239 U.S. 538,544 (1916); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913).
422. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001).
423. See Moss, 95 P. at 514) (citing Johnson vs. Johnson, 95 P. 499 (Idaho 1908)); Ulbright v.
Baslington, 119 P. 292, 293-94 (Idaho 1911).
424. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006) (citing West v. Smith, 511 P.2d 1326, 1330
(Idaho 1973)); IDAHOCODEANN. § 58-1202(1).
425. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-104(9), 58-1202(2); Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake
Watershed Improvement Dist., 17 P.3d 260, 264 (Idaho 2000).
426. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d at 85 (quoting Erickson v. Idaho, 970 P.2d 1, 3 (Idaho 1998)).
427. Id.
428. Id. (citing Callahan v. Price, 146 P. 732, 735 (Idaho 1915); Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at
737).
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Moreover, "[t]he public trust doctrine is based upon common law equitable
principles," and:
While those equitable principles in certain circumstances may no longer
apply to public trust property which has lost its navigable status naturally, it
may well be that a loss of navigability resulting from a manmade dike or
diversion may not, for equitable reasons, eliminate or destroy the public
trust status of land which was once subject to that trust. 429
Similarly, public rights in a navigable river follow any artificial raising of the
river level. 430
Illinois Central Railroad established the principle that the state may not
abdicate its role as trustee of the lands beneath navigable waters to private
parties. 431 In the statutory public trust doctrine enacted in 1996, the Idaho
Legislature preserved this primary focus and principle of the public trust. 432
Public trust lands conveyed to private parties by the Department of State Lands
are limited by that principle and remain subject to the public trust. 433 "The
public trust doctrine at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible
government action with respect to public trust resources." 434 As such, the
public trust doctrine creates both procedural and judicial review requirements.
Procedurally, "public trust resources may only be alienated or impaired through
open and visible actions, where the public is in fact informed of the proposed
action and has substantial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before
a final decision is made thereon." 435 Judicially, the courts make the final
determination as to whether a conveyance is valid, taking a close look at the
agency's decision:
[T]he court will examine, among other things, such factors as the degree of
the effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recreation,
and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust
resource; the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively
with existing impediments to full use of the public trust resource ... ; the
impact of the project on the public trust resource when that resource is
examined in light of the primary purpose for which the resources is suited,
i.e., commerce, navigation, fishing, or recreation; and the degree to which
broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited or private ones. 436

429.
430.
431.
1983).
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 738 (citing Rutledge v. Idaho, 482 P.2d 515 (Idaho 1981)).
Burrus v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., 202 P. 1067, 1068 (Idaho 1921).
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho
IDAHOCODEANN. § 58-1203(1)(2009).
Kootenai Enwl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1095.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092-93.
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Nevertheless, the state has the burden to prove its title by clear and
convincing evidence if the state is not the record title holder. 437 Moreover,
"[t]here is no 'public trust doctrine' relating to land which is wholly
independent or unconnected with such navigable waters." 438 In addition, the
public trust doctrine does not apply to private property traceable to an 1892
patent from the United States government.439
Although public rights were initially limited to navigation and incidents of
navigation, such rights have expanded in Idaho to include fish and wildlife
habitat, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality. 440
By statute, the public trust doctrine does not apply to water rights. 441 This
law, enacted in 1996, invalidates a line of cases that had indicated that
"proprietary rights to use water ... are held subject to the public trust." 442

KANSAS
Date of Statehood:

1861

Water Law Regime:

Prior appropriation

Kansas Constitution: Kansas has not constitutionalized its public trust
doctrine. Indeed, there are no provisions in the Kansas Constitution relevant to
water.
Kansas Statutes:
•

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-201 to 82a-218: Navigable Waters. If there
is a sudden (avulsive) change in a navigable river, the Secretary of
State must buy or condemn the new channel. 443 The state will
acquire ownership to the high water mark. 444 The state can also
convey the old channel. 445

•

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to 82a-773: Kansas Water
Appropriation Act. "All water within the State of Kansas is hereby

437. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 17 P.3d 260, 264
(Idaho 2000).
438. Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 737.
439. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1102 (Idaho 1979).
440. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006); Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 737;
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1093.
441. IDAHOCODEANN. §58-1203(2)(b)(2009).
442. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); Kootenai Em•tl.
Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1094 (holding that ..the public trust doctrine talces precedence even over vested
water rights").
443. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 82a-201 (2009).
444. Id.§ 82a-202.
445. Id.§ 82a-205.
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dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to the control
and regulation of the state in the manner herein prescribed. " 446 The
act allows for minimum streamflows and a permit system. 447 The
act also addresses conservation plans and practices,448 and
establishes a water bank. 44 9

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Kansas courts have recognized that, under the English tidal test of
navigability, three categories of waters existed: the non-navigable waters;
intermediate waters, whose beds were in private ownership but whose waters
are subject to public rights of use; and the navigable waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, whose beds belong to the Crown. 450 Nevertheless, in the
United States, the American navigable-in-fact test governs, and the ancient tidal
test was never part of Kansas common law. 451
Thus, for state title and public trust doctrine purposes, the Kansas courts
apply the federal title test of navigability. According to those courts,
Under this test, bodies of water are navigable and title to the beds under the
water are vested in the State if: (I) the bodies of water were used, or were
susceptible of being used, as a matter of fact, as highways for commerce;
(2) such use for commerce was possible under the natural conditions of the
body of water; (3) commerce was or could have been conducted in the
customary modes of trade or travel on water, and (4) all of these conditions
were satisfied at the time of statehood.452
Older cases, however, allowed the establishment of navigability by judicial
notice, "at least so far as the great rivers are concemed."453 Moreover, lack of

446. Id. § 82a-702.
44 7. Id. §§ 82a-703a to 82a-703c.
448. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733.
449. Id. § 82a-763.
450. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Kan. 1990); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682,
689 (1882).
451. Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 645~9 (Kan. 1914); Wood, 26 Kan. at 689.
452. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1359 (citing United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926)); see
also Hurst v. Dana, 122 P. 1041, 1042 (Kan. 1911) (noting that "any water to be navigable should be
susceptible of use for purposes of commerce or possess the capacity for valuable floatage in
transportation to market of the products of the country through which it runs, and should be of practical
usefulness to the public as a public highway in its own state and without aid of artificial means; that a
theoretical or potential navigability or one that is temporary, precarious and unprofitable, is not
sufficient"); Kregar v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845, 84~7 (Kan. 1908) (noting that navigability is a question of
fact determined through the federal commerce test; meandering is not dispositive).
453. Wood, 26 Kan. at 689 (addressing the navigability of the Kansas River); Hurst, 122 P. at 1042
(addressing the Arkansas River).
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use does not affect state title to a river that is navigable-in-fact. 454 There is no
state common law test of navigability in Kansas. 455
Applying the federal test, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that
Shoal Creek was non-navigable. 456 The court emphasized that the creek did not
allow for any valuable floatage, that it dries up, and that parts of the creek are
not navigable even by canoes. 457 Similarly, the Neosho River was not
navigable even though it could support log floatation and light boats over short
distances; it was never used to transport the products of the country. 458
By 1990, three rivers in Kansas had been declared navigable for title
purposes: the Kansas River, the Arkansas River, and the Missouri River. 459
Three rivers had been declared non-navigable: the Neosho River, the Delaware
River, and the Smoky Hill River. 460
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

For navigable streams, the riparian landowner owns "only to the
banks."461 In contrast, landowners along non-navigable streams own the bed of
the stream and may put a fence across the stream to stop trespassing
canoeists. 462 "Navigable waters and public waters are synonymous terms. This
state claims title to the beds of public streams only. The title to the beds of all
other streams is in the riparian owner. " 4 63
In navigable waters, both riparian owners and the general public have
rights; "[t]he stream is a public highway, and no one can maintain an exclusive
privilege to any part of the water."464 Public rights include the right to take
ice. 465 Moreover:
The title of the state to the bed of a meandered stream is not an absolute
fee, which the state can dispose of as it wishes; but such title is vested in it
in trust for the benefit and common right of all the people, for the purposes
for which such property has been used from time immemorial, viz; the
common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for domestic,

454. Hurst, 122 P. at 1043.
455. Silerv. Dreyer, 327 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Kan. 1958).
456. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1360.
457. Id.
458. Webb v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Neosho County, 257 P. 966,966 (Kan. 1927).
459. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1360 (citing Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637 (Kan. 1914); Hurst, 122 P. at
1041; Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682 (1882)).
460. Id. (citing Webb v. Neosho County Commissioners, 257 P. 966 (Kan. 1927); Piazzek v.
Drainage Dist., 23 7 P. 1059 (Kan. 1925); Kreger v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845 (Kan. 1908)).
461. Id at 1358; Kregar, 96 P. at 847.
462. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1358; Kregar, 96 P. at 848 (noting that title in non-navigable \.Vaters goes to
the thread of the stream).
463. Pia::::ek, 237 P. at 1060.
464. Woodl'. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, WL 910 at •2.
465. Id.
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agricultural, and commercial purposes, and therefore the state has no
proprietary right in the bed of the stream or in the water which it can
selt.466

In addition, private persons cannot acquire prescriptive rights in these assets
against the public. 467
In 1990, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to extend public trust concepts
to non-navigable streams based on state ownership of the water and § 82a-702
of the Kansas statutes. 468
Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of
control of everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional
and statutory limitations, restrictions, and regulations. Where the legislature
refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in nonnavigable
streams, courts should not alter the legislature's statement of public policy
by judicial legislation. 46 9
As a result, "[t]he public has no right to the use of nonnavigable water overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of the
landowner. " 470

MONTANA

Date of Statehood:

1889

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

Montana Constitution: The Montana Constitution has several prov1s1ons
related to water, public access, and environmental protection that the Montana
courts have deemed relevant to Montana's public trust doctrine. 471 These and
other relevant provisions include:
•
Preamble: "We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet
beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of
our rolling plains, and desiring to improve the quality of life,
equality of opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this
and future generations to ordain and establish this constitution."
•

Art. IX, § 1: "The state and each person shall maintain and improve
a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations." 472 "The legislature shall provide for the

466. Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637,640 (Kan. 1914).
467. Id. at 650.
468. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1364 (Kan. 1990).
469. Id. at 1364-65.
470. Id. at 1365.
471. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use of all Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404
(Mont. 2002) (linking the Constitution to the public trust doctrine).
472. MONT. CONST., art. IX,§ 1(1)(1972).
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administration and enforcement of this duty_,..i 73 "The legislature
shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide
adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and
degradation of natural resources." 474
•

Art. IX, § 3: "All existing rights to the use of any waters for any
useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and
confirmed."475 "The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be
appropriated for sale, rent, distribution or other beneficial use, the
right of way over the lands of others for all ditches, drains, flumes,
canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connection therewith, and
the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing water
shall be held to be a public use. "476 "All surface, underground,
flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are
property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to
appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law_,,4 77 "The
legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and
regulation of water rights and shall establish a system of centralized
records, in addition to the present system of local records. "4 78

•

Art. IX, § 4: "The legislature shall provide for the identification,
acquisition,
restoration,
enhancement,
preservation,
and
administration of scenic, historic, archeologic, scientific, cultural,
and recreational areas, sites, records, and objects, for their use and
enjoyment by the people."

•

Art. IX, § 7: "The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild game
animals is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual
citizens of the state and does not create a right of trespass on private
property or diminution of other private rights."

Montana Statutes:

•

473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322: Recreational Use of
Streams. These provisions define "ordinary high-water mark" to be
"the line that water impresses on land by covering it for sufficient
periods to cause physical characteristics that distinguish the area
below the line from the area above it. Characteristics of the area
below the line include, when appropriate, but are not limited to
deprivation of the soil of substantially all terrestrial vegetation and

Id. § 1(2).

Id. § 1(3).
Id.§ 3(1).
Id.§ 3(2).
Id. § 3(3).
Id.§ 3(4).
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destruction of its agricultural vegetative value. A flood plain
adjacent to surface waters is not considered to lie within the surface
waters' high-water marks." 479 Recreational uses of surface waters
include "fishing, hunting, swimming, floating in small craft or other
flotation devices, boating in motorized craft unless otherwise
prohibited or regulated by law, or craft propelled by oar or paddle,
other water-related pleasure activities, and related unavoidable or
incidental uses." 480 '"Surface water' means, for the purpose of
determining the public's access for recreational use, a natural water
body, its bed, and its banks up to the ordinary high-water mark."481
While codifying public recreational rights, these provisions ensure
that title to land is not affected by public access,482 and that the
public can acquire no prescriptive easements as a result of its
recreational use of surface waters. 483 Moreover, the rights do not
apply to lakes. 484 These provisions also restrict riparian landowners'
Iiability. 485 However, the provisions do allow the public rights to
portage above the high-water mark. 48 6

•

MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-5-705: Nothing in the state's water quality
laws and water quality assessment provisions "may be construed to
divest, impair, or diminish any water right recognized pursuant to
Title 85."

•

MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-7-104: Provisions for the protection of
streambeds "shall not impair, diminish, divest or control any
existing or vested water rights under the laws of the state of
Montana or the United States."

•

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-111: "Navigable waters and all streams
of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country are
public ways for the purposes of navigation and such transportation.
This section shall not be construed so as to affect or impair, in any
manner, any rights acquired prior to July 1, 1901, by any person,
association of persons, or corporation. The right of any person,
association of persons, or corporation to take and use any water, as
now provided by law, from any stream or streams for the purpose of
irrigation or any beneficial or industrial pursuit shall not be
abridged."

•

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-112: "All lakes wholly or partly within
this state which have been meandered and returned as navigable by

479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

MONT. CODE ANN.§ 23-2-301 (2009).
Id. § 23-2-301(10).
Id.§ 23-2-301(12).
Id. § 23-2-309.
Id. § 23-2-322.
Id. § 23-2-310.
Id § 23-2-321.
Id. § 23-2-311.
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the surveyors employed by the government of the United States and
all lakes which are navigable in fact are hereby declared to be
navigable and public waters, and all persons shall have the same
rights therein and thereto that they have in and to any other
navigable streams or public waters."487 "All rivers and streams
which have been meandered and returned as navigable by surveyors
employed by the government of the United States and all rivers and
streams which are navigable in fact are hereby declared
navigable."488

•

MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 2: Surface Water and Ground
Water. This chapter provides for water rights adjudications;
appropriations, permits, and certificates of water rights; utilization
of water; and Indian and federal water rights.

•
•

MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 7: Irrigation Districts .
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-102: "All docks and wharves built on
any of the navigable waters of the state shall be public docks and
wharves, and all boats, vessels, and steamboats plying such
navigable waters shall have a right to land thereat and take on and
discharge their cargoes and passengers thereon. The owner of such
dock or wharf shall have the right to charge and collect from the
owner or owners of such boat, steamboat, or vessel a reasonable
compensation therefor."

•

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-107: With respect to land under a
navigable water, state ownership e:>..1ends to the high water mark or
meander line.

•
•

MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 20: Water Compacts .
MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305: "Navigable rivers, sloughs, or
streams between the lines of ordinary high water thereof of the state
of Montana and all rivers, sloughs, and streams flowing through any
public lands of the state shall hereafter be public waters for the
purpose of angling, and any rights of title to such streams and the
land between high water flow lines or within the meander lines of
navigable streams shall be subject to the right of any person owning
an angler's license of this state who desires to angle therein or along
their banks to go upon the same for such purpose."

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Early on, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the common law "ebb and
flow" tidal rule of navigability in favor of the navigable-in-fact test. 489 For
487.
488.
489.

Id.§ 85-1-112(1).
Id.§ 85-1-112(2).
Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517,519 (Mont 1895).
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purposes of state title to the beds and banks, Montana uses a federal test of
navigability based on The Daniel Ball and The Montello. 490 However, in the
Montana Supreme Court's interpretation, this is essentially a log floatation test.
For example, evidence that the Dearborn River was used in 1887 to float
approximately 100,000 railroad ties, and used in 1888 and 1889 to float log
drives supported a finding that the river was navigable for state title
purposes. 491 State ownership of the bed also gives the state ownership of
minerals contained therein. 492
Nevertheless, "where title to the bed of [a river] rests within the State, the
test of navigability for use and not for title, is a test to be determined under
state law and not federal law. " 493 In its case law relying on the Montana
Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court has employed a broad "recreational
use" test to determine which waters are subject to public use. Specifically,
the capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes detennined
whether the waters can be so used. The Montana Constitution clearly
provides that the State owns the waters for the benefit of its people. The
Constitution does not limit the waters' use. Consequently, this Court cannot
limit their use by inventing some restrictive test. 494
By statute, for purposes of public use rights, streams and lakes in Montana
are navigable if they are navigable in fact under a commerce definition or
meandered and returned as navigable by federal surveyors. 495 In addition, the
public has a right to fish in any waters that flow through public lands. 496
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Big Hom River is navigable
and Montana owns its beds and banks. 497
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

The line between private and state ownership of the beds of navigable
waters is the high-water mark or meander line. 498 However, under older

490. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 166 (Mont. 1984).
491. Id.; see also Edwards v. Severin, 785 P.2d 1022, 1023-24 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that the
Yellowstone River is a navigable river because it could float logs).
492. Jackson v. Burlington N., Inc., 667 P.2d 406, 408 (Mont. 1983).
493. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d at 168.
494. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984) (rejecting
both the federal navigability and .. pleasure boat" tests for public rights); see also Mont. Coal. for Stream
Access,,. Curran, 682 P.2d at 169 (recreational use and fishing can make a stream navigable for public
use purposes, and ..[s]treambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant," overruling Herrin v.
Sutherland, 241 P. 328 (Mont. 1925), which held that persons who waded a non-navigable creek had
committed a trespass. on the grounds that that holding "was contrary to the public trust doctrine and the
1972 Montana Constitution").
495. MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 85-1-111, 85-1-112 (2009).
496. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305.
497. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 553-57 (1981).
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statutes, riparian landowners on navigable streams took title to the low water
mark, while landowners along non-navigable waters took title to the middle of
the stream or lake. 499 Neveertheless, even under these cases, public rights
extended to the high water mark. 5oo
"The public has the right to use the waters and the bed and banks up to the
high water mark," including portage "in the least intrusive manner
possible." 501 Moreover, "(u]nder the Constitution and the public trust doctrine,
the public has an instream, non-diversionary right to the recreational use of the
State's navigable surface waters. 502 However, this right does not give the
public access rights over private property. 503 Early rights recognized included
the rights to fish and to shoot wild ducks. 504
Montana is one of the western states that has used public ownership of
water to extend public trust rights to non-navigable waters. Thus, the Montana
Supreme Court has emphasized that "(t]he public trust doctrine in Montana's
Constitution grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of
streams."505 Moreover, "(t]he Montana Constitution makes no distinction
between Class I and Class II waters. All waters are owned by the State for the
use of its people." 506 As a result, "the public has the right to use the water for
recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining real estate
essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water," even if the bed and banks are
privately owned. 507 "The public has a right of use up to the high water mark,
but only such use as is necessary to utilization of the water itself. We hold that

498. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-107; Galt v. Mont. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d
912,915 (Mont 1987).
499. Montgomery v. Gehring, 400 P.2d 403,405 (Mont 1965) (citing MONT. REV. CODE.§ 67-712
(1947)); see also Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 266 P. 646,648 (Mont. 1928) (noting that under MONT.
REV. CODE§ 6771 (1921), landowners along navigable waters took title to the low-water mark); He1Tin,
241 P. at 331 (same); Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517,519 (Mont. 1895) (noting that the boundary between
public and private ownership is the low water mark, based on av. CODE§ 772 (1895)).
500. Gibson, 39 P. at 519-20 (recognizing public rights of fishing and navigation to this mark).
501. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984).
502. In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use All the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont.
2002). For a more detailed discussion of recreational use rights in Montana, see generally Sarah K.
Stauffer, The Row on the Ruby: State Management ofPublic Trust Resources, the Right to Exclude, and
the Future of Recreational Stream Access in Montana, 30 ENVTL. L. 1421 (2006).
503. Mont. Coal.for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091.
504. Herrin, 241 P. at 331.
505. Galt v. Montana Dep't offish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 912,915 (Mont. 1987) (emphasis
added).
506. Id.
501. Id.; Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildeth, 684 P.2d at 1092 (noting that underlying
ownership of the bed does not matter for the public's recreational use right); Mont. Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. I 984) (holding that "under the public trust doctrine
and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so
used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational
purposes").
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any use of the bed and banks must be of minimal impact. " 508 Nevertheless,
Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other
public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public
use rights. 509
Montana statutes codify public rights of recreation, navigation, and fishing
in the navigable and public surface waters. 510 Given the statutory limitations
regarding "surface waters" and "natural" waters in § 23-2-301 of the Montana
Code, recreational rights in artificial lakes are limited. 511

NEBRASKA
Date of Statehood:

1867

Water Law System: Prior appropriation, although some riparian rights
remain 512

Nebraska Constitution: Nebraska's constitution contains several provisions
relating to water. These include:
•
Art. XV,§ 4: Water a Public Necessity. "The necessity of water for
domestic use and for irrigation purposes in the State of Nebraska is
hereby declared to be a natural want."
•

Art XV, § 5: "The use of the water of every natural stream within
the State of Nebraska is hereby dedicated to the people of the state
for beneficial purposes, subject to the provisions of the following
section."

•

Art. XV, § 6: This section establishes the right to divert
unappropriated waters, subject to a public interest limitation and a
preference for domestic use, followed by a preference for
agriculture.

•

Art. XV, § 7: This section declares that the appropriation of water
for power uses is a public purpose.

Nebraska Statutes:

•

NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-105: South Platte River Compact.

•

NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-106: Republican River Compact.

508. Galt, 731 P.2dat915;Mont. Coal.forStreamAccessl'. Curran,682P.2dat 172.
509. MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-111 (2009).
510. Id.§§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322, 85-1-111, 85-1-112, 85-16-102, 87-2-305.
511. Ryan v. Harrison & Harrison Farms, L.L.P., No. 00-395, 2001 WL 828068, at •4 (Mont.
2001).
512. Koch v. Aupperle, 737 N.W.2d 869,878 (Neb. 2007); Wassennan v. Coffee, 141 N.W.2d 738,
744-45 (Neb. 1966).
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•

NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-11O: Nebraska-South Dakota-Wyoming
Water Compact.

•

NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-111: Nebraska-Kansas Water Compact
Commission.

•

NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-112: Wyoming-Nebraska Compact on Upper
Niobrara River.

•

NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-114: Missouri-Nebraska Boundary Compact.
Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from claiming the
beds of the Missouri River against private landowners.

•

NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-115: Blue River Basin Compact.

•

NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-123: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary
Compact. Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from
claiming the beds of the Missouri River against private landowners.

•

NEB. REV. STAT., Chapter 46: Irrigation and Regulation of Water.
This chapter provides for water rights adjudications and ground
water regulation.

143

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
In 1906, the Nebraska Supreme Court observed the variations among the
states regarding what constituted "navigable waters" and blamed the
"confusion" on a variety of factors. 513 Noting that Nebraska had adopted
English common law, the court rejected the navigable-in-fact test for title as a
mistake and adhered instead to the common law ebb-and-flow tidal test-even
for the Missouri River. 514 Despite holding that Nebraska lacked title in the
Missouri River, the court explained that "[t]he public retains its easement of the
right of passage along and over the waters of the river as a public highway.
This is the interest of the public in connection with such rivers which is
paramount, and which is, and should be, protected by the courts." 515
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
A landowner along navigable or non-navigable waters "owns to the thread
of the stream, and his riparian rights extend to existing and subsequently
formed islands." 516 "The only difference is that in the case of a navigable

513. Kinkead v. Turgeon, 109 N.W. 744, 744 (Neb. 1906).
514. Id. at 745-47.
515. Id. at 747. But see Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 64 N.W.
239, 240-41 (Neb. 1895) (accepting the navigable-in-fact test but nevertheless finding that the
Republican River was not navigable).
516. Monument Farms, Inc. v. Daggett, 520 N.W.2d 556, 561-62 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994)~
Krumwielde v. Rose, 129 N.W.2d 491,496 (Neb. 1964).
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stream, such as the Missouri River, it is subject to the superior easement of
navigation." 517 Further,
[t]he interest of the public in the waters and bed of a navigable river is
analogous to that of the public in a public road. It has the right of passage
over the stream as it had over the road. The owner of the land abutting upon
a private road can do nothing in any way to interfere with the rights of the
public in the same, nor can the riparian owner on the banks of a navigable
stream exercise any dominion over its waters or over the bed thereof in any
manner inconsistent with, or opposed to, the public easement. 518
Apart from this, neither the courts nor the
comprehensively developed Nebraska's public trust law.

legislature

have

NEVADA
Date of Statehood:

1864

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

Nevada Constitution: There are no provisions relevant to water in the Nevada
Constitution.
Nevada Statutes:
•

NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.450: Nuisance includes befouling,
obstructing, or rendering dangerous for passage "a lake, navigable
river, bay, stream, canal, ditch, millrace, or basin ...."

•

NEV. REV. STAT. § 322.0052: This provision defines a littoral or
riparian residential parcel.

•

NEV. REV. STAT. § 455B.420: "'Water access area' includes,
without limitation, a beach, river entry or exit point and land located
at or below the ordinary high-water mark of a navigable body of
water within this state."

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 532: State Engineer.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 533: Adjudication of Vested
Water Rights; Appropriation of Public Waters. "The water of all
sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state whether
above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the
public." 519 These provisions also declare that recreational use of the
waters is a beneficial use. 52 0

517.
518.
519.
520.

Kru,mvielde, 129 N.W.2d at 496 (citing Kinkead v. Turgeon, 109 N.W. 744 (Neb. 1906)).
Kinkead, 109 N.W. at 747.
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 533.025 (2008).
Id § 533.030(2).
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•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 534: Underground Water and
Wells.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 535: Dams and Other
Obstructions.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 536: Ditches, Canals, Flumes,
and Other Conduits.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 537: Navigable Waters. This
chapter lists specific waters that the State of Nevada considers
navigable for title purposes. Thus, "[a]ll of the Colorado River
within the State of Nevada, from the Arizona line on the north to the
California line on the south, is hereby declared to be a navigable
stream for purposes of fixing ownership on the banks and beds
thereof, and title to the lands below the high water mark thereof is
held by the State of Nevada, insofar as they lie within the state."521
Similarly, the Virgin River and Winnemuca Lake are navigable
waters, with title to their beds and banks in the State of Nevada. 522

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 538: Interstate Waters,
Compacts, and Commissions. The Colorado River Compact is
codified at § 53 8.0 I 0.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 539: Irrigation Districts.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540: Planning and Development
of Water Resources.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540A: Regional Planning and
Management.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 541: Water Conservancy
Districts.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 543: Control of Floods.

•

NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 544: Modification of Weather.

145

Definition of "Navigable Waters":

In Chapter 537, Nevada's statutes declare certain waters to be navigable
for title purposes, including the Colorado River, the Virgin River, and
Winnemuca Lake. 523 These statutes are effectively treated as conclusive
determinations of navigability for title purposes. 524
521.
522.

Id.§ 537.010.
Id. §§ 537.020, 537.030.
523. NEV. REV. STAT. § 537 (2008).
524. See State Eng'r v. Cowles Bros, Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970) (concluding that, because
Winnemuca Lake went dry naturally and gradually, the court would nonnally have declared it nonnavigable for title purposes, but for the declaration of navigability in NEV. REV. STAT. § 537.030
(1921 )),

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2-CRAJG

146

3/8/2010 4:30:53PM

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 37:53

However, Chapter 537 does not provide a complete list of the navigable
waters in Nevada, and outside of these statutory declarations, the Nevada courts
use the federal test for navigability and recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court
has established different navigability tests for Commerce Clause and state title
purposes. 525 For state title purposes, the water must be navigable as of the date
of statehood. 526 Moreover, "[a] body of water is navigable if it is used or is
usable in its ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted." 527 Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme
Court has interpreted the federal title test to be a log floatation test, concluding
that:
[a]lthough no Supreme Court case has expressly based its decision of title
navigability on the capacity of a stream to float out logs, the emphasized
portions of ... The Montello and Appalachian Power leads us to believe
that in the setting of this case navigability for title has been established.
Log driving was the first and apparently only important commercial use of
the Carson. The river was fortuitously and ideally located geographically
for this use. The Carson River was and is navigable. 528
Moreover, Nevada courts have noted that the Supreme Court allows states to
use less stringent tests for navigability to define allowable public uses. 529

Rights in "Navigable Waters":
The Nevada Supreme Court has noted that "the states hold title to the beds
of navigable watercourses in trust for the people of their respective states. Title
to navigable water beds are normally inalienable."530 As a result, in the absence
on an express legislative determination to convey these submerged lands, it is
presumed that state land patents did not convey them. 531
Early case law indicates that private landowners own to the low water
mark of navigable waters. 532 However, if the title describes a meander line, the
landowner takes only to that meander line or high water line. 533

525. State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231. 1233, 1235-36, 1238 (Nev. 1972).
526. State Eng'r, 478 P.2d at 160.
527. Id. (citing Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922)).
528. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1236; see also Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev. 261, 267 (1878)
(concluding that the Truckee River is navigable because it is "a highway for the floatage of wood and
timber. and has been treated by the officers of the government as a navigable stream").
529. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1235.
530. Id. at 1233, 1235-36, 1238.
531. Id.
532. Shoemaker, 13 Nev. at 267.
533. Michelsen v. Harvey, 822 P.2d 660,662 (Nev. 1991)~ Reno Brewing Co. v. Pacjard, 103 P.
415 (Nev. 1909).
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Nevada's case law on its public trust doctrine is quite limited. Indeed, one
writer has declared that "Nevada remains the only western state that has not
addressed the public trust doctrine." 534
Nevertheless, as in many western states, the issue of the relationship
between appropriative water rights and the public trust doctrine has arisen in
Nevada, although the courts have largely side-stepped the issue. 535 The Nevada
Supreme Court has discussed the public trust doctrine in the water rights
context, however, stating that:
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, the state government, as trustee of all
public natural resources, owes a fiduciary obligation to the general public
to maintain public uses unless an alternative use would achieve a
countervailing public benefit. Thus, the Public Trust Doctrine serves to
protect public expectations in natural resources held in common against
destabilizing change. 53 6
Moreover, the State Engineer's
refusal to consider alternatives to the [water] project is not consistent with
the exercise of his functions as the trustee of water resources in Nevada and
his responsibility to insure that 'all sources of water supply within the ...
state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground' is managed as an
asset belonging to the public. In refusing to consider any of the alternatives
presented by the protestants to the use proposed by the applicants, the State
Engineer has violated his trust and has failed to consider adequately the
public's interest in its water resources. 537
As in Montana, the statutory declaration of public ownership of Nevada's
water may yet influence its public trust doctrine. In 1997, the Nevada Supreme
Court declared that "the most fundamental tenet of Nevada water law [is that]
'[t]he water of sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state
whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public. "'538
In addition, at least one justice of the Nevada Supreme Court has expressed a
willingness to consider "the existence and role of the public trust doctrine in the
State of Nevada," noting that in other states the doctrine has evolved to include
recreational and ecological uses and emphasizing the public ownership of water
in Nevada. 539 According to Justice Rose, "[t]his extension of the doctrine is

534. John P. Sande IV, A Ril'er Runs to It: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Walker Lake?. 44
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 831, 833 n.15 (2004 ).
535. See, e.g., Mineral County v. Nev. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res, 20 P.3d 800,807 n.35
(Nev. 2001) (avoiding the issue of how the public trust doctrine would apply to water rights affecting
Walker River on procedural grounds).
536. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 709 n.7 (Nev. 1996)
(citations omitted).
537. Id. at 709 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025).
538. Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. §
533.025, with the court adding emphasis).
539. Mineral County, 20 P.3d at 807-08 (Rose, J., concurring).
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natural and necessary where, as here, the navigable water's existence is wholly
dependent on tributaries that appear to be over-appropriated."540

NEW MEXICO
Date of Statehood:

1912

Water Law Svstem:

Prior appropriation

New Mexico Constitution: The New Mexico Constitution includes several
provisions related to water, and the New Mexico courts have determined that
the constitutional declaration of public ownership of the waters is relevant to
public use rights. Relevant provisions of the Constitution include:
•
Art. XVI, § 1: "All existing rights to the use of any waters in this
state for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and
confirmed."
•

Art. XVI, § 2: "The unappropriated water of every natural stream,
perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation
for beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of this state. Priority
of appropriation shall give the better right."

•

Art. XVI, § 3: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and
the limit of the right to the use of water."

•

Art. XVI, § 6(A): "The 'water trust fund' is created in the state
treasury to conserve and protect the water resources of New Mexico
and to ensure that New Mexico has the water it needs for a strong
and vibrant future. The purpose of the fund shall be to secure a
supply of clean and safe water for New Mexico's residents."

•

Art. XX,§ 21: "The protection of the state's beautiful and healthful
environment is hereby declared to be of fundamental importance to
the public interest, health, safety and the general welfare. The
Legislature shall provide for control of pollution and control of
despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources of this
state, consistent with the use and development of these resources for
the maximum benefit of the people."

New Mexico Statutes:
•

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-17-7: "A municipality shall consider
ordinances and codes to encourage water conservation and drought
management planning ...."

540. Id. at 808 (connecting the public trust doctrine to NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025, which declares
public ownership ofNevada's water).
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•

N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 3-27-1 to 3-27-9: Municipal Water Facilities.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-53-1 to 3-53-5: Municipal Regulation of
Waters.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-14: This provision prohibits diversions or
reductions of flows that are detrimental to game fish.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-13-2(C): This provision defines "state lands"
to include "all land owned by the state, all land owned by school
districts, beds of navigable rivers and lakes, submerged lands and
lands in which mineral rights have been reserved to the state."

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 1: Water Rights in General.
"All natural waters flowing in streams and watercourses, whether
such be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the state ofNew
Mexico, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for
beneficial use. A watercourse is hereby defined to be any river,
creek, arroyo, canyon, draw, or wash, or any other channel having
definite banks and bed with visible evidence of the occasional flow
of water. " 541 This article also contains provisions related to the
Pecos River water shortage crisis and New Mexico's obligations to
deliver water to Texas,§§ 72-1-2.1 et seq., and settlements of water
rights claims and disputes by tribes. 542

•
•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 2: State Engineer.
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 3: Water Districts and Water
Masters.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4: Surveys, Investigations and
Adjudications of Water Rights.

•
•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4A: Water Project Finance .
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 5: Appropriation and Use of
Surface Waters.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article SA: Ground Water Storage
and Recovery.

•
•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 6: Water-Use Leasing .

~

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 7: Appeals from State
Engineer.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 8: Offenses and Penalties
under the Water Act of 1907.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 9: Application of the Water
Act of 1907.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 10: Community Uses.

541.
542.

149

N.M. STAT.§ 72-1-1 (2009).
Id.§§ 72-1-11, 72-1-12.
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•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 11: Salt Lakes. "All the salt
lakes within this state, and the salt which has, or may accumulate on
the shores thereof, is, and shall be free to the citizens, and each one
shall have power to collect salt on any occasion free from
molestation or disturbance." 543

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12: Underground Waters.
"The water of underground streams, channels, artesian basins,
reservoirs or lakes, having reasonably ascertainable boundaries, is
declared to belong to the public and is subject to appropriation for
beneficial use." 544

•
•

N.M. STA. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12A: Mine Dewatering .
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 13: Artesian Wells .

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 14: Interstate Stream
Commission; Protection of Interstate Streams.

•

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 15: Interstate Compacts. The
Colorado River Compact is codified within this chapter. 545

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
New Mexico cases regarding title navigability are limited, and the most
important resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court declaring the Rio Grande nonnavigable. Specifically, the Court reversed the New Mexico Territorial Court to
find that "the Rio Grande is not navigable within the limits of the territory of
New Mexico. The mere fact that logs, poles, and rafts are floated down a
stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a navigable
river." 546 The Court went on to note:
Obviously, the Rio Grande, within the limits of New Mexico, is not a
stream over which, in its ordinary condition, trade and travel can be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. Its use for
any purposes of transportation has been and is exceptional, and only in
times of temporary high water. The ordinary flow is not sufficient. 547
More recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on the federal test
of navigability from The Daniel Ball to declare Navajo Lake to be navigable. 548
However, this question arose in the context of the applicability of maritime law,
not state title.
543. Id § 72-11-1.
544. Id.§ 72-12-1.
545. Id.§ 72-15-5.
546. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899) (citing The
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430,439 (1874)).
547. Id at 699.
548. Wreyford v. Arnold, 477 P.2d 332,336 (N.M Ct. App. 1970) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(JO Wall.) 557,563 (1870)).
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State title to the beds and banks of navigable waters is less critical to New
Mexico's public trust doctrine than in other states, because the New Mexico
Supreme Court held early on that the New Mexico Constitution's declaration of
public ownership of waters-Article XVI, § 2-is relevant to the defmition of
"public waters" for public use purposes. Regarding this provision as a
declaration of existing law, not a change, the court concluded that beneficial
uses include recreation and fishing, unhampered by a doctrine of riparian
rights. 549 Moreover, navigability under federal law is not the only test for
determining whether waters are public; recreational use is enough. 550
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

"So far as non-navigable streams are concerned, the common law rule,
seemingly without exception, is that the one owning both banks of a stream
likewise owns the entire bed thereof, the waters are private waters, and the
owner has the exclusive right to fish therein." 551 Although "[t]he same rule is
sometimes applied to navigable streams ... it is conceded that the weight of
authority is, rather, that the bed and waters of a navigable stream are the
property of the public with adjoining land owners having no exclusive right to
fish therein. " 552 Indeed:
Where there is no separation in ownership of soil and water, "the right to
hunt and trap from boats on rivers, lakes, streams, etc., is analogous to the
right to take fish from the water. As a general rule, the test as to the public
right of fowling, hunting, and trapping is the public or private ownership of
the soil beneath the waters." 553
As in many western states, the fact that the New Mexico Constitution declares
waters to be publicly owned is relevant not just to state water law but also to
the public's rights to use those waters. In 1947, the New Mexico Supreme
Court declared that all waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated,
and hence the public can use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and
fishing. 554
In 1899, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested with regard to the Rio Grande
River that the federal government's interest in downstream navigability may
limit application of the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, even though the Rio
Grande is non-navigable in New Mexico, the Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Company could not divert the entire flow of the river and so destroy

549.

State ex rel. State Grune Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co.• 182 P.2d 421. 427-28 (N.M.

1947).

550.
551.
552.
553.
554.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 430.
at 426.
(quoting 24 AM. JUR. 378).

at 429-32.
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downstream navigability. 555 While the Court recognized that the western states
were moving toward prior appropriation, it still held that appropriative rights
under state law could not destroy the United States' rights to downstream
flow. 556 As a result, it remanded the case for a determination of the effects of
the irrigation company's proposed dam and diversion on downstream
navigability. 557 After the case made another trip to the Supreme Court, 558 the
New Mexico Territorial Court eventually concluded that the irrigation company
had forfeited its right to build the dam. 559

NORTH DAKOTA
Date of Statehood:

1889

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

North Dakota Constitution: The North Dakota Constitution has two
provisions potentially relevant to public trust principles:
•
Art. XI, § 3: "All flowing streams and natural watercourses shall
forever remain the property of the state for mining, irrigating and
manufacturing purposes."
•

Art. XI, § 27: "Hunting, trapping, fishing and the taking of game
area valued part of our heritage and will be forever preserved for the
people and managed by law and regulation for the public good."

North Dakota Statutes:
•

N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-01-15: "Except when the grant under which
the land is held involves a different intent, the owner of the upland,
when it borders on a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of
the lake or stream at low watermark. All navigable rivers shall
remain and be deemed public highways. In all cases when the
opposite banks of any stream not navigable belong to different
persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to
both."

•

N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-08: "Islands and accumulations of land
formed in the beds of streams which are navigable belong to the
state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary. The control
and management, including the power to execute surface and

555. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 701-02 (1899).
556. Id. at 703.
557. Id. at 710.
558. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 65 P. 276 (N.M. Terr. 1900), rev'd and
remanded, 184 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1902).
559. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 85 P. 393,399 (N.M. Terr. 1906).
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mineral leases, of islands, relictions, and accumulations of land
owned by the state of North Dakota in navigable streams and waters
and the beds thereof, must be governed by chapter 61-33."
•

N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-01: "All waters within the limits of the
state from the following sources of water supply belong to the
public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use and the
right to uses these waters must be acquired pursuant to chapter 6104": surface waters, "excluding diffuse surface waters," and all
waters underground.

•

N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-08: "Every person who in any manner
obstructs the free navigation of any navigable watercourse within
this state is guilty of a misdemeanor."

•

N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-17: This provision allows the booming of
logs on shores of navigable streams, but the owner must leave a
channel for free passage.

•

N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-26: State Water Resources Policy.

•

N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-04: Appropriation of Water. Among
other things, the proposed appropriation must be in the public
interest, which includes consideration of "the effect on fish and
game resources and public recreation opportunities."560 North
Dakota prioritizes uses of water; fish, wildlife, and recreational uses
are all included in the sixth priority, after domestic, municipal,
livestock, irrigation, and industrial uses. 561

•

N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-04.1-01: "'[T]he state of North Dakota claims
its sovereign right to use the moisture contained in the clouds and
atmosphere within the state boundaries. All water derived as a result
of weather modification operations shall be considered a part of
North Dakota's basic water supply and all statutes, rules, and
regulations applying to natural precipitation shall also apply to
precipitation resulting from cloud seeding."

•

N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-15: Water Conservation. A
"navigable lake" is "any lake which shall have been meandered and
its metes and bounds established by the government of the United
States in the survey of public lands. " 562 This section also defines
"high water mark." Under its police power, the state has control of
navigable Jakes "within the ordinary high water mark for the
purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating dams, dikes,
ditches, fills, spillways, or other structures to promote the
conservation, development, storage, distribution, and utilization of

560. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06( 4) (2009).
561. Id§ 61-04-06.1.
562. Id.§ 61-15-01.
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such water and the propagation and preservation of wildlife. " 563
These provisions also allow for water and wildlife conservation
projects. 564 Finally, "[a]ny person who, without written consent of
the state engineer, shall drain or cause to be drained, or who shall
attempt to drain any lake or pond, which has been meandered by the
government of the United States in the survey of public lands, shall
be guilty of a class B misdemeanor." 565
•

N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-33-01: "Sovereign lands" are "those areas,
including beds and islands, lying within the ordinary high
watermark of navigable lakes and streams."

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Navigability for title purposes is a question of federal law, and a water is
navigable if it is navigable-in-fact. 566 North Dakota does not employ the tidal
navigability test. 567 Instead:
When a stream is not tidewater ... , it must be navigable in fact in its
natural state, without the aid of or reference to artificial means, and be of
sufficient capacity to render it capable of being used as a highway for
commerce, either in the transportation of the products of the mines, forests,
or of the soil of the country through which it runs, or of passengers ....
It must be capable of being used for such a purpose, that is, for a public
highway, a considerable part of the year, and it is not sufficient that it have
an adequate volume of water therefor only occasionally, as the result of
freshets, for brief periods of uncertain recurrence and duration. 568
The North Dakota Supreme Court has noted, however, that "the test as to
navigability applied in North Dakota is not as narrow as that in federal courts ..
. . " 569 A water will be deemed navigable-in-fact for state title purposes if it
supports rowing for pleasure and hunting, the cutting and selling of ice, or
hunting from flat-bottomed boats. 570 Similarly, public uses supporting
navigability do not have to be commercial or pecuniary:
A use public in its character may exist when the waters may be used for the
convenience and enjoyment of the public, whether traveling upon trade
purposes or pleasure purposes. . . . Purposes of pleasure, public

563.

ld. § 61-15-02.

564.

Id.§ 61-15-03.

565.

Id.§ 61-15-08.

566.
567.
568.

Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. North Dakota, 37 N. W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1949).
Roberts v. Taylor. 181 N.W. 622,625 (N.D. 1921).
Bissel v. Olson, 143 N.W. 340, 341 (N.D. 1913) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557, 563~ The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874)).
569. O=ark-Mahoning Co., 37 N.W.2d at 491.
570. North Dakota v. Brace, 36 N. W.2d 330, 333 (N.D. 1949).
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convenience, and enjoyment may be public as well as purposes of trade.
Navigation may as surely exist in the former as in the latter. 571
In addition, it is the capacity for public use, not current use, that counts. 572
Even so, under this test Fuller Lake is non-navigable, because it is small
and marshy and its only public use is hunting. 573 Similarly, Grenora Lake is
also not navigable:
There is no evidence that any use has ever been or could be made of the
waters of the lake either for pleasure or for profit, for travel, or for trade.
No boats were used thereon. The water at all times has been of such a
character that it was not habitable for fish. Neither the lake not its
surroundings are suitable for any purposes of pleasure. It is true that aquatic
birds sometimes rested on its surface and there is evidence that hunters
occasionally shot waterfowl that flew to or from the lake, but this was an
infrequent occurrence. s74
The provision of the North Dakota Constitution declaring waters to be
publicly owned does not give the state title to the beds and banks. 575 The
Legislature can declare waters navigable, but "[t]he Legislature may not adopt
a retroactive definition of navigability which would destroy a title already
vested under a federal grant, or transfer to the state a property right in a body of
water or the bed thereof that had previously been acquired by a private
owner." 576
Unless a waterway is meandered or declared navigable by the state
legislature, it is presumed to be non-navigable, and the burden of proof is on
the party claiming navigability. 577 Thus, the Mouse River was presumed nonnavigable, because the parties assumed that it was. 578 In contrast, Devil's Lake
was stipulated to be navigable-in-fact based on boats using the lake for
commercial purposes. 579 Similarly, "it is clear from the undisputed testimony ..
. and from prior holdings of this court that the Missouri River is a navigable
stream in this state. " 580
North Dakota engaged in a long battle with the United States to quiet title
to the Little Missouri River. Despite original findings that the river was
navigable, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed North Dakota's quiet title claim
on the grounds that North Dakota had failed to comply with the Quiet Title
571. Roberts, 181 N.W. at 626.
572. Id.
573. Brace, 36 N.W.2d at 334.
574. Ozark-Mahoning Co., 37 N.W.2d at 491.
575. Id. at 335; see also Roberts, 181 N.W. at 625 (noting that this constitutional provision "is a
declaration concerning public waters").
576. Brace, 36 N.W.2d at 332.
577. Amoco Oil Co. v. N.D. Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978).
578. Id.
579. Rutten v. North Dakota, 93 N.W.2d 796, 797 (N.D. 1958).
580. Hogue v. Bougois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955) (citing Gardner v. Green. 271 N.W. 775;
North Dakota v. Loy, 720 N.W.2d 668).
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Act's twelve-year statute of limitations581 for claims against the federal
government. 582 In 1986, Congress amended the Act to exempt state claims to
navigable rivers from the statute of limitations, and North Dakota re-filed its
action. Nevertheless, despite evidence of use by Indians, ferries, and explorers,
and modem use by recreational canoeists, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the Little Missouri River is not navigable and that
title to its beds and banks remains in the United States. 583 The court applied
The Daniel Ball test of navigability. 584
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

Riparian landowners own to the thread of non-navigable streams. 585 The
federal equal footing doctrine gives states title to the beds underlying navigable
waterways to the high water mark, but states can then pick a different title line.
Despite a statutory provision establishing that riparian landowners generally
take title to the low water mark, 586 "[w]hether North Dakota has limited its title
to the area below the low watermark has not been decided. " 587
Regardless of title, however, the public trust doctrine extends to the high
water mark, because under the equal footing doctrine and the public trust
doctrine, the state could not totally abdicate its interest in that land. 588 Thus, the
state and private landowners have co-existent, overlapping interests in the shore
zone between the high and low water marks. 589 The ordinary high water mark
is determined by the existing state of the river, even if Army Corps dams-as
on the Missowi River-have raised the water level. 590 "[T]he state has rights in
the property up to the ordinary high watermark. The ordinary high watermark is
ambulatory, and is not determined as of a fixed date." 591 The public trust
doctrine and its protection of the public's right of navigation support this
view. 592
581. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1972).
582. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 284-93
(1983).
583. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University & School Lands v. United States, 972 F.2d 235, 240
(8th Cir. 1992).
584. Id. at 237-38.
585. Amoco Oil Co. v. North Dakota Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978) (citing St.
Paul & P.RR Co. v. Schurmeier, 72 U.S. 272, 287-89 ( 1868)).
586. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-01-15 (2009).
587. J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 n.l
(N.D. 1988). But see State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills (Mills I), 523 N.W.2d 537, 540-42 (N.D.
1994).
588. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 542-44.
589. State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills (Mills II), 592 N.W.2d 591,592 (N.D. 1999).
590. Id.
591. Id. (citing In re Ownership of the Bed of Devil's Lake, 423 N.W.2d 141, 143-44 (N.D.
1988)).
592. Id. at 593.
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"The purpose of state title was to protect the public right of navigation. " 593
Indeed, by statute, "[a]ll navigable rivers shall remain and be deemed public
highways." 594 Thus, the policy of protecting the public right of navigation is
embodied in both the public trust doctrine and North Dakota statutes. 595 State
title and public rights shift to the new beds when navigable rivers change
course:
The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would
receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by
1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands
and modify common law so that the state's title would follow the
movement of the bed of the river. This accords with the underlying public
policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to
foster the public's right of navigation, traditionally the most important
feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to us that other
important aspects of the state's public interest, such as bathing, swimming,
recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water
supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new
riverbed, not the old. 596
The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all development, and hence the
granting of a permit to drain wetlands did not violate the public trust doctrineassuming that the doctrine even applied-when the State Engineer studied the
consequences, imposed conditions, and was subject to a public interest
requirement. 597 However, the public trust doctrine does limit the state's
discretionary authority "to allocate vital state resources," as enunciated in
Illinois Central Railroad. 598
Moreover, the doctrine is not restricted to conveyances of real property;
instead, "[t]he State holds the navigable waters, as well as the lands beneath
them, in trust for the public," as provided in the North Dakota Constitution and
refined in statutes.599 Thus, North Dakota's public trust doctrine applies to
appropriations of water. When the State Engineer issues water permits, "the
Public Trust Doctrine requires, at a minimum, a determination of the potential
effect of the allocation of water on the present water supply and future needs of
this State. This necessarily involves planning responsibility."600 While the
593. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 (N.D.
1988).
594. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-01-15 (2009).
595. J.P. Furlong Enters., 423 N.W.2d at 136-37.
596. Id. at 140.
597. In the Matter of the Application for Permits to Drain Related to Stone Creek Channel
Improvements & White Spur Drain, 424 N.W.2s 894,901 (N.D. 1988) (citing United Plainsmen v. N.D.
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457,463 (N.D. 1976)).
598. United PlainsmenAss'n, 247 N.W.2d at 460.
599. Id. at 461 (noting that "[w]e believe that § 61-01-01, NDCC, expresses the Public Trust
Doctrine").
600. Id.
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North Dakota Supreme Court also acknowledged that "[i]t is evident that the
Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding role in environmental law," it
saw no need for such expansive declarations in the context of water rights
permitting. 601 Instead, even as "[c]onfined to traditional concepts, the Doctrine
confirms the State's role as trustee of the public waters. It permits alienation
and allocation of such precious state resources only after an analysis of present
supply and future need."602
OKLAHOMA
Date of Statehood:

1907

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation and riparian rights603

Oklahoma Constitution: Only one provision of the Oklahoma Constitution is
relevant to water. It declares that "[t]he Legislature shall have power and shall
provide for a system of levees, drains, and ditches and of irrigation in this State
when deemed expedient ...."60 4
Oklahoma Statutes:
•

OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 60: This section preserves riparian
rights to use water for domestic use.

•

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 337: "Islands and accumulations of land
formed in the beds of streams which are navigable, belong to the
state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary."

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 1: Irrigation and Water Rights.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter IA: Oklahoma Dam Safety Act.

•

80 OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 2: Irrigation Districts.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 4: Conservation in General.

601. /dat463.
602. Id.~ see also N.D. State Water Comm'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254,258 (N.D. 1983)
(holding that the State does not lose its authority over the waters of a lake merely because the bed is
privately owned and detennining that "[p]rotecting the integrity of the waters of the state is a valid
exercise ofthe Commission's duties pursuant to§ 61-02-12, NDCC, as well as being part ofthe state's
affmnative duty under the 'public trust' doctrine"; as a result the Commission had authority to control
the drainage of a non-navigable lake).
603. Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571-72 (Okla. 1990)
(noting that while the 1963 amendments to Oklahoma's water law modified riparian rights, Oklahoma
riparian owners retain "a vested common-law right to the reasonable use of the stream," and the
legislature's attempt to extinguish those riparian rights by giving ownership of all water to the state was
unconstitutional; however, appropriative rights for irrigation have existed since 1897, and riparian and
appropriative rights are co-existent).
604. OKLA. CONST., art. XVI,§ 3.
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•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 5: Conservancy Act of
Oklahoma.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 8: Grand River Dam Authority.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 11: Oklahoma Groundwater
Law.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 14: Oklahoma Water Resources
Board.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 14A: Oklahoma Weather
Modification Act.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 15: Port Authorities.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 17: Regional Water Distribution
Act.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 18: Rural Water, Sewer, Gas and
Solid Waste Management Districts Act.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20: Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas
River Basin Compact.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20A: Arkansas River Basin
Compact Arkansas-Oklahoma.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20B: Red River Compact.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 21: Scenic Rivers Act.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 22: Conservation District Act.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 23: Oklahoma Floodplain
Management Act.

•

80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 25: Oklahoma Weather
Modification Act.

159

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Navigability is a question of fact, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
adopted and applied the federal test of navigability from The Montello. 605
Under this test, the South Canadian River is non-navigable, and avulsive
(sudden) changes to the river did not change title. 606 Similarly, no stipulation
was allowed as to the navigability of the Grand River or the Neosho River, and
both were found non-navigable under the federal test ofnavigability. 607

605.
1915).
606.
607.

The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430,439 (1874)~ see Hale v. Record. 146 P. 587, 587 (Okla.
State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Warder, 198 P.2d 402, 406--07 (Okla. 1948).
Hanes v. Oklahoma, 973 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title
purposes from navigability for public use purposes. Thus, it found that the
Kiamichi River was navigable for fishing and pleasure but not for commerce:
[W]e find that the Kiamichi River is one of the beautiful streams of
southeastern Oklahoma that it has for many years been known as one of the
best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for fishing,
recreation and pleasure; that at one time the stream was used for
commercial purposes in that logs were floated down its channel to be used
for mill purposes; that at the site of the controversy herein the river was
between 150 and 200 feet in width; that many small boats used the river. 608
Thus, the river was not navigable for title purposes and private landowners
owned the bed of the river. However, that ownership is "subject to the rights of
the public to use the river as a public highway," and the landowner "does not ..
. have exclusive fishing rights therein. " 609 Thus, the Kiamichi River was
"navigable" in the sense that the public could use the river, but not in the sense
that the state owned the bed. 610
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the Arkansas River is
navigable; as a result, title to the bed vested in the state. 611 However, eight
years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that under the federal test of
navigability, the Arkansas River along the Osage Indian Reservation in
Oklahoma is non-navigable and belongs to the United States in trust for the
Tribe. 612 The Oklahoma Supreme Court responded by declaring that the Osage
Tribe had title only to the bed of the non-navigable portions. 613
In 1953, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that the Arkansas River
was navigable from its confluence with the Grand River, vesting title to the bed
in the state. 614 However, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the entire
river below its confluence with the Grand River, while navigable, was reserved
to the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw tribes by treaty. 615
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Red River is not
navigable anywhere in Oklahoma, so the state does not own its beds. 616

608. Cllll)' v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969).
609. Id.
610. Id. at 936.
611. Oklahoma v. Nolegs, 139 P. 943,945 (Okla. 1914).
612. Brewer Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1922).
613. Vickey v. Yahola Sand & Gravel Co., 12 P.2d 881, 885 (Okla. 1932). But see Aladdin
Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office, 191 P.2d 224, 229-30 (Okla. 1948) (applying
the U.S. Supreme Court's non-navigability analysis to the Arkansas River).
614. Lynch v. Clements, 263 P.2d 153, 156 (Okla 1953).
615. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 (1970); United States v. Cherokee
Nation ofOklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987).
616. Oklahoma v. Texas, 259 U.S. 565, 566-67 (1922); accord Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 191 P.2d
at 228-29. Contra Hale v. Record, 146 P. 587,588 (Okla. 1915) (finding the Red River to be navigable).
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Rights in "Navigable Waters":
The state takes title to the beds of navigable rivers to the high water
mark. 617 Moreover, pursuant to Illinois Central Railroad, the government has a
right to regulate public wharves and piers in navigable waters, loading places
along navigable waters, and rights in navigable waters.618 The Oklahoma
courts have not otherwise extensively addressed the state public trust doctrine,
except to hold that the public has rights of boating, recreation, and fishing in
waters that are not navigable under the federal title test. 619
When the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged the co-existence of
riparian and appropriative water rights in 1990, the dissent was "of the ...
opinion that the majority confuses certain public rights in our streams as being
exclusive private property rights of riparians."620 In contrast, the dissent was
willing to establish an expansive public trust doctrine that would require
minimum flows in Oklahoma's rivers and supersede private rights. 621

OREGON
Date of Statehood:

1859

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation622

Oregon Constitution: Oregon has not constitutionalized its public trust
doctrine. However, the Oregon Constitution contains several relevant
provisions, including:
•
Art. I, § 1: As part of its private property takings protections, the
Oregon Constitution states that "the use of all roads, ways and
waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw
products of mine or farm or forest or water for beneficial use or
drainage is necessary to the development and welfare of the state
and is declared a public use."
•

Art XI-D, § 1: "The rights, title and interest in and to all water for
the development of water power and to water power sites, which the

617. Oklahoma v. Nolegs,139 P. 943, 94~6 (Okla. l 914); City of Tulsa v. Comm'rs of Land
Office, IOI P.2d 246,248 (Okla. 1940).
618. Sublett v. City ofTulsa, 405 P.2d 185, 196 (Okla. 1965).
619. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla. 1969).
620. Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 595 (Okla. 1990)
(Hargrave, J., dissenting).
621. Id. at 595-96.
622. See In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1089-90 (Or. 1924) (upholding the state's prior
appropriation system).
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state of Oregon now owns or may hereafter acquire, shall be held by
it in perpetuity."

•

Art. XI-D, § 2: As part of its constitutional authority over water
power, "[t]he state of Oregon is authorized and empowered," inter
alia: (I) "[t]o control and/or develop the water power within the
state"; (2) "[t]o lease water and water power sites for the
development of water power"; (3) "[t]o develop, separately or in
conjunction with the United States, or in conjunction with the
political subdivisions of this state, any water power within the state,
and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric
power plants, transmission and distribution lines"; (4) "[t]o develop,
separately or in conjunction with the United States, with any state or
states, or political subdivisions thereof, or with any political
subdivision of this state, any water power in any interstate stream
and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric
power plants, transmission and distribution lines"; (5) "[t]o contract
with the United States, with any state or states, or political
subdivisions thereof, or with any political subdivision of this state,
for the purchase or acquisition of water, water power and/or electric
energy for use, transmission, distribution, sale and/or disposal
thereof'; and (6) "[t]o do any and all things necessary or convenient
to carry out the provisions of this article."

•

Art XI-D, § 4: Nothing in the constitutional authority over water
power "shall be construed to affect in any way the laws, and the
administration thereof, now existing or hereafter enacted, relating to
the appropriation and use of water for beneficial purposes, other
than for the development of water power."

•

Art. XI-H, § I: This article provides for "loans and grants for the
purpose of planning, acquisition, construction, alteration or
improvement of facilities for or activities related to, the collection,
treatment, dilution and disposal of all forms of waste in or upon the
air, water and lands of this state."

•

Article XI-1(1): This article covers water development projects and
creates a Water Development Fund. "The fund shall be used to
provide financing for loans for residents of this state for
construction of water development projects for irrigation, drainage,
fish protection, watershed restoration and municipal uses and for the
acquisition of easements and rights of way for water development
projects authorized by law."

•

Art. XV, §§ 4, 4a: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to
be used for "the public purpose of financing the protection, repair,
operation, creation and development of state parks, ocean shores
and public beach access areas, historic sites and recreation areas ...
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Art. XV,§§ 4, 4b: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to
be used for salmonid and wildlife protection, including protection
and restoration of watersheds, aquatic habitats, and water quality.

Oregon Statutes:
•

•

OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 196: Columbia River Gorge; Ocean
Resource Planning; Wetlands; Removal and Fill. "The protection,
conservation and best use of the water resources of this state are
matters of the utmost public concern. Streams, lakes, bays, estuaries
and other bodies of water in this state, including not only water and
materials for domestic, agricultural and industrial use but also
habitats and spawning areas for fish, avenues for transportation and
sites for commerce and public recreation, are vital to the economy
and well-being of this state and its people. Unregulated removal of
material from the beds and banks of the waters of this state may
create hazards to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this
state. Unregulated filling in the waters of this state for any purpose,
may result in interfering with or injuring public navigation, fishery
and recreational uses of the waters. In order to provide for the best
possible use of the water resources of this state, it is desirable to
centralize authority in the Director of the Department of State
Lands, and implement control of the removal of material from the
beds and banks or filling of the waters of this state. " 623 The Director
of the Department of State Lands may issue permits for the fill or
dredging of water resources only if the activity: "(a) [i]s consistent
with the protection, conservation and best use of the water resources
of this state ... ; and (b) [w]ould not unreasonably interfere with the
paramount policy of this state to preserve the use of its waters for
navigation, fishing and public recreation."624 The Oregon courts
have concluded that these two provisions (as formerly numbered)
"are a codification of the public trust doctrine."625
OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 274: Submersible and Submerged Lands.
In general, "submerged lands" in Oregon are "lands lying below the
line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters within the
boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established,
whether such waters are tidal or nontidal."626 "Submersible lands,"
in contrast, are the "lands lying between the line of ordinary high
water and the line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters and
all islands, shore lands, or other such lands held by or granted to this

623. OR. REV. STAT.§ 196.805 (2009).
624. Id. § 196.825(1).
625. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520,527 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), ajf'd, 590 P.2d 709
(Or. 1979).
626. OR. REV. STAT§ 274.005(7).
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state by virtue of her sovereignty, wherever applicable, within the
boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established,
whether such waters or lands are tidal or nontidal." 627 The "line of
ordinary high water" is "the line on the bank or shore to which the
high water ordinarily rises annually in season," while the "line of
ordinary low water" is "the line on the bank or shore to which the
low water ordinarily recedes annually in season. " 628 "Tidal
submerged lands" are "lands lying below the line of mean low tide
in the beds of all tidal waters within the boundaries of this state as
heretofore or hereafter established."629 "The title to the submersible
and submerged lands of all navigable streams and lakes in this state
now existing or which may have been in existence in 1859 when the
state was admitted to the Union, or at any time since admission, and
which has not become vested in any person, is vested in the State of
Oregon. The State of Oregon is the owner of the submersible and
submerged lands of such streams and lakes, and may use and
dispose of the same as provided by law."630 "The State Land Board
has exclusive jurisdiction to assert title to submerged or submersible
lands in navigable waterways on behalf of the State of Oregon," 631
and this chapter provides procedures for the administrative
determination of navigability. 632 Moreover, "all meandered lakes
are declared to be navigable and public waters," with title to their
submerged and submersible lands vested in the State of Oregon
unless otherwise validly conveyed. 633 "The Department of State
Lands [had] exclusive jurisdiction over all ungranted tidal
submerged lands owned by this state .... " 634

•

627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.

OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 537: Water Rights Act. "All water within
the state from all sources of water supply belongs to the public,"
including ground water. 635 The Act allows for instream water rights
for public uses, 636 and public uses include but are not limited to
recreation, "conservation, maintenance and enhancement of aquatic
and fish life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat and any other
ecological values," pollution abatement, and navigation. 637 In
addition, "[p]ublic uses are beneficial uses," but "(t]he recognition
of an in-stream water right ... shall not diminish the public's rights

Id. § 274.005(8).
Id.§ 274.005(3), (4).
Id.§ 274.705(7).
Id. § 274.025(1 ).
Id. § 274.402( 1).
Id. §§ 274.404 to 274.412.
Id.§ 274.430(1).
Id. § 274.710.
Id. §§ 537.010, 537.525.
Id. §§ 537.332- 537.360.
Id. § 537.332(5)(b).
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in the ownership and control of the waters of this state or the public
trust therein." 638 The Water Rights Act also allows for extensions of
the irrigation season639 and encourages conservation of water. 640
•

OR. R.Ev. STAT., Chapter 780: Improvement and Use of Navigable

Streams: "All channels of rivers and watercourses made navigable
or the navigation of which is improved ... shall be public highways,
and shall be free to all crafts navigating them. " 641

Definition of"Navigable Waters":
For title purposes, Oregon originally adhered to the ebb-and-flow tidal test
of navigability. 642 Thus, because the Tualatin River was not subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, its bed and banks were privately owned. 643 In contrast, the
bed and banks of the Columbia River, which is subject to the ebb-and-flow of
the tide, are owned by the state. 644 Moreover, in tidal waters, state title
advances with the rising of the sea. 645
However, the Oregon Supreme Court soon thereafter adopted a fairly
liberal log floatation test of navigability that extended public use navigability to
navigable-in-fact waters. It held in 1869 that:
any stream in this state is navigable on whose waters logs or timbers can be
floated to market, and that they are public highways for that purpose; and
that it is not necessary that they be navigable the whole year for that
purpose to constitute them as such. If at high water they can be used for
floating timber, then they are navigable; and the question of their
navigability is a question of fact, to be determined as any other question of
fact by a jury. Any stream in which logs will go by the force of the water is
navigable. 646
This rule, the court held, best served Oregon public policy:

638. Id. § 537.334(1), (2).
639. Id § 537.385.
640. Id. § 537.460.
64 I. Id § 780.030.
642. See Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 448-49 (1869) (recognizing that the navigable-in-fact test has
largely replaced the ebb-and-flow tidal test in the United States); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 411
( 1877) (holding that "the tide lands-those uncovered by the ebb and flow of the sea-belong to the
state of Oregon by virtue of its sovereignty"); Hogg v. Davis, 30 P. 160, 160 (Or. 1892) (same); Bowlby
v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 156 (Or. 1892), aff'd, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) ("Upon the admission of the state into the
Union, the tide lands became the property of the state, and subject to its jurisdiction and disposal.").
643. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 376, 380-82 (1882).
644. Hinman, 6 Or. at 411-12; see also Atkinson v. Tax Comm'n of Or., 303 U.S. 20, 22 (1938)
(determining that Oregon, not the United States, owns the bed of the Columbia River on Oregon's side
of the border with Washington); Hurne v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1067 (Or. 1907)
(determining that the Rogue River is navigable, and its bed is owned by the State, because it is
influenced by the tide for at least four miles).
645. Wilson v. Shively. 4 P. 324, 325-26 (Or. 1884).
646. Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455, 457-58 (1869).
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And we think it the rule that best accords with common sense and public
convenience, for these rapid streams, penetrating deep into the mountains,
are the only means by which timber can be brought from these rugged
sections, without great labor and expense; and by their use large tracts of
timber, otherwise too remote or difficult of access, can be rendered of great
value, as the country shall grow and timber become scarce. 647
Thus, "[a] stream, which, in its natural condition, is capable ofbeing commonly
and generally useful for floating boats, rafts or logs, for any useful purpose of
agriculture or trade, though it be private property, and not strictly navigable, is
subject to the public use as a passageway." 648
As such, the Oregon courts early on distinguished three categories of
waters:
First, Such rivers, or arms of the sea, in which the tide ebbs and flows; and
in these, which are technically called navigable, the sovereign is the owner
of the subjacent soil, and all right in it belongs exclusively to the public.
Second, Such streams as are navigable in fact for boats, vessels, or lighters;
and in these, which are termed public highways, the public have an
easement for the purposes of navigation and commerce, but the title of the
subjacent soil to the middle of the stream, and the right to the use of the
water flowing over it is in the riparian owner, subject to the superior rights
of the public to use it for the purposes of transportation and trade. Third,
Such streams as are so small or shallow as not to be navigable for any
purpose; and in these the public have no rights of a highway or otherwise,
and they are altogether private property. 649
In 1935, however, the State of Oregon was involved in litigation in the
U.S. Supreme Court that applied the federal navigable-in-fact test to determine
whether Oregon had title to the beds of Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Harney
Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef. 650 The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
that navigability for purposes of title is a federal question651 and applied the

647. Id. at 458.
648. Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 449 (1869); see also Haines v. Hall, 20 P. 831. 835 (Or. 1888)
("Whether the creek in question is navigable or not ... depends upon its capacity in a natural state to
float logs and timber, and whether its use for that purpose will be an advantage to the public."); Nutter v.
Gallagher, 24 P. 250, 252-53 (Or. 1890); Kamm v. Normand, 91 P. 448, 450-53 (Or. 1907); Lebanon
Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 136 P. 891, 892 (Or. 1913); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 440-42
(Or. 1918).
649. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 375-76 (1882); see also Haines v. Welch, 12 P. 502,
503 (noting that navigability "depends upon [the water's] capacity, extent and importance. If it is
capable of serving an important public use as a channel for commerce, it should be considered public;
but if it is only a brook, although it might carry down saw logs for a few days during a freshet, it is not,
therefore, a public highway. (citation omitted) And even if it were public, in the sense that it is useful to
float products to market, it can only be used with due regard to the rights of the owner of its banks
through which it flows.").
650. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
651. Id. at 14.
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federal commerce-based test to determine that none of the waters in question
was navigable in fact:
[N]either trade nor travel did then or at any time since has or could or can
move over said [waters], or any of them, in their natural or ordinary
conditions according to the customary modes of trade or travel over water; .
. . nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of being used in the
natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent or other
highways or channels for useful or other commerce. 652
As a result, the Oregon courts now apply the federal navigable-in-fact test of
navigability as well as the tidal test. Moreover, while acknowledging that this
test derives from The Daniel Ball, The Montello, and United States v. Utah,
they apply this title test broadly, emphasizing that the extent of commerce on a
river is not the test. 653 Timber use and log floatation are still evidence of
navigability, 654 and the Oregon Court of Appeals declared the John Day River
navigable on the basis of Native American use and log floatation for timber
purposes. 655
In addition, according to contemporary Oregon statutes, all meandered
lakes are considered navigable and public, unless otherwise validly
conveyed. 656 Moreover, by statute, Oregon recognizes both the tidal and
navigable-in-fact tests for navigability. 657 Thus, Oregon now asserts title by
statute to a broader category of waters than the federal title navigability test
would allow, because Oregon asserts title to the submerged and submersible
lands of waters which became navigable after its admission to the United States
in 1859, unless those lands have been validly conveyed to private persons. 658
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

Oregon provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine
that, once submerged lands passed from the federal government to the states,
issues of title as between the state and private landowners were to be
determined by state law. 659 This case involved the Willamette River, and

652. Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Holt State Banlc., 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926); United States v.
Utah. 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922);
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574,586 (1922); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113,
123 (1921); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,698 (1899); The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870)).
653. Nw. Steelheaders Ass'n. Inc. v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 389-90 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
654. Id. at 390.
655. Id. at 391-95.
656. OR. REV. STAT.§ 274.430(1)(2009).
657. Id. § 274.005(7)-(8).
658. Id.§ 274.025(1).
659. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977)
(overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)).
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Oregon eventually decided that, under Oregon law, the state retained ownership
of the bed after an avulsive change to the river. 660
Oregon also provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to declare
that, as a federal matter, states take title to the beds of navigable waters to the
high-water mark. 661 Oregon has now codified this rule. 662 Moreover, no
adverse possession of lands below the low-water mark of navigable waters is
allowed.
In Oregon, riparian owners retain riparian rights to use the water and
submerged lands below the high-water mark, including the right to wharf out,
the right to moor logs on the water, and a preference in leasing or purchasing
tidelands, if the state decides to lease or sell them. 663 However, these rights are
subject to the public's rights of use. 664
The Oregon courts have acknowledged that
lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and
limited resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their
preservation for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and
recreation. Under the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of
such waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related
purposes. 665
"The state, as trustee for the people, bears the responsibility of preserving and
protecting the right of public use of the waters for those purposes. " 666
These trustee responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As a
result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable waters
violated the privileges and immunities clause in the Oregon Constitution. 667
Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over navigable waters, it can

660. State ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co .• 582 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1978).
661. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15, 26 (1897)(involving the Columbia River).
662. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 274.025(1), 274.005; see also Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 (Or.
1877) (concluding that the high tide line is the property line for properties along the Columbia River,
regardless of what the grant says); Parker v. W. Coast Packing Co .• 21 P. 822, 824 (Or. 1889) (holding
that the state owns submerged lands on a navigable river to the high water mark); Oregon v. Portland
Gen. Elec. Co.• 95 P. 722, 728-29 (Or. 1908) (same).
663. Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia Pac. Towing Corp.• 443 P.2d 205, 207-18 (Or. 1958)
(reviewing the history of Oregon's case law on the subject).
664. Id. at 218.
665. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands. 581 P.2d 520,523 (Or. App. 1978), ajf'd, 590 P.2d 709
(Or. 1979).
666. Or. Shores Conservation Coal. v. Or. Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 662 P.2d 356, 364 (Or. Ct.
App. 1983); see also Wilson v. Welch, 7 P. 341,344 (Or. 1885) ("The state does own the channel of the
navigable river within its boundaries. and the shore of its bays, harbors, and inlets between high and low
water. but its ownership is a trust for the public.").
667. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy,
47 P.2d 252, 252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for
salmon).
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regulate fishing. 668 Specifically, fishing methods can be enjoined if they
interfere with the public's common right of fishing. 669
Under the public trust doctrine, "[w]hile certain of the state's interests are
alienable, its obligation as trustee of the public interest remains .... Thus, all
submerged and submersible lands are subject to the paramount responsibility of
the state to preserve and protect the public interest. " 670 Like California, Oregon
views waters as a limited and precious resource:
The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water
resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of
such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of
the resources and its fundamental important to our society and our
environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore,
the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries
once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public and,
accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public
trustee. 671
As a result, the purpose of a private use of navigable waters is critical to
whether the use may be allowed under the public trust doctrine. Following
Illinois Central Railroad, the Oregon courts have concluded "that water
resources should be devoted to uses which are consistent with their nature and
should be protected from inimical uses."672 Undertakings in furtherance of and
consistent with the trust, "such as the construction of wharves, docks and
piers," are permitted, while "upland-related activities which consume water
resources by adapting them to uncharacteristic uses" must be examined more
closely. 673 However, to the e:x.1ent that the Oregon public trust doctrine
prohibits some uses, it "does not prohibit [activities] other than water-related
uses . . . ."674 Moreover, the State Lands Board does not give up the jus
publicum in leasing submerged lands. 675

668. Oregon v. Nielsen. 95 P. 720, 722 (Or. 1908); Antony v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Or.
1950).
669. Radich v. Frederckson, 10 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. 1932); Johnson, 47 P.2d at 252.
670. Morse, 581 P.2d at 524.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 525.
673. Id. For an earlier review of Oregon's public trust doctrine, see generally Michael B. Huston,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Oregon, 19 ENVTL. L. 623 ( 1989). For an argument in favor of expanding
that doctrine, see generally Scott B. Yates, Comment, A Case For the Extension of the Public Trust
Doctrine in Oregon, 27 ENvn. L. 663 (1997).
674. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (Or. 1979); see also Cook v. Dabney,
139 P. 721, 722 (Or. 1914) (holding that the Oregon State Lands Board cannot convey submerged lands
"in a manner and for a purpose which would act as a direct and pennanent impediment to navigation,"
because doing so would violate the public trust doctrine); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 ( 1877)
(holding that the State "has no authority to dispose of its tidelands in such a manner as may interfere
with the free and untrammeled navigation of its rivers, bays, inlets and the like. The grantees of the state
[to properties along the Columbia River] took the land subject to every easement growing out of the
right of navigation inherent in the public."); Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 160 (Or. 1892), ajf'd, 152
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Oregon's Water Rights Act explicitly acknowledges the public trust
doctrine and prohibits instream water rights from diminishing public rights in
waters under that doctrine. 676 Moreover, under Oregon case law, private
landowners cannot divert navigable-in-fact rivers subject to public use
rights. 677
Oregon statutes ex1end public rights to any waters made navigable by the
state678 and to non-navigable, privately owned waters that can float boats, rafts
or logs. 679 The private owner cannot deny the public its right of navigation,
including the right to bypass obstructions by traveling over private land, but the
public has only an "incidental" right to "meddle" with the privately owned
banks. 680
In addition, the public has acquired the right to use the dzy sand portions
of beaches through the doctrine of custom. 681 As a result, there is no taking of
private property when the state denies landowners permits to build sea walls. 682

SOUTH DAKOTA
Date of Statehood:

1889

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

South Dakota Constitution: The South Dakota Constitution has no provisions
relevant to the public trust doctrine.
South Dakota Statutes:
•

S.D. COD. L. § 1-2-8: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary Compact.

•

S.D. COD. L. § 8-03: "The public has a right to use the strip of land
50 feet landward from all navigable waters provided the strip is

U.S. 1 (1894) (holding that the state can dispose of tidelands, but only subject "to the paramount right of
navigation and commerce," and "the owner of the upland or tide water has certain rights, arising from
his adjacency to such waters, subordinate, however, to their use by the public for navigation and
fishing").
675. Brusco Tugboat Co. v. Oregon, 589 P.2d 712, 718 (Or. 1978).
676. OR. REV. STAT.§ 537.334(2) (2009).
677. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371,383 (1882).
678. OR. REV. STAT. § 780.030.
679. Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445,449 (1869).
680. Id. at 450.
681. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673-78 (Or. 1969). For an argument that the
public trust doctrine still plays a role in protecting public rights in Oregon's beaches, see generally Erin
Pitts, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Ensuring Continued Public Use of Oregon
Beaches, 22 ENVTL. L. 731 (1992).
682. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449,451 (Or. 1993).
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between the ordinary high water mark and ordinary low water mark
of public bodies of water."
•

•

683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.

S.D. COD. L. Chapter 34A-10: Environmental Protection Act. This
act creates a private right of action "for the protection of the air,
water, and other natural resources and the public trust therein from
pollution, impairment, or destruction."683 Similarly, agencies can
allow parties to intervene in agency proceedings if the proceeding in
question "involves conduct which has the effect of polluting,
impairing, or destroying the air, water, or other natural resources or
the public trust therein." 684 The act also allows the courts to "grant
temporary equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the
air, water, and other natural resources or the public trust therein
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, " 685 and requires the
courts to "adjudicate the impact of the defendant's conduct on the
air, water, or other natural resources and on the public trust therein
in accordance with this chapter. " 686 In both administrative and
judicial proceedings, "any alleged pollution, impairment, or
destruction of the air, water or other natural resources or the public
trust therein, shall be determined, and no conduct shall be
authorized or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect
so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with
the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and
welfare." 687 Courts may "grant temporary and permanent equitable
relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant that are required
to protect the air, water, and other natural resources or the public
trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction." 688
S.D. COD. L. Title 43, Chapter 17: Water Boundaries and Riparian
Lands. "The ownership of land below ordinary high-water mark,
and of land below the water of a navigable lake or stream, is
regulated by the laws of the United States or by such laws of the
state as the Legislature may enact." 689 "Unless the grant under
which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the
upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the
edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers
and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the
water's nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such
public highway may not expand beyond the ordinary high water
mark and may not contract within the ordinary low water mark, and

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34A-10-1 (2009)(emphasis added).
Id.§ 34A-10-2 (emphasis added).
Id.§ 34A-10-5 (emphasis added).
Id. § 34A-10-7 (emphasis added).
Id.§ 34A-10-8.
Id§ 34A-10-11.
Id.§ 43-17-1.
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subject to§§ 43-17-29, 43-17-31, 43-17-32, and 43-17-33." 690 "In
all cases where the opposite banks of any streams not navigable
belong to different persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall
become common to both." 691 "The Water Management Board shall
establish . . . the ordinary high water mark and install benchmarks
and may establish the ordinary low water mark on public lakes
which are used for public purposes including, but not limited to
boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, picnicking, and
similar recreational pursuits."692 "If any water level rises above the
ordinary high water mark of a navigable lake, the right of the public
to enjoyment of the entire lake may not be limited, except that
access to the lake shall be by public right-of-way or by permission
of the riparian landowner . . . ." 693 "A stream, or portion of a
stream, is navigable if it can support a vessel capable of carrying
one or more persons throughout the period between the first of May
to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten
years. A dry draw, as defined in § 46-1-6, is not navigable. This
section does not apply to any stream or portion of a stream which is
navigable pursuant to federal law. Any person may petition the
Water Management Board for a declaratory ruling as to the
navigability of any stream, or portion of a stream, in this state." 694
Under certain circumstances, riparian owners can fence navigable
waters. 695 However, the fence must be constructed so "that the right
of the public to utilize the navigable stream is not prohibited or
unduly restricted." 696 Moreover, the right to fence "does not apply
to any river or stream or portion of any river or stream that has been
determined to be navigable pursuant to federal law." 697

•

690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.

696.
697.
698.
699.

S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 1: Water Resources Act: Definitions
and General Provisions. Under these provisions, "the people of the
state have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the state
and that the state shall determine what water of the state, surface
and underground, can be converted to public use or controlled for
public protection. " 698 Moreover, "all water within the state is the
property of the people of the state, but the right to the use of water
may be acquired by appropriation as provided by law.''699
"(B]ecause of conditions prevailing in this state the general welfare

Id.§43-17-2.
Id. § 43-17-4.
Id. § 43-17-21.
Id.§ 43-17-29.
Id.§ 43-17-34.
Id. § 43-17-35.
Id.
Id.
Id.§ 46-1-1.
Id.§ 46-1-3.
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requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the
conservation of such water is to be exercised with a view to the
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or watercourse in this state is
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
ex1end to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of
diversion of water." 700 Domestic use takes precedence. 701

•

S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 2: Water Resources Act: Water
Management Board and Chief Engineer.

•

S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 2A: Water Resources Act:
Administrative Procedure for Appropriation of Water.

•

S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 3A: Water Resources Act: Weather
Modification Activities.

•

S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 4: Water Resources Act: Dry-Draw
and Nonnavigable Stream Dams.

•

S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 5: Water Resources Act:
Appropriation of Water.

•

S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 6: Water Resources Act:
Groundwater and Wells.

•

S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 7: Water Resources Act: Storage,
Diversion, and Irrigation Works.

•

S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 8: Water Resources Act: Eminent
Domain.

•

S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 10: Water Resources Act:
Adjudication of Water Rights.

•

S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter IOA: Water Resources Act: Water
Use Control Areas.

•

S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 12: Water Resources Act: Irrigation
Districts.

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
South Dakota recognizes several categories of navigable waters. The test
of navigability for title purposes under the equal footing doctrine is a federal

700.
701.

Id.§ 46-1-4.
Id.§ 46-1-5.
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test. 702 According to the South Dakota Supreme Court, the ebb-and-flow tidal
test of title navigability is not useful in South Dakota. 703 Instead, the state uses
the navigable-in-fact test for other waters. 704 Under this test, Lake Albert is
navigable. 705 In addition, by statute, South Dakota has identified the Missouri
River, James River, Boise des Sioux River, and the lower five miles of the Big
Sioux River as being federally navigable. 706
For purposes of determining whether the public has rights to use waters,
South Dakota uses a common law "pleasure boat" test for navigability. 707 For
public use purposes, "whether or not waters are navigable depends upon the
natural availability of waters for public purposes taking into consideration the
natural character and surroundings of a lake or stream. This division of lakes
and streams into navigable and nonnavigable is the equivalent of classification
of public and private waters."708
By statute, South Dakota defines "navigable water" for public use
purposes to be "[a] stream, or portion of a stream [that] can support a vessel
capable of carrying one or more persons throughout the period between the first
of May to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten
years." 709 However, this definition "does not apply to any stream or portion of
a stream which is navigable pursuant to federal law." 7 JO

Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Fairly continuously under South Dakota's statutes, private landowners
have owned navigable waters to the low-water mark. 711 However, the
landowner's title is "absolute" only to the high water mark; title to lands
between the high water and low water marks is subject to the rights of the
public. 712 The public has access to and a right to use these lands for
"navigating, boating, fishing, fowling, and like public uses."713 Nevertheless,

702. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829-31 (S.D. 2004).
703. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796,799 (S.D. 1912).
704. Id. at 799-800.
705. Id.
706. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-38.
707. Parks, 616 N.W.2d at 830-31 (citing Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821 (S.D. 1937)).
708. Hillebrand, 274 N.W. at 822.
709. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-34.
710. Id.
711. Flisrand v. Madson. 152 N.W. 796, 799 (S.D. 1912) (citing Crv. CODE§ 289); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS§ 43-17-2.
712. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799 (citing av. CODE§ 289); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-2.
713. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799 (citing av. CODE§ 289); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-2; see also
Hillebrand, 274 N.W. at 822 (listing sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water,
and cutting ice as public uses).
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the ordinary high water mark can migrate, and public rights follow natural
changes in the waterway. 714
In contrast, at common law, landowners have "absolute ownership" of the
beds of non-federally navigable waters. 715 However, under current statutes,
[u]nless the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent,
the owner of the upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes
to the edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers
and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the water's
nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such public highway may
not expand beyond the ordinary high water mark and may not contract
within the ordinary low water mark .... 716
For federally navigable waters, "[o]nce the beds of the navigable waters are in
state ownership, they are held subject to a public trust and cannot be conveyed
unless it would promote a public trust purpose. ,m 7
As in many western states, public ownership of water for prior
appropriation purposes is becoming relevant to public rights in non-navigable
waters in South Dakota. Recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court declared
that "[n]ever in South Dakota has determining the navigability of a water body
been a matter of deciding if the water itself is public or private." 718 Instead,
under the Desert Land Act of 1877,719 non-navigable waters became subject to
state control. 720 When the legislature adopted the prior appropriation doctrine
in 1905, it qualified riparian owners' rights to the water, and several states have
recognized public rights in water despite private ownership of the bed,
including Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota,
and Iowa 721 Moreover, in 1955 the South Dakota Legislature confirmed that
all water is public property. 722 As a result, the Water Resources Act works in
tandem with the public trust doctrine:
[W]hile we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as
having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public
trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to
allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust

714. S.D. Wildlife Fed'n v. Water Mgmt. Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26, 31-32 (S.D. 1986).
715. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799,801.
716. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS.§ 43-17-2.
717. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829 (S.D. 2004) (declaring lllinois Central Railroad Co. to
be the first definition of the public trust doctrine); Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799-800.
718. Parks, 616 N.W.2d at 829. For a more extensive discussion of this case, see generally Janice
Holmes, Note, Following Jhe Crowd: The Supreme Court of South Dakota Expands the Scope of Jhe
Public Trust Doctrine to Non-Navigable, Non-Meandered Bodies of Water in Parks ,,. Cooper, 38
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1317 (2005).
719. 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23 (2006).
720. Parks, 676 N.W.2d. at 831-32 (citing Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142, 162-64 (1935)).
721. Id. at 833-36.
722. Id. at 837.
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principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of
the public trust doctrine-"the people of the state have a paramount interest
in the use of all the water of the state," SDCL 46-1-1; "the state shall
determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and
underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit," SDCL
46- 1-2; and "all water within the state is the property of the people of the
state." SDCL 46-1-3. 723
Thus, even when increased precipitation creates new lakes over private
property that had never really existed before, "the State of South Dakota retains
the right to use, control, and develop the water in these lakes as a separate asset
in trust for the public," and the public trust doctrine applies independently of
bed ownership. 724 "[A]ll waters within South Dakota, not just those waters
considered navigable under the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the
public."725 The public purposes for which these lakes can be used potentially
include, but are not limited to, "boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating,
picnicking, and similar recreational pursuits." 726 However, the court noted, it
would be better for the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
regulate public recreational use of new non-navigable lakes, because "it is
ultimately up to the Legislature to decide how these [new] waters are to be
beneficially used in the public interest" and to carry out these policies "through
a coordination of all state agencies and resources." 727
South Dakota's Environmental Protection Act also embodies the public
trust doctrine. 728 This act "authoriz[es] legal action to protect 'the air, water
and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution,
impairment or destruction. "'729

TEXAS
Date of Statehood:

1845

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation after 1895730

Texas Constitution: The Texas Court of Appeals recently indicated that
Article XVI, § 59(a) of the Texas Constitution is relevant to the public trust
doctrine. 731 This provision states:
723. Id. at 838.
724. Id.
725. Id. at 838-39.
726. Id. at 840 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-21).
727. Id. at 841.
728. Id. at 838.
729. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34A-10-l).
730. TEX. WATERCODE.ANN. § 11.001(b)(Vemon2009).
731. Cwnmins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17. 175 S.W.3d 34, 49
(Tex. App. 2005).
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The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this
State, and development of parks and recreational facilities, including the
control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm and flood waters,
the waters of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other
useful purposes, the reclamation and irrigation of its arid, semiarid and
other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage of its
overflowed lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and
development of its forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation
of its inland and coastal waters, and the preservation and conservation of all
such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public
rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be
appropriate thereto. 732

No other provisions of the Texas Constitution discuss rights in water.

Texas Statutes:

732.
733.

734.
735.
736.

•

TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 21.001: This provision defines a
"navigable stream" to be "a stream which retains an average width
of 30 feet from the mouth up."

•

TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN., Chapter 33: Coastal Public Lands
Management Act of 1973. "The natural resources of the surface
estate in coastal public land shall be preserved. These resources
include the natural aesthetic values of those areas and the value of
the areas in their natural state for the protection and nurture of all
types of marine life and wildlife." 733 "Uses which the public at
large may enjoy and in which the public at large may participate
shall take priority over those uses which are limited to fewer
individuals." 734 "The public interest in navigation in the intracoastal
water shall be protected." 735 '"Coastal public land' means all or any
portion of state-owned submerged land, the water overlying that
land, and all state-owned islands or portions of islands in the coastal
area." 736 "'Submerged land' means any land extending from the
boundary between the land of the state and the littoral owners
seaward to the low-water mark on any saltwater lake, bay, inlet,
estuary, or inland water within the tidewater limits, and any land
lying beneath the body of water, but for the purposes of this chapter
only, shall exclude beaches bordering on and the water of the open
Gulf of Mexico and the land lying beneath this water. " 737 The act

TEX. CONST.• art. XVI, § 59(a).
TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.§ 33.00l(b) (Vernon 2009).
Id. § 33.00I(c).
Id. § 33.00l(d).

Id. § 33.004(6).

737. Id. § 33.004(11).
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provides for a Coastal Management Program. 738 Although the act
allows for leasing of coastal public land, "[m]embers of the public
may not be excluded from coastal public land leased for public
recreational purposes or from an estuarine preserve. " 739
•

TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001--61.26: Texas Open Beaches
Act. "It is declared and affirmed to be the public policy of this state
that the public, individually and collectively, shall have the free and
unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the state-owned
beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico, or if
the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over an area
by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of
continuous right in the public, the public shall have the free and
unrestricted right of ingress and egress to the larger area extending
from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on
the Gulf of Mexico." 740 "'Beach' means state-owned beaches to
which the public has the right of ingress and egress bordering on the
seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico or any larger area extending
from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on
the Gulf of Mexico if the public has acquired a right of use or
easement to or over the area by prescription, dedication, or has
retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public."741 This
act was upheld in Moody v. White. 742

•

TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 134.006: This provision of the Texas
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act ensures that the Act
"does not affect the right of a person under other law to enforce or
protect the person's interest in water resources affected by a surface
coal mining operation."

•

TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.§ 90.001: This provision defines
"navigable river or stream" to be "a river or stream that retains an
average width of 30 or more feet from the mouth or confluence up."

•

TEX. WATER CODE ANN., Chapter 11: Water Rights. "The water of
the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river,
natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of
Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every
river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in
the state is the property of the state." 743 The right to appropriate can
be subordinate to instream flow needs. 744 "The waters of the state
are held in trust for the public, and the right to use state water may

738. Id. § 33.053.
739. Id. § 33.108.
740. Id. § 61.0ll(a).
741. Id.§ 61.012.
742. 593 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
743. TEx. WATER CODE ANN.§ 1 l.021(a)(Vemon 2009).
744. Id. § 11.023(a).
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be appropriated only as expressly authorized by law."745 Moreover,
"[m]aintaining the biological soundness of the state's rivers, lakes,
bays, and estuaries is of great importance to the public's economic
health and general well-being. The legislature encourages voluntary
water and land stewardship to benefit the water in the state,"746 and
"[t]he legislature has expressly required the commission while
balancing all other public interests to consider and, to the extent
practicable, provide for the freshwater inflows and instream flows
necessary to maintain the viability of the state's streams, rivers, and
bay and estuary systems in the commission's regular granting of
permits for the use of state waters." 747 Water rights can be taken by
eminent domain. 748 The Water Code provides for pro rata
distribution of water during shortages. 749 Obstruction of navigable
streams is prohibited. 750
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Texas follows the tidal test of navigability for title purposes, and, as such,
"[t]he bays, inlets, and other waters along the Gulf Coast which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide of the Gulf of Mexico are defined as 'navigable
waters. "'751 Applying this test, the Texas Supreme Court noted that Tres
Palacios Bay was an arm of the Gulf of Mexico and thus held it navigable for
title purposes. 752
However, Texas also follows the navigable-in-fact test. 753 "[S]treams or
lakes ... are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water . . . ."754 Moreover, the courts consider the
navigability test "broad" because navigable waters in Texas "include waters

745. Id. § 1 l.0235(a).
746. Id.§ l I.0235(b).
747. Id. § 1I.0235(c).
748. Id. § 1I.033.
749. Id. § l I .039.
750. Id. § I l.096.
751. Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 S.W.2d 410, 41 I (Tex. l943)(citing City of Galveston
v. Mann, 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (Tex. I 940); Crary v. Port Arthur Channel & Dock Co., 47 S.W. 967,
970 (Tex. 1898)); Butler v. Sadler, 399 S.W.2d 411,415 (Tex. Civ. App. I 966).
752. Lorino, 175S.W.2dat4ll (citingTexasv.Bradford,50S.W.2d 1065, 1069(Tex.1932)).
753. 111 Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, 218 S.W.3d 173, 182 n.7 (Tex. App. 2007) (citations
omitted); Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Texas 1935).
754. Hix v. Robertson, 211 S.W.3d 423, 428 n.3 (Tex. App. 2006) (quoting Taylor Fishing Club v.
Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49, 56 (1926))).
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within the tidewater limits of the Gulf of Mexico and streams that are navigable
in law or fact." 755
Nevertheless, "[e]very inland lake or pond that has the capacity to float a
boat is not necessarily navigable. It must be of such size and so situated as to be
generally and commonly useful as a highway for transportation of goods or
passengers between the points connected thereby. " 756 Thus, even though boats
could float on Stanmire Lake, the lake could not practically be used for
commerce, and hence it was not navigable. 757 Conversely, under this test, as
well as the tidal test, the Old River and San Jacinto River are navigable. 758 In
addition, the Colorado River is navigable, and the state owns its bed. 759
By statute, Texas has defined "navigable stream" to be a river or stream
"which retains an average width of 30 feet from the mouth up." 760 While the
Texas Court of Appeals referenced this definition in a recent case in connection
with title navigability, 761 the real "effect of this statute is to render all streams
navigable in law that have an average width of 30 feet, regardless of ownership
of the bed of the streams and regardless of whether they are actually
navigable. " 762 Thus, creeks not navigable in fact can still be subject to public
use under these statutes. 763 This legislation dates back to 1929 and was enacted
"because survey lines has incorrectly crossed navigable streams," and the
legislation "sought to rectify those errors by relinquishing title in the
streambeds while reserving the public's right to the waters of navigable
streams." 764 However, versions of the thirty-foot rule have actually existed in
Texas since 1837. 765 Public rights in these waters include navigation, fishing,
recreation, and commercial uses. 766 For example, Hog Creek is a statutorily
navigable stream and the public has a right to enjoy its waters, including by
fishing, and those rights extend to a lake formed by damming the creek. 767

755. TH lnl's., 218 S.W.3d at 182 n.7.
756. Taylor Fishing Club, 88 S.W.2d at 129.
757. Id. at 130. But see Weider v. Texas. 196 S.W. 868. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (declaring
Green Lake navigable because it could float boats for fishing, and discussing the ..pleasure boat" and log
floatation tests of navigability with approval); Orange Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 126 S.W. 604, 606
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910) (holding that log floatation was enough to make a water navigable. citing The
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430,432 (1874)).
758. Taylor Fishing Club, 88 S.W.2d at 184.
759. NaCl Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain, 479 S.W.2d 341, 349-50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
760. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon 2009); see also TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE
ANN. § 90.001 (Vernon 2009).
761. TI-I Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine. 218 S.W.3d 173,184 (Tex. App. 2007).
762. Tex. River Barges v. City of San Antonio. 21 S.W.3d 347,352 (Tex. App. 2000).
763. Hix v. Robertson, 211 S.W.3d 423, 427-28 (Tex. App. 2006); see also Port Acres
Sportsman's Club v. Mann, 541 S.W.2d 847, 848-49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that the Big Hill
Bayou, which was deemed non-navigable in 1875, was navigable under the statute).
764. Hix, 211 S.W.3d at 428.
765. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441,444 (Tex. 1935).
766. Tex. River Barges, 21 S.W.3d at 352.
767. Hix, 211 S.W.3d at 428.
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However, the adjoining lake was not navigable because the statute does not
apply to lakes. 768 In addition, both the north and south forks of the Upper
Guadalupe River are navigable under this statutory definition. 769
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
"Title to land covered by the bays, inlets, and arms of the Gulf of Mexico
with tidewater limits is in the State, and those lands constitute public property
that is held in trust for the use and benefit of the people."770 As such,
submerged lands are different from ordinary public lands. 771 The shore is the
stretch of land between the high and low water marks, and as a "settled
principle of English common law," title to the shore belongs to the state.772
Until the shore is granted, the state "holds the right, both to the water and land
under the water, for the public use; and the right of passing and repassing,
navigation, fishing, etc., etc., are common to all the citizens, subject of course
to such general regulations as may be imposed for the general benefit." 773
Public rights include hunting, fishing, navigation, "and other lawful
purposes." 774
In common law land grants after 1840, the boundary between state and
private property in tidal lands is the mean high tide line. 775 For Spanish or
Mexican grants, the boundary is the mean higher high tide line, 776 which is the
average of the higher of the two daily high tides over time. In contrast, "[m]ean
high tide is measured by taking an average of all the daily highest readings over
a long time. Mean high tide is the same as mean high water." 777 Title to islands
follows title to the bed. 778
"[T]wo presumptions arise regarding submerged lands: (I) they are owned
by the State and (2) the State has not acted to divest them." 779 "[O]nly the
Texas Legislature may convey submerged tidal lands."780 However, unlike in
768. Id. at 428-29.
769. In re Adjudication of Upper Guadalupe River Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 625 S.W.2d
353, 362--63 (Tex. App. 1981 ).
770. Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. App. 1993); City of Corpus
Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640,643 (Tex. App. 1981).
771. Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 S.W.2d 410,412 (Tex. 1943).
772. City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 1859 WL 6290, at *9 (1859).
773. Id. at *11 (citations omitted).
774. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. 1935); see generally Michael D.
Morrison, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L.
REV. 365 (1985).
775. City of Corpus Christi, 622 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Rudder v. Ponder, 293 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.
1956)); TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, 2 I 8 S.W .3d 173,184 (Tex. App. 2007).
776. TH lnl's., 218 S.W.3d at 184.
777. Id. at 184 n.10 (citation omitted).
778. Tumerv. Mullins, 162 S.W.3d 356, 361--62 (Tex. App. 2005).
779. TH Inl's., 218 S.W.3d at 182-83.
780. Id. at 183.
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most states, when the State of Texas does grant submerged lands to individuals,
there is no implied reservation in favor of the public trust, despite the ruling in
Illinois Central Railroad. 78 1
The state's ownership of water782 is relevant to the operation of the public
trust doctrine in Texas. 783 "The purpose of the State maintaining title to the
beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the public's interest in
those scarce natural resources. " 784 As such, "the State, as trustee, is entitled to
regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its citizens' health and
safety and to conserve natural resources." 785
There are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic
life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil
Court of Appeals declared:
The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic
life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs
subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this
State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish ad
Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and
aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people ... , and pollution of
streams and water courses is condemned .... The Constitution of Texas,
Art. 16, § 59(a) ... designates rivers and streams as natural resources,
declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature
with the preservation and conservation of such resources. 786

Date of Statehood:

1890

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation

781. Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port. Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 59-60 (Tex. App. 1993) (citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473, 481-84 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 26
(1894); City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349 (1859); Texas v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579 (Texas
1961)); City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 1859 WL 6290, at *12 (1859).
782. TEX WATER CODE ANN.§ 1 l.021(a)(Vemon 2009).
783. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 175 S.W.2d 34, 48 (Tex.
App. 2005). For a lengthier discussion of this case, see generally Amy Mockenhaupt, Cummins v.
Travis County Water Control and Improvement Dist., 175 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App. 2005), 9 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 269 (2005).
784. Cummins, 175 S.W.2d at 49.
785. Id. (citing Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see
also Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1983)
("The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for
navigation purposes." (citing Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex. 1926))).
786. Goldsmith & Powell, 159 S.W.2d at 535.
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Utah Constitution: Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine.
However, several provisions of the Utah Constitution are relevant. These
include:
• Art. XI, § 6: "No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly,
lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or
sources of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled
by it; but all such waterworks, water rights and sources of water
supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal
corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any
such municipal corporation from exchanging water-rights, or
sources of water supply, for other water-rights or sources of water
supply of equal value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public
supply of its inhabitants."

•

Art. XVII, § 1: "All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in
the State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized
and confirmed."

•

Art. XX, § I: "All lands of the State that have been, or may
hereafter be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired
by gift, grant or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may
otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to be the
public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to
be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the respective
purposes for which they have been or may be granted, donated,
devised or otherwise acquired."

Utah Statutes:
•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-21-4(1): "[T]here is reserved to the public
the right of access to all lands owned by the state, including those
lands lying below the official government meander line of navigable
waters, for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing."

•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-6(5): The Marketable Record Title Act

does not apply to sovereign lands.
•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-34-3.2: Wetlands Protection Account.
"Funds in the Wetlands Protect Account may be used in accordance
with the public trust doctrine." 787

•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-1-I: This provision defines "public trust

assets" to be "those lands and resources, including sovereign lands,
administered by the" Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands. 788
787.
788.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 79-2-305(3) (2009).
Id.§ 65A-l-1(4).
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"Sovereign lands," in tum, are "those lands lying below the ordinary
high water mark of navigable bodies of water at the date of
statehood and owned by the state by virtue of its sovereignty." 789

•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-2-5: The Division of Forestry, Fire, and

State Lands (DFFSL) can limit public use of leased parcels of
sovereign lands to protect lessees from hunting, trapping, or fishing.

•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-l: The DFFSL "is the management

authority for sovereign lands, and may exchange, sell, or lease
sovereign lands but only in the quantities and for the purposes as
serve the public interest and do not interfere with the public
trust." 790 "Nothing in this section shall be construed as asserting
state ownership of the beds of nonnavigable lakes, bays, rivers, or
streams." 791
•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-2(1): The DFFSL, "with the approval
of the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
and the governor, may set aside for public or recreational use any
part of the lands claimed by the state as the beds of lakes or
streams."

•

UTAH CODE ANN.

•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-8: This provision provides for
management of the Great Salt Lake.

•

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-1-1: "All waters in this state, whether above
or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the
public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof."

•

UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-5: "The use of water for beneficial

§ 65A-10-3: This provision allows for
agreements and establishes dispute resolution procedures to
establish boundaries of sovereign lands.

purposes, as provided in this title, is hereby declared to be a public
use."

•

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1 to 73-3-31: Appropriation of Water.

"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state
may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of
water may be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no
notice of intent to appropriate shall be recognized except application
for such appropriation first be made to the state engineer in the
manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation
must be for some useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between
appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in rights; provided,
that when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of
the unappropriated waters of the state would materially interfere
789.
790.
791.

Id.§ 65A-l-1(5).
Id.§ 65A-10-l(l).
Id.§ 65A-10-1(2).
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with a more beneficial use of such water, the application shall be
dealt with as provided in Section 73-3-8. No right to the use of
water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by
adverse use or adverse possession." 792

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Utah has provided the U.S. Supreme Court with several occasions to
discuss the definition of navigability that gives states title to the beds and banks
of navigable waters. For example, in litigation regarding title to the Green
River, the Grand River, and the Colorado River in Utah, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed that states received title to the beds and banks of navigable
waters upon statehood, while the federal government retained title to the beds
and banks of non-navigable waters. 793 The question of title navigability is a
federal question, and hence the fact that the Utah Legislature in 1927 passed
legislation declaring these three rivers navigable was irrelevant. 794
Summarizing its prior case law, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
The test of navigability has frequently been stated by this Court. In The
Daniel Ball, IO Wall. 557, 563 ... , the Court said: "Those rivers must be
regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel on water." In The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 441 ... , it was
pointed out that "the true test of navigability of a stream does not depend
on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, nor the
difficulties attending navigation," and that "it would be a narrow rule to
hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigation by
steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway." The
principles thus laid down have recently been restated in United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 ... , where the Court said:
'The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution
and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes which are
navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of being used, in
their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes
of trade and travel on water; and further that navigability does not
depend on the particular mode in which such use is or may be hadwhether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor an absence of
occasional difficulties in navigation, but the fact, if it be a fact, that the
792.
793.
794.

Id.§ 73-3-1.
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
Id. at 75 & n.6.
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stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful
commerce.' 795

Moreover, "[t]he extent of existing commerce is not the test." 796
Under this test, all three rivers were declared navigable, and Utah owns
their beds and banks. 797 Similarly, the Great Salt Lake is navigable and owned
by Utah. 798 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "the fact that the Great Salt
Lake is not a part of a navigable interstate or international commercial highway
in no way interferes with the principle of public ownership of its bed." 799
Finally, Utah owns the bed and banks of Utah Lake, another navigable lake. 800
In 1927, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the English ebb-and-flow tidal
test of navigability. 801 According to that court's most recent definition of
navigability, a body of water is navigable for title purposes "if it is useful for
commerce and has 'practical usefulness to the public as a public highway' ...
. " 802 In contrast, "[a] theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is
temporary, precarious, and unprofitable, is not sufficient."803 Under this test,
Scipio Lake was not navigable because the lake was not, and was not likely to
become, "a valuable factor in commerce." 804
Rights in "Navigable Waters":

In waters navigable for title purposes, private landowners own only to the
high water mark, often deemed the equivalent of the meander line. 805 The high
water mark is "the mark on the land where valuable vegetation ceased to grow
because the land was inundated by water for long periods oftime." 806
795. Id. at 76.
796. Id. at 82.
797. Id. at 89.
798. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); see also Morton, Int'l, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 495 P.2d 31, 34 (Utah 1972) ("The Great Salt Lake is the property of Utah subject only to
regulation ofnavigation by Congress."); Utah State Road Comm'n v. Hardy Salt Co., 486 P.2d 391, 392
(Utah 1971) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under the Equal Footing Doctrine); Deseret
Livestock Co. v. Utah, 171 P.2d 401,403 (Utah 1946) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under
the principles of United States l'. Utah, 283 U.S. at 89).
799. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10 (citations omitted).
800. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 203--09 (1987); see also Utah v.
Rollo, 262 P. 987, 989-90 (Utah 1927) (declaring Utah Lake navigable under the rules of United States
v. Holt State Banlc, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 {1894)).
801. Rollo, 262 P. at 991-92.
802. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting Monroe v. Utah, 175 P.2d
759, 761 (Utah 1946) (quoting Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1906))).
803. Monroe, 175 P.2d at 761.
804. Id. at 762.
805. Provo City v. Jacobsen, 217 P.2d 577,578 (Utah 1950); see also UTAH CODE ANN.§ 23-214(1) (2009) (citing the meander line as the line for public rights); UTAH CODE.ANN.§ 65A-l-1(5) (citing
the high water mark as the boundary of sovereign lands). But see Knudsen v. Omanson, 37 P. 250,251
(Utah 1894) (emphasizing that the border is the water line, not the meander line).
806. Provo City, 217 P.2d at 578.
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For navigable waters and sovereign lands in Utah, the essence of the
public trust doctrine, as expressed in Illinois Central Railroad, "is that
navigable waters should not be given without restriction to private parties and
should be preserved for the general public for uses such as commerce,
navigation, and fishing." 807 Deciding whether a conveyance of sovereign lands
to a private party was in the public interest is a question of fact for trial. 808
Public ownership of the water itself has expanded the scope of Utah's
public trust doctrine by giving the public rights to use non-navigable waters.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 73-1-1, waters are owned by the public. The
Utah Supreme Court has explained that:
Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and
essential resource in this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare
of all people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of
allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the
State as a whole. 809
Thus:
Under this "doctrine of public ownership," the public owns state waters and
has "an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed
beneath." In granting this public this easement, "state policy recognizes an
interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes."
This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within
the easement's scope. They include "the right to float leisure craft, hunt,
fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water." 810
Bed ownership is thus irrelevant for the public's rights to use waters in the
state. 811 Moreover, "the scope of the public's easement in state waters provides
the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water
and does not limit the public to activities that can be performed upon the
water." 812 As a result, "the public has the right to touch privately owned beds
of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the
easement." 813
Utah appears to have extended its public trust doctrine to ecological
protection. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained,
The 'public trust' doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public
lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large.

807. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990) (citing Kootenai Envtl.
AJliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983)).
808. Id. at 635-36.
809. JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
810. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co., 655 P.2d at
I 137). See generally Teresa Mareck, Searching for the Public Trust Doctrine in Utah Water Law, 15 J.
ENERGY, NATURAL R.Es., & ENVTL. L. 321 ( 1995).
811. Conater, 194 P.3d at 899-900.
812. Id. at 901.
813. Id. at 901-02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users).
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The public trust doctrine, however, is limited to sovereign lands and
perhaps other state lands that are not subject to specific trusts, such as
school trust lands. 814

WASHINGTON

Date of Statehood:

1889

Water Law System: Prior appropriation. However, existing riparian rights
have been protected, especially with respect to non-navigable waters. 815 With
respect to navigable waters, "the state's title to the beds and shores of navigable
lakes and streams is paramount and absolute, and ... an abutting owner has no
riparian or littoral right in the waters or shores of the stream."816
Washington Constitution: Washington has constitutionalized some of its
public trust doctrine, particularly with regard to state ownership of submerged
lands and the Illinois Central Railroad limitation on conveyances of submerged
lands. Moreover, several provisions of the Washington Constitution are
relevant to water and submerged lands. These include:
•

Art. XV, § 1: "The state shall never give, sell or lease to any private
person, corporation, or association any rights whatever in the waters
beyond such harbor lines, nor shall any of the area lying between
any harbor line and the line of ordinary high water, and within not
less than fifty feet nor more than two thousand feet of such harbor
line (as the commission shall determine) be sold or granted by the
state, nor its rights to control the same relinquished, but such area
shall be forever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other
conveniences of navigation and commerce."

•

Art. XV, § 2: Leases for wharves and docks in harbors and tidal
waters are limited to 30 years.

•

Art. XVII, § 1: "The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the
beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and
including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide
ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high
water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes: Provided,
That this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person
from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state."

814. NaCl Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,919 (Utah 1993).
815. City ofNewWhatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 738 (Wash. 1901).
816. Hill v. Newell, 149 P. 951, 952 (Wash. 1915); see also Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 26 P. 539, 54142 (Wash. 1891) (holding that there are no riparian rights on navigable waters).
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•

Art. XVII, § 2: "The state of Washington disclaims all title in and
claim to all tide, swamp and overflowed lands, patented by the
United States: Provided, the same is not impeached for fraud."

•

Art. XXI, § I: "The use of the waters of this state for irrigation,
mining and manufacturing purposes shall be deemed a public use."

189

Washington Statutes:

817.
818.
819.
820.
821.

•

WASH. REV. CODE § 79.02.010(1): "Aquatic lands" are "all stateowned tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable
waters as defined in chapter 79.90 RCW that are administered by
the [D]epartment [of Natural Resources]."

•

WASH. REV. CODE§ 79.02.095: Normal public lands statutes do not
apply to state tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of
navigable waters.

•

WASH. REV. CODE§ 79.100.010(2): For purposes of dealing with
derelict vessels, "aquatic lands" are "all tidelands, shorelands,
harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters, including lands
owned by the state and lands owned by other public or private
entities."

•

WASH. REV. CODE§§ 79.105.001 to 79.105.904: Aquatic Lands.
"Aquatic lands" are "all tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the
beds of navigable waters." 817 "Beds of navigable waters" are "those
lands lying waterward of and below the line of navigability on rivers
and lakes not subject to tidal flow, or extreme low tide mark in
navigable tidal waters, or the outer harbor line where harbor area
has been created." 818 "First-class shorelands" are "the shores of a
navigable lake or river belonging to the state, not subject to tidal
flow, lying between the line of ordinary high water and the line of
navigability, or inner harbor line where established and within or in
front of the corporate limits of any city or within two miles of either
side." 819 "The legislature finds that state-owned aquatic lands are a
finite natural resource of great value and an irreplaceable public
heritage." 820 The state is to manage aquatic lands to encourage
public use and access and to ensure environmental protection. 821
Moreover, in managing aquatic lands, the state "shall preserve and
enhance water-dependent uses," which are favored over non-water
dependent use; highest priority goes to "uses which enhance
renewable resources, water-borne commerce, and the navigational
WASH. REV. CODE§ 79. 105.060(1)(2009).

Id§
Id.§
Id.§
Id.§

79.105.060(2).
79.105.060(3).
79.105.010.
79.105.030.
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and biological capacity of the waters . . . . " 822 Specifically, the
Department must consider the value of state-owned aquatic lands
"as wildlife habitat, natural area preserve, representative ecosystem,
or spawning area'' before leasing the lands or allowing changes in
use. 823 Sales and leases of these lands are allowed but require a
permit. 824 Similarly, land exchanges are allowed "if the exchange is
in the public interest and will actively contribute to the public
benefits .... '' 825

•

WASH. REV. CODE§§ 79.130.010 to 79.130.900: Beds ofNavigable
Waters. The legislative intent of these provisions is the same as in §
79.105.001, relating to aquatic lands. 826 Leases of these beds are
allowed. 827

•

WASH. REV. CODE§§ 90.03.005 to 90.03.611: Water Code. "It is
the policy of the state to promote the use of the public waters in a
fashion which provides for obtaining maximum net benefits arising
from both diversionary uses of the state's public waters and the
retention of waters within streams and lakes in sufficient quantity
and quality to protect instream and natural values and rights." 828
"Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the
public ...." 829 The Water Code requires minimum flows and levels
to be protected. 830

•

WASH. REV. CODE§§ 90.14.010 to 90.14.910: Registration, Waiver,
and Relinquishment.

•

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.16.010 to 90.16.120: Appropriation of
Water for Public and Industrial Purposes.

•

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.20.010 to 90.20.110: Appropriation
Procedure.

•

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.22.010 to 90.22.060: Minimum Water
Flows and Levels.

•

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.40.010 to 90.40.100: Water Rights of
United States.

•

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.42.005 to 90.42.900: Water Resource
Management. The legislature found that Washington was facing a

822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.

Id.§ 79.105.210(1).
Id.§ 79.105.210(3).
See id.§§ 79.105.100-79.105.160.
Id. § 79.105.400.
Id.§ 79.130.001.
Id.§ 79.130.010.
Id. § 90.03.005.
Id § 90.03.010.
Id. § 90.03.247.
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water shortage. 831 These provisions establish a trust water rights
program 832 and water banking. 833
•

WASH. REV. CODE§§ 90.44.010 to 90.44.520: Regulation of Public
Ground Waters.

Definition of"Navigable Waters":

Washington recognizes both the "ebb and flow" tidal test and the
navigable-in-fact test for title navigability. 834 Thus, a slough was considered
navigable when it was navigable during the ebbing and flowing of the tide
and has been and can be used as a public highway for boats, scows, and
other ordinary modes of water transportation for general commercial
purposes, and especially for rafting, booming, and floating and towing of
logs up and down the same; that said slough has been so used for at least
twenty years. 835

Washington has used a log floatation test, in combination with the
declaration in Article XVII § 1, of the Washington Constitution, to find the
Cowlitz River navigable for purposes of state ownership and control. 836
Similarly, Lake Union was declared navigable because it is capable of being
navigated. 837 However, "a stream which can only be made navigable or
floatable by artificial means is not a public highway." 838 Moreover, the
Washington Supreme Court has also applied the federal commerce test of
navigability. 839
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Columbia River is a
navigable river under the federal test. 840 As a result, Washington, not the
United States, owns the beds and banks of that river on the Washington side of
the Oregon-Washington border. 841

831. Id. § 90.42.005(2)(a).
832. See id §§ 90.42.030-90.42.040.
833. Id§ 90.42.100.
834. WASH. CONST., art. XVII. § t Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. Washington, 95 P. 278, 280
(Wash. 1908); City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 737-38 (Wash. 1901).
835. Dawson v. McMillan, 75 P. 807, 808--09 (Wash. 1904).
836. Robinson v. Silver Lake Railway & Lumber Co., 279 P. 1109, 1113-14 (Wash. 1929).
837. Brace & Hergert Mill Co., 95 P. at 281.
838. East Hoquiam Boom & Logging Co. v. Neeson, 54 P. 1001, 1002 (Wash. 1898) (citing The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) 557 (1870)).
839. Lefevre v. Wash. Monument & Cut Stone Co., 81 P.2d 819, 822 (Wash. 1938) (citing
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Snively v. Washington, 9 P.2d 773, 774 (Wash. 1932); Smith
v. Washington, 50 P.2d 32, 32-33 (Wash. 1935); Proctor v. Sim, 236 P. 114, 116 (Wash. 1925)).
840. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n of State of Wash., 302 U.S. 186, 197-99 (1937).
841. Id. at 198.
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Rights in "Navigable Waters":
In Washington, the ordinary high water mark is the boundary between
state and private ownership in navigable waters. 842 However, "the public has
the right to go where the navigable waters go, even though the navigable waters
lie over privately owned lands. " 843
Before Washington changed its policies in 1971 to limit sales and leases of
aquatic lands, "the state had sold approximately 60 percent of its tidelands and
30 percent of its shorelands." 844 Despite the state's power to engage in such
sales and leases, however, "[t]he Legislature has never had the authority ... to
sell or otherwise abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over such tidelands
and shorelands." 845 The state cannot convey this jus publicum,
and the state holds such dominion in trust for the public. It is this principle
which is referred to as the 'public trust doctrine.' Although not always
clearly labeled or articulated as such, our review of Washington law
establishes that the doctrine has always existed in the State of
Washington. 846
Moreover, in general, in every grant of submerged lands "there was an implied
reservation of the public right." 847
Washington's Shoreline Management Act of 1971 848 fully meets the
requirements of the public trust doctrine. 849 As such, public recreational docks
permitted under the Act do not violate the doctrine. 850 Similarly, a county
ordinance banning personal watercraft in navigable waters did not violate the
public trust doctrine, because the doctrine is flexible, the "county had not given
up its right of control over its waters," and "the Ordinance is consistent with the
goals of statewide environmental protection statutes"; plus, "it would be an odd
use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and
damages the waters and wildlife of this state." 851
842. Brace & Hergert Mill Co., 95 P. at 280.
843. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232, 238 (Wash. 1969). See generally Lorraine Bodi, The
Public Trust Doctrine in the State of Washington: Does It Make Any Difference to the Public?, 19
ENVTL. L. 645 (1989).
844. Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1987).
845. Id.
846. Id. at 994 (citations omitted).
847. City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 737 (Wash. 1901); see also Lake
Union Drydock Co., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Natural Res., 179 P.3d 844, 851 (Wash. App. 2008) (holding
that the Department cannot lease shorelands for $1.93 per acre (which is considered "virtually rentfree") because, under the public trust doctrine, the state cannot give away the jus publicum).
848. WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.58 (2009).
849. Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 995.
850. Id. at 997.
851. Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 283-84 (Wash. 1998). But see Biggers v. City of
Brainbridge Island, 169 P.3d 14, 22 (Wash. 2007) (en bane) (holding that the Washington Constitution
and the public trust doctrine limit local government authority to regulate the shoreline use, and police
powers are limited there). See generally Ralph W. Johnson, The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Z.One
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Because the public trust doctrine existed in Washington prior to the
Shoreline Management Act of 1971, there could be no regulato:ry takings
claims based on that statute's limitations on shoreland property's use. 852 "The
public trust doctrine resembles a 'covenant running with the land (or lake or
marsh or shore) for the benefit of the public and the land's dependent
wildlife. "' 853 As a result, owners along shorelands "never had the right to
dredge or fill [their] tidelands, either for a residential community or
farmlands. " 854
In navigable waters, the public has rights of navigation, fishing, boating,
swimming, water skiing, and other related recreation. 855 Such other rights
probably include boating, bathing, fishing, fowling, skating, cutting ice, water
skiing, and skin diving. 856 However, "in Washington, the public trust doctrine
does not encompass the right to gather clams on private property," because
shellfish rights follow title to the submerged lands. 857
Nevertheless, Washington's public trust doctrine is limited to surface
navigable waters, and the Washington Supreme Court has refused to apply it to
either ground waters or non-navigable waters. 858 Moreover, absent specific
statuto:ry authorization, state agencies cannot "assume the State's public trust
duties and regulate in order to protect the public trust. " 859 As a result, the
public trust doctrine does not apply to the Department of Ecology's
implementation of state water law. 860
In contrast, Washington has flirted with applying some version of a public
trust doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington
Court of Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the
Department of Natural Resources' regulation of shellfish such as geoducks. 861
Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. R.Ev. 521 (1992) (discussing the relationship of the
doctrine to police power and coastal planning).
852. Orion Corp. v. Washington, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (Wash. 1987).
853. Id. (quoting Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, l ENVTL. L. & LmG.
107, 118 (1986)).
854. Id. at 1073.
855. Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 994 (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232,239 (Wash. 1969)).
856. Wilbour, 462 P.2d at 239 n.7. See generally Davison, supra note 146 (arguing that
Washington's public trust doctrine is already broader in the rights it protects).
857. Washington v. Longshore, 982 P.2d Jl9l, I 195-96 (Wash. App. 1999), ajf'd, 5 P.3d 1256,
1259--63 (Wash. 2000) (en bane); see also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Washington State
Dep't of Natural Res .• 101 P.3d 891, 895 (Wash. App. 2004) (noting that shellfish are not typical
wildlife in Washington because they are considered part of the land).
858. See Rettowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232,239 (Wash. 1993) (en bane).
859. Id.
860. Id. at 239-40; see also RD. Merrill Co. v. Wash. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 969 P.2d
458, 467 (Wash. 1999) (holding that. in the water rights context, the public trust doctrine is not an
independent source ofregulatory authority for the Department of Ecology); Postema v. Wash. Pollution
Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 744 (Wash. 2000) (en bane) (same).
861. Wash. State Geoduck Han•est Ass'n, 101 P.3d at 895. But see Citizens for Responsible
Wildlife Mgmt. v. Washington, 103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. App. 2004) ("No Washington case has
applied the public trust doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or resources. But we need not decide whether the
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Nevertheless, the Department's regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest
pursuant to the wildlife statutes did not violate the public trust doctrine despite
the public right to fish, because the state must "balance the protection of the
public's right to use resources on public land with the protection of the
resources that enable these activities," the Department had not given up its
control over the state's geoduck resources, and the regulation facilitated
sustainable geoduck harvesting and natural regeneration of the resource,
serving the public interest. 862 Because the state owns the beds of navigable
waters and because, under Washington case law, shellfish are considered part
of the beds, the Department "has a continuing obligation under the public trust
doctrine to manage the use of the resources on the land for the public interest.
And [case law] is consistent with the conclusion that shellfish embedded on
public property are resources that invoke a public right under the public trust
doctrine. " 863
WYOMING

Date of Statehood:

1890

Water Law System:

Prior appropriation864

Wyoming Constitution: Wyoming has constitutionalized public rights in
water through the constitutional declaration that waters belong to the state.
Several other constitutional provisions are also relevant:
•

Art. I, § 31: "Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of
limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its
control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall
equally guard all the various interests involved."

•

Art. 8, § 1: Irrigation and Water Rights. "The water of all natural
streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the

public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial hunting and trapping] because, even if it does,
Citizens' challenge fails." (emphasis added)).
862. Wash. State Geoduck Han•est Ass'n, 101 P.3d at 895-97 (examining WASH REV. CODE §
79.135.210 (2005)).
863. Id. at 896; see also Nelson Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Washington, 177 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Wash.
App. 2008) (upholding a tax on geoduck harvests on the first commercial owner and noting that the
Department of Natural Resources merely regulated the harvest in accordance with the public trust
doctrine). For a discussion of whether Washington's public trust doctrine could apply to other
environmental issues, see ·Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U.
PuGET SOUND L. REV. 671, 671-73, 688-707 (1991) (discussing the application of the doctrine to oil
spills).
864. See Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 259 (Wyo. 1900) (noting that prior appropriation
legislation had been in place since 1875 and holding that "[i]n this state the doctrine prevails that a right
to the use of water may be acquired by priority of appropriation for beneficial purpose, in contravention
to the common law rule that every riparian owner is entitled to the continued natural flow of the waters
of the stream running through or adjacent to his lands").
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boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the
state."
•

Art. 8, § 2: "There shall be constituted a board of control, to be
composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water
divisions, which shall, under such regulations as may be prescribed
by law, have the supervisions of the waters of the state and of their
appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers
connected therewith. Its decisions shall be subject to review by the
courts of the state."

•

Art. 8, § 3: "Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give
the better right. No appropriation shall be denied except when such
denial is demanded by the public interest."

•

Art. 8, § 4: "The legislature shall by law divide the state into four
(4) water divisions, and provide for the appointment of
superintendents thereof."

•

Art. 8, § 5: This provision establishes the office of the state
engineer.

•

Art. 13, § 5: Municipal corporations have authority to acquire water
rights.

•

Art. 16, § 10: This provision governs the construction and
improvement of works for the conservation and utilization of water.

Wyoming Statutes:
•

WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 1-37-106: Adjudication of Water Rights.

•

WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 35-10-401: This provision prohibits obstruction
of a "public river or stream, declared navigable by law," or pollution
of waters.

•

WYO. STAT. ANN. Title 41, Chapter 3: Water Rights. This provision
establishes preferences for domestic and transportation purposes,
steam power plants, and industrial purposes. 865 "The legislature
finds, recognizes and declares that the transfer of water outside the
boundaries of the state may have a significant impact on the water
and other resources of the state. Further, this impact may differ
substantially from that caused by uses of the water within the state.
Therefore, all water being the property of the state and part of the
natural resources of the state, it shall be controlled and managed by
the state for the purposes of protecting, conserving and preserving to
the state the maximum permanent beneficial use of the state's
waters." 866 These statutes encompass reservoirs (Article 3);

865.

WYO. STAT.

866.

Id. § 41-3-11 S(a).

ANN.§ 41-3-102 (2009).
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abandonment of water rights {Article 4); water divisions and
superintendents {Article 5); water districts and commissioners
(Article 6); water conservancy districts (Article 7); flood control
districts {Article 8); underground water (Article 9); and instream
flows (Article 10).
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 41-12-301: Colorado River Compact.

•

Definition of "Navigable Waters":
The Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledges the variety of definitions of
"navigable waters," including the federal commerce definition, which it uses as
the title definition of navigability. The court noted:
We understand that "navigability in the Federal sense" means the capability
or susceptibility of waters, in their natural condition, of being used for
navigation in interstate or international commerce, and navigability in any
other sense may mean any one of a variety of definitions given navigability
by either of the several states of the Union. 867
Historical statutes in Wyoming reference transportation and log floatation. 868
Regarding public use rights in Wyoming, "the actual usability of the
waters is alone the limit of the public's right to employ them." 869 Except in
federally navigable waters, ''the exclusive control of waters is vested in the
state," and hence "[i]t follows that the state may lay down and follow such
criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and
the state may also decide the ownership of submerged lands, irrespective of the
navigable or nonnavigable character of the waters above them." 870 As a result,
because the Wyoming Constitution gives the waters to the state, fine
distinctions of navigability are unimportant. 871 "The test of navigability does
not determine other uses to which the state may put its waters even though
navigability would determine the title to the land underlying them." 872

Rights in "Navigable Waters":
"[I]f a river is nonnavigable the bed and channel of the stream belong to
the riparian owner. " 873
Nevertheless, in Wyoming, the public has rights in the waters themselves,
irrespective of bed ownership. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court:

867.

Dayv. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961).

868. Id.
869. Id.
870. Id.
871. Id. at 144.
872. Id.
873. Id. at 145.
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At the modem common law, public waters are generally confined to those
which are navigable; and public rights therein to navigation and fishery,
and privileges incident thereto. In the arid region of this country another
public use has been recognized by custom and laws, and sanctioned by the
courts-a public use sufficient to support the exercise of eminent
domain. 874
Thus, Wyoming waters are public, and the constitutional declaration of state
ownership is valid. 875
More expansively, "the Legislature was aware that, without regard to their
being navigable or nonnavigable in the Federal sense or any other concept of
navigability, [the state's] waters are usable for purposes other than irrigation,
consumption, power or mining and that the waters might be used for
transportation by floatation." 876 As a result, the public has a right to float in the
North Platte River, whlch was also recognized in the 1959 State Laws of
Wyoming. 877
State ownership of the waters themselves impresses those waters with a
public trust. 878 The public can float craft down any waters so usable, regardless
of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over
shoals. 879 Moreover, members of the public can hunt or fish while floating. 880
However, public use rights do not give the public the right to wade or walk on
privately owned streambeds. 881

874.
875.
876.

Fann Inv. Co. v, Carpenter, 61 P. 258,264 (Wyo. 1900).

Id. at 264-65.
Day, 362 P.2d at 143.

877. Id. at 139.
878. Id. at 145.
879. Id. at 145-16.
880. Id. at 147.
881. Id. at 146.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@
boaltorg. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://l\•ww.boaltorg/elq.
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This Court granted certiorari (131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011) (Mem.)) to decide the first question presented by the petition for a writ
of certiorari (Pet. i-ii), which asks:
Does the constitutional test for determining whether a section of a river is navigable for title purposes require a trial court to
determine, based on evidence, whether the relevant stretch of the river was navigable at the time the State joined the Union as
directed by United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), or may the court simply deem the river as a whole generally navigable
based on evidence of present-day recreational use, with the question "very liberally construed" in the State's favor?
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*1 INTRODUCTION
Under the constitutionally grounded equal footing doctrine, all States enter the Union with title to the lands underlying the
navigable waters within their borders and "the right to control and regulate navigable streams" on that land. Coyle v. Smith,
221 U.S. 559,573 (1911). This case concerns the State of Montana's title to lands underlying three rivers - the Missouri, Clark
Fork, and Madison. Those rivers not only are home to some of the most prized trout fishing in the world, but have served as
public highways of commerce since long before frontier times. The importance of the Missouri runs even deeper. The Missouri
has long been regarded as one of America's great rivers and is the object of one of the nation's most important explorations the Lewis and Clark Expedition. From territorial times to this day, the Great Falls of the Missouri have appeared on the official
seal of Montana. In a real sense, the question in this case is whether the Great Falls belong to the people of Montana in public
trust, or instead to the federal government or petitioner PPL Montana (PPL).
After carefully considering this Court's navigability precedents dating back nearly two centuries, the Montana state courts
reached a judgment that would surprise few Montanans: The rivers at issue are navigable, and Montana therefore took title
to the riverbeds at statehood, in public trust for Montanans. Indeed, PPL itself admitted at the outset of this litigation that the
rivers at issue were navigable. Infra at 15. PPL now asks this Court to overturn that judgment. PPL's position is grounded
on a novel interpretation of this Court's decisions and a selective account of history. If adopted, PPL's position would *2
upset centuries-old expectations and call into question the navigability of rivers not just in Montana but throughout the United
States. That is particularly true for the American West, where rivers remain important highways of commerce, provide vital
habitats for fish and wildlife, are generally open to the public for recreational pursuits such as fishing, and have a near-mystical
quality in parts like Montana. Cf New York v. New Jersey, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) ("A river is more than an amenity; it is
a treasure.") (Holmes, J.).
The "constitutional test" for navigability (Pet. i) articulated by the Montana Supreme Court is grounded on this Court's
precedents going back to The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871). PPL itself acknowledges that, under "long-settled
law," the touchstone of navigability-for-title is whether the river was used, or was susceptible for use, as a highway of commerce
at statehood. PPL Br. 27 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563). As to the Missouri and Clark Fork, PPL argues that this
test cannot be met, because the Great Falls (Missouri) and Thompson Falls (Clark Fork) themselves were impassable by boat.
But, as the Montana Supreme Court recognized (Pet. App. 54-55), this Court long ago held that natural interruptions do not
defeat navigability where the obstacles were portaged so that the river continued to serve as a channel of commerce. Indeed,
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since at least the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, such "carrying places" have been recognized as facilitating - not defeating the highways of commerce along America's navigable rivers. Here, it is undeniable that the falls in question were portaged so
that the rivers served as continuous highways of commerce before statehood.
*3 As to the Madison, PPL's primary argument is that the Montana Supreme Court erred in considering post-statehood use in

determining whether the navigability test was met. All agree that, compared to the Missouri and Clark Fork, there is relatively
little evidence of the pre-statehood use of the Madison. In that respect, the Madison presents a tougher historical case. But The
Daniel Ball itself holds that navigability may be based on susceptibility for use as a highway of commerce. 77 U.S. at 563. And
this Court's precedents support the commonsense conclusion that - while the navigability-for-title test looks to navigability at
the time of statehood - post-statehood evidence of navigability is relevant, and thus admissible, insofar as it helps to establish
susceptibility of navigation at statehood. That is the only basis for which the Montana Supreme Court relied upon evidence of
post-statehood use. Pet. App. 56. And this Court's precedents also repudiate PPL's other argument concerning the Madison that
log floats and commercial drift boat fishing on the river are not relevant in gauging navigability as of statehood.
PPL goes to extraordinary lengths to attack the Montana Supreme Court's decision. It calls into question the good faith and
intentions of the Montana courts, PPL Br. 25, 30, 33, and decries the Montana Supreme Court's decision as a 'judicial taking[],"
id at 25. But the only potential "taking" in this case is the one that PPL is attempting to accomplish by asking this Court to
substantially narrow the centuries-old concept of navigability and thereby deprive Montana - and the people of Montana - of
their long-held title to the riverbeds at issue. That effort should be rejected.

*4 STATEMENTOFTHECASE
More than two centuries ago, Captain Meriwether Lewis stood on the banks of the Missouri in the territory that would become
Montana. Taken by the sight before him, Lewis observed that he did not believe "that the world can furnish an example of a river
running to the extent which the Missouri and Jefferson's rivers do through such a mountainous country and at the same time
so navigable as they are." JA 162. Within a few years of Lewis and Clark, fur traders established trade routes along Montana's
rivers, to both the East and West. Decades later, with the advent of the gold and copper rushes, Montana's population surged
and the territory's fledgling economy began to take off. But transportation remained a challenge. The railroad did not reach
Montana until the late 19th century, and at the time Montana joined the Union in 1889, the railroad was still in its infancy. See
id at 112-13, 215,236. Cutting through Montana's vast expanse, Montana's network ofnavigable waterways fueled exploration
and the territory's economic growth. That was particularly true for the Missouri - one of America's signature waterways - which,
among other things, was used to transport gold mined from the Helena area back East. Ultimately, the history of the Missouri
and other rivers at issue in this case well illustrates the indispensable role that navigable waters played in the exploration,
economy, and everyday life of early America.

A. Montana's Entry Into The Union
The State of Montana - like all States - holds title to the lands beneath all navigable waters within its borders for the benefit of
its citizens. The sovereign's responsibility to hold such lands in trust for its *5 citizenry can be traced as far back as Justinian
in ancient Rome. See Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841) ("Rivers and ports are public;
hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common."). Under English common law dating back to the time of the
Magna Carta, the Crown held title to all lands underlying navigable waters "for the benefit of the whole people." Utah Div. of
StateLandsv. United States, 482U.S.193, 196(1987)(citingShivelyv. Bowlby, 152U.S.1, 11-14(1894));seeMichaelEvans
& R. Ian Jack, Sources ofEnglish Legal and Constitutional History 53 (1984).
When the original thirteen Colonies formed the Union, they claimed title to the lands under navigable waters within their
boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English Crown. Shively, 152 U.S. at 15-16. "The shores of navigable waters, and
the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively."
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Pollardv. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212,230 (1845). Because the "right to the rivers passes with a transfer of sovereignty, id
at 216, new States entered the Union "on an equal footing with the original 13 Colonies and succeeded to the United States'
title to the beds of navigable waters within their boundaries," United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. I, 5 (1997). Montana entered
the Union on the same footing in 1889 when it became the 41st State.
From the time of Montana's statehood, it has been generally recognized that the riverbeds at issue belong to the people of
Montana in public trust, and not private riparian owners. At or around the time of statehood, the General Land Office (the
predecessor agency to the Bureau of Land Management within the *6 Department of the Interior), "meandered" most of the
riverbanks along the rivers at issue to ensure that any later conveyances to private parties ended at the high-water mark - and
thus did not purport to convey title to the lands underlying navigable waters. See Trial Exh. S-48 at 13 (Jenkins Report). The
maps created by the Surveyors General of the United States plainly show that the federal surveyors "returned as navigable"
the rivers at issue and therefore excluded the riverbeds from private conveyances. See, e.g., Exhs. S-40, S-41, S-42, S-42B
(Thompson Falls); Exh. S-33 (Madison); see also Exh. S-44 (Missouri River Commission map). Although such meandering
does not conclusively establish navigability, it is precisely the sort of thing on which "settled expectations" are formed "where
land titles are concerned." Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,687 (1979). 1

Under instructions issued by the Commissioner of the General Land Office in 1881, navigable rivers were to be meandered by federal
surveyors on both banks, thereby clearly delineating riparian property boundaries, while rivers considered non-navigable were to
be meandered on only one bank. See U.S. Gen. Land Office, Instructions of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the
Sun,eyors General of the United States Relative to the Sun,ey of the Public Lands and Private Land Claims 33-35 (May 3, 1881).
Montana law has long recognized such meandering in determining title to riverbeds. SeeMont. Code Ann. § 85-1-112.

Likewise, consistent with the understanding that the State owns the riverbeds, the State has long managed the rivers and attendant
riverbeds under actual and apparent authority of title. Thus, for example, Montana's Board of Land Commissioners, which
manages school trust land across Montana, has *7 issued (at least) 97 easements on the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison,
an additional 85 mineral leases on the Missouri, and eight annual licenses and other leases on the Clark Fork and the Missouri
to such private parties. 2 Likewise, in practice, private parties seeking to construct a power line, pipeline, riprap, kayak run,
access bridge, or other commercial fixture along the rivers at issue in this case generally have sought permission from the State
before doing so.

2

Montana Trust Land Management System (TMLA NET) Query, Sept. 27,2011 (record and ownership repository),http://dnrc.mt.gov/
trust/default.asp; see Resp. Mont. S. Ct Br. 13-15 (discussing State's management of trust lands).

Not long after statehood, the Montana Supreme Court recognized the navigability of both the Missouri and Clark Fork,
describing the latter as " a matter of common knowledge. " Opp. App. 31 (citation omitted), 35. To the State's knowledge, until
this litigation, no private riparian owner has ever claimed title to the riverbeds at issue as against the State. And, as the Montana
trial court found (consistent with the way in which the federal government meandered the rivers at issue long ago), the deeds
held by PPL and other private owners show on their face that any private ownership interests end at the riverbank. Opp. App.
59; see id at 37-38; Resp. Mt. S. Ct. Br. 28-29. Nor has the United States ever asserted ownership of the riverbeds at issue - an
assertion that would be undermined by the way the federal government's own surveyors meandered the rivers at statehood. 3

3

In a footnote that refers to flood lands, the United States (at 3 n.3) appears to suggest that PPL pays rent to the federal government
for some portion of the riverbeds at issue. That is incorrect. PPL advanced this argument for the first time in its Supplemental Brief
in Support of Certiorari (at 2), citing only a letter that PPL itself submitted to FERC just ten days before that Supplemental Brief
was filed (id at App. 4-9). In any event, the State's claim for compensation meticulously excluded federally-owned flooded uplands
(see Ex. S-48 at 22; Sept. 4, 2007 Order 20-29 (Dkt. 253)), and was based solely on riverbeds to which the United States has
never claimed title.
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*8 B. The Rivers At Issue
The Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison Rivers span hundreds of miles of the northwest, central, and southern parts of the State.
See Add. 1a (map). While each has its own unique history and geography, the rivers - and especially the Missouri - are among
the crownjewels ofMontana's system of waterways.
Missouri River. The Missouri is the longest river in North America (spanning some 2400 miles) and before the railroads took
root provided one of the most important thoroughfares to the West for settlers and pioneers. See, e.g., Francis Parkman, The
Oregon Trail, Sketches of Prairie and Rocky-Mountain Life (1883); JA 311. It has been cited frequently in court opinions,

legislative debates, and historic works as the exemplar of a navigable river. 4 The Missouri has its headwaters at Three Forks,
Montana - the junction of the Gallatin, Madison, and Jefferson Rivers - and flows northward through Helena, Great Falls, and
Fort Benton, Montana, before turning east and entering *9 North Dakota. After passing through six more States, it eventually
flows into the Mississippi River.

4

See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,382 (1891); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,698 (1899);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907); 59 Cong. Rec. 7730 (1920).

In 1803, aware of the Missouri's reputation as one of the continent's great waterways, President Jefferson commissioned an
expedition whose "object" was "to explore the Missouri River, and such principal streams of it ... [that] may offer the most
direct and practicable water-communication across the continent." JA 304-05. Lewis and Clark left St. Charles, Missouri, on
May 14, 1804, heading up the Missouri for what would become one of America's greatest explorations. They arrived in what
today is Montana approximately one year later, having ascended the river in pirogues and bateaux.
On June 13, 1805, Lewis set out ahead of the group to scout the upcoming route. By midday, he had come upon a series of
five waterfalls, the largest of which - known as Great Falls - Lewis called "the grandest site I ever beheld." 4 The Journals of
the Lewis & Clark E.xpedition, 284 (Gary E. Moulton ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 1987). Within a day, Lewis managed to chart
out a roughly 17-mile portage around the falls - a distance that must be viewed in light of the 20 or more miles that Lewis
and his team regularly traveled in a day during the course of the expedition. The portage began on June 22. JA 405. Although
the land was unfamiliar, the load heavy (JA 407-08), and some members of the party - including Sacagawea - ill (JA 412),
the expedition arrived at upper portage camp, just south of the present day city of Great Falls, on July 2 - 11 days later. App.
2a (map); JA 421. On July 15, the party put *10 their boats back into water to proceed up the Missouri to its very mouth at
Three Forks. JA 433-34. 5

5

PPL describes (at 8, 40-41) the portage as taking 33 days. That covers the period from when Lewis first discovered the Great Falls
to when the expedition put boats back into water above the falls. The expedition "set out to pass the portage" nine days after Lewis
discovered the falls. JA 405. It took the expedition 11 days to travel the 17 miles from the lower to upper portage camps. And the
expedition spent the remaining 13 days at upper portage camp preparing to continue the journey upriver. See JA 401-434.

The Great Falls consists of five different falls along almost eight river miles from the first cascade to the last, with various
rapids and calmer waters mixed in between. The largest cascade - Great Falls - is the first in the series moving upriver from
Fort Benton. Crooked Falls lies about 4.3 miles upriver from that. Beautiful Falls (or Rainbow Falls) lies about a half mile up
river. Colter Falls, which is now fully submerged, lies about one mile upriver. And Black Eagle Falls, the last of the cascades,
lies about two miles upriver. See JA 687; Add. 2a (map). The 17 miles that has been used in this case to refer to the Great
Falls is generally demarked by the confluence with Belt (Portage) Creek, several miles below Great Falls, and Sun (Medicine)
River, several miles above Black Eagle Falls. JA 296; Add. 2a. It is undisputed that the falls themselves were not passable
by boat at statehood.
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Although Lewis and Clark's portage of the Great Falls is certainly the most historic, it was by no means the last. In particular,
during the 1860s, amidst the Montana gold rush, large numbers of miners regularly portaged the Great Falls as they traveled
the Missouri between Fort Benton and Three Forks. JA 313. A line *11 of mackinaw boats regularly carried passengers from
north of Helena to Fort Benton, making a short portage around the Great Falls, and arriving at Fort Benton in just three days
total. From there, passengers embarked onto steamboats and headed East down the Missouri as far as St. Louis. See JA 312-13
(citing Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Washington, Idaho, and Montana 732 n.9 (1890)); Add. 3a-6a, 9a-16a (excerpts of
federal government briefs in Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n). 6

6

Although the United States attempts the distinguish Montana Power Company on legal grounds (U.S. Br. 26), the Solicitor General's
factual description of the "actual use" of the same stretch of the Missouri at issue here is in no way tied to any particular legal
argument concerning navigability. Add. 3a-7a.

The 260-mile stretch of the Missouri between Three Forks and Fort Benton - encompassing the seven dams that PPL today
owns along the Missouri - served as a vital highway of commerce at and before statehood. There is historical evidence that
the stretch was used by fur traders and miners to transport their goods, as well as evidence of the use of steamboats above and
below the falls, and oflog rafting. See, e.g., JA 112, 169, 175-77, 181, 189, 307-08. As the evidence shows - and the Solicitor
General of the United States has previously explained in detail to this Court - the Great Falls by no means marked the end of,
or impeded, this highway of commerce. Rather, a relatively short portage around the falls allowed commerce to continue along
this stretch of the river as part of a continuous highway of commerce. That highway was well-known, and well-traveled, before
the railroads arrived in Montana. See JA 313 & n.24; Add. 4a-5a, 13a-15a.

*12 Clark Fork River. The Clark Fork rises in the Silver Bow Mountains near Butte, Montana. From there, it flows northwest
through Missoula where it intersects with the Blackfoot, continues through Thompson Falls, and eventually crosses into Idaho,
where it empties into Lake Pend Oreille. The Clark Fork provided a remarkably uniform channel at statehood with few
interruptions. The only significant obstruction was the Thompson Falls - which today is the site of one of PPL's dams. The
falls occupied less than half a mile and caused a drop in elevation of four to six feet. Including its surrounding rapids, the falls
span approximately 2.8 miles. Despite that obstacle, the Clark Fork was regularly navigated by traders and explorers along this
stretch, and was used for numerous log drives, before statehood.
Shortly after Lewis and Clark passed through Montana on their way back East, David Thompson - a fur trader and explorer
- canoed down the Clark Fork from the Flathead river all the way to Lake Pend Oreille, "portaging at Thompson Falls and
Rock Island Rapids." JA 66,234. Others similarly navigated the Clark Fork from Missoula (above Thompson Falls) down to
Lake Pend Oreille. JA 101. During the early fur-trading era, the Kootenai "often traded on the Clark Fork" (referring to the
stretch between the lower Flathead and Lake Pend Oreille, encompassing Thompson Falls). JA 105. Many decades later, during
the 1860s and 1870s, local newspapers reported boat service along the Clark Fork from points above Thompson Falls to Lake
Pend Oreille. JA 118, 131.
This stretch of the Clark Fork also served as a significant channel for log drives. Multiple reports oflog floats on the Clark Fork
appear in the 1880s, in *13 tandem with the need to move building materials for construction of the railroads. JA 213. Log
drives originated on Ninemile Creek and the Flathead River - both above Thompson Falls - and the logs were driven down the
Clark Fork all the way to Idaho. JA 240-41. In 1882, the Missoulian announced that logs "can be floated right to the locality
down the Missoula and Pen d'Oreille rivers." JA 143. There are numerous additional accounts of log floating and small boat
use from Lake Pend Oreille to places above Thompson Falls around the time of statehood and shortly thereafter. See JA 126,
129,223, 234, 356-57.
Steamboat navigation brought heavier traffic to the Clark Fork below Thompson Falls. In the 1860s, during the Montana gold
rush, several companies operated steamboats that took miners and others from Lake Pend Oreille to points near Thompson Falls
and back, providing for "a complete and reliable line of steamers for a distance of 125 miles, from Pen d'Oreille [sic] landing
to Thompson's river." JA 119; see JA 113, 116, 119-21, 125, 138-39, 141.
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Madison River. The Madison River rises in Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming and flows northward into Montana for 140
miles before joining the Gallatin and Jefferson Rivers at Three Forks to form the Missouri River. When William Clark reached
the Three Forks on July 25, 1805, he obsetved that the Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin Rivers were "nearly of a Size" (i.e.,
shared the same characteristics). JA 252. This comparison is significant because Lewis had previously described the Jefferson
as an exemplar of a navigable river in "a mountainous country." JA 162. While it has been reported that the Madison was used
by trappers and explorers in the 1800s (JA 218,251), *14 the evidence of pre-statehood commerce along the river was sparse
compared to that of the Missouri and the Clark Fork. The lack of additional historic use no doubt stems in part from the fact
that low-land Indian Tribes, such as the Blackfeet, lacked permanent settlements and were notoriously hostile to outsiders - as
Lewis himselflearned the hard way. JA 189. 7

7

On July 27, 1806, the Blackfeet attacked Lewis and his party, stealing some of their guns and attempting to escape with their horses.
Lewis and other members of the party took chase to recover the stolen property, eventually apprehended the culprits, and recovered
their horses. See 5 Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition (R G. Thwaites ed., 1904) 219-28.

The Madison's natural condition between April and July was viewed as ideal for log-driving - this being "the first river in the
country that had not a dollar of expenditure before the drive was started." JA 155. Shortly after Montana's entry into the Union,
however, several dams were built along the Madison - including the Hebgen and Madison dams owned by PPL - making log
floats more difficult by lowering water levels during what were previously high-flow months and erecting artificial obstructions.
JA 258-59. Nevertheless, not long after statehood, the Madison River Lumber Company floated logs down most of the middle
portion of the Madison, despite the relatively lower July waters. JA 155.
The Madison is best known today for its prized fishing - something close to "religion" in Montana. Norman MacLean, A River
Runs Through It and Other Stories 1 (1976). The river is classified as a "blue ribbon" trout stream and attracts avid fishermen
from all around the world. JA 261. Commercial fishing drift *15 boats regularly navigate the Madison near the Ennis and
Heb gen dams. JA 261-62; Opp. App. 63. These drift boats are the historical successors to the shallow-draft pirogues and bateaux
used by Lewis and Clark and traders in early commerce. See generally Richard Fletcher, Drift Boats and River Dories 53-63
(Stackpole Books 2007). The Madison is today among the most heavily used rivers in Montana - just behind the Missouri in angler days. Opp. App. 63.

C. This Litigation
1. In 2003, parents of Montana school children filed suit in federal district court in Montana against PPL and other privately
owned utilities on behalf of Montana's public school children, seeking compensation for defendants' use of state-owned
riverbeds at various hydroelectric generation facilities. The suit alleged that the riverbeds occupied by the dams comprised
state-owned trust lands for which Montana was obliged under the state constitution to seek compensation in the form of rent
for their use. The State inteivened in the action and filed its own complaint seeking compensation from defendants for use of
the riverbeds. The district court dismissed the action for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Pet. App. 3-5.
2. Before the federal action was dismissed, PPL and other hydroelectric utilities filed a declaratory judgment action against the
State in Montana state court, seeking a declaration that Montanans are not entitled to compensation for the use of the riverbeds
at issue. The State counterclaimed, claiming that it owned the riverbeds at issue and seeking a declaration that it was due
compensation for their use. Opp. App. 2-3 (,JiJ 1-2). PPL admitted that its dams were on "navigable river[s]." E.g., Pet. App. 5-8,
17-20; Opp. *16 App. 17-20 (iii! 16, 17-24, 26-27). Instead of contesting navigability, PPL argued that the State's claims for
compensation were preempted by the Federal Power Act and the federal navigational seivitude because the plants at issue were
federally licensed. But after the district court rejected those preemption arguments, PPL did an about-face on navigability. 8
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8

PPL later tried to disavow its admissions and claimed that it had never admitted navigability for title purposes. But neither the State's
counterclaims nor PPL's answer contained any limitation in describing the rivers as "navigable." Moreover, the State pleaded that
"Montana acquired title to the beds and banks of navigable waters in Montana at issue herein." Opp. App. 2 ('i 3). PPL made similar
concessions in its pleadings and briefs in the preceding federal case. Id. at 26-31. Courts have long recognized that such admissions
ordinarily are binding. See, e.g., American Title Ins. Co. v. Lace/aw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Peuse v.
Mal/..-uch, 911 P .2d 1153, 1157 (Mont. 1996). And the Montana district court appropriately found that these admissions were binding
on PPL here. Pet. App. 139-43.

The State moved for partial summary judgment on navigability. (PPL did not cross-move.) Both sides submitted affidavits
attaching various materials. The State's evidence is summarized at Opp. App. 26-57. PPL's affidavits are reprinted at Pet. App.
190-213. The main point of PPL's lead expert (Emmons) was that the Missouri and Clark Fork were not navigable because it
was "impossible" to take a boat down the Great Falls or Thompson Falls themselves. Id at 197; see id at 197-201, 203. PPL's
other expert (Schumm) focused on the Madison. Id at 205-15. Applying the test for navigability established by The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. at 563 - which holds that rivers are "navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being *17 used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce" - the district court granted summary judgment for the State. Pet. App. 135,143.
The court rejected PPL's position - which was the crux of its argument concerning the Missouri - that "the Great Falls clearly
prevent navigability" because the falls themselves are not susceptible to boat traffic. Id at 138. As the court explained, this
Court has long found that natural obstacles "requiring portage" do not defeat navigability when, as the evidence showed here,
" 'the natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a channel for useful commerce.' "Id (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 430,443 (1874)). The court explained that the same analysis compelled a finding that the Clark Fork was navigable,
despite Thompson Falls, given the evidence that the river was used as a "channel of commerce." Id at 142. The court also held
that PPL was bound by its admissions that these rivers were navigable. Id. at 139, 142.
As for the Madison, the court recognized that, although there is comparatively "little historical documentation" of its use,
the available evidence - which includes reports of use " 'by explorers, trappers, miners, farmers, and loggers' " as well as a
log float in 1913 - established navigability. Id at 143. The court also observed that "[t]oday, the Madison River experiences
considerable recreational use," and found that, "[a]s with the Missouri and Clark Fork," PPL was "bound by its admissions"
on navigability. Id

9

9

The Montana summary-judgment rule requires that a party present any "opposing affidavits" before the "day of hearing." Mont.
R. Civ. P. 56{c). Two months after the district court's ruling on navigability, PPL purported to make an "offer of proof regarding
navigability," comprising hundreds of pages of additional reports prepared by its paid experts. JA 38. The district court heard that
proffer but did not accept these reports as part of the summary judgment record- and could not have under Montana Rule 56(c). PPL
thus did not put these documents in the appendix before the Montana Supreme Court or refer to them in that court. PPL nevertheless
included the late-filed Emmons report in the appendix to its certiorari petition (at 216312) and continues to rely on both reports in
its merits brief. See, e.g., PPL Br. 14, 16, 17, 18. Cf Br. in Opp. 11 n. l.

*18 The district court subsequently held a trial on the outstanding issues in the case and ultimately entered judgment requiring
PPL to compensate the people of the State of Montana for its use of their riverbeds.
3. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's navigability ruling. The Court explained that its "independent review
of the case law in this area" confirmed that the district court's "understanding of the navigability for title test was correct,"
including as to the two "crucial aspects" of the district court's ruling: the significance of portages (bearing on the navigability
of the Missouri and Clark Fork) and use of post-statehood evidence (bearing on the navigability of the Madison). Id at 53-54.
Relying on The Montello, the court held that portages do not destroy navigability (id) or "require a piecemeal classification"
of the river (id at 58). The court explained that this Court had long recognized that most of the nation's rivers " 'originally
present[ ed] serious obstructions to an uninterrupted navigation,' " but these " 'natural barriers' " did not destroy navigability
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where the river still" 'afford[ed] a channel *19 for useful commerce.'" Id at 54a (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. at 442-43).
Applying that settled principle, the court held that, "[d]espite the presence of portages along the Clark Fork and Missouri Rivers,
the historical evidence establishes that they provided a channel for commerce at the time of statehood, or were susceptible of
such use." Id at 56.
As for the post-statehood usage of the Madison, the court explained that, under this Court's decisions in The Montello and
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931 ), a river is navigable if "it was 'susceptible' of providing a channel for commerce,"
even ifthere is little evidence of" 'actual use' at or before the time of statehood." Pet. App. 54. Applying that principle, the
court held that, "[w]hile the historical usage of the Madison was not well-established, the evidence of a log float on its middle
portion in the 19th century, combined with its present-day usage, demonstrates that this river was susceptible of providing a
channel for commerce at the time of statehood." Id at 56.
The court also carefully considered PPL's more particularized, evidence-specific objections to summary judgment. See id at
56-62. Although PPL has suggested that the Montana Supreme Court gave short shrift to the navigability issue, the court's
treatment of that issue was entirely consistent with the space devoted to this issue in the parties' briefs - in a case in which PPL
presented several issues on appeal. 1o

10

Because it agreed with the district court's conclusion that the State was entitled to judgment under the navigability-for-title test, the
Montana Supreme Court did not need to reach PPL's direct admissions of navigability. Pet. App. 62.

*20 SUM11AR.Y OF ARGUMENT
The judgment reached by the Montana Supreme Court in this case would have seemed natural to Lewis and Clark and the many
pioneers who followed in their wake and helped settle the State. PPL's sharp-edged attack on the reasoning and even motives of
the Montana Supreme Court is unfounded and out of step with this Court's precedents. The judgment of the Montana Supreme
Court should be affirmed.

I. Montana's interest in the riverbeds at issue in this case implicates a matter of core federalism. Under the equal footing doctrine,
title to the lands beneath navigable waters is conveyed to the States upon their admission into the Union by the Constitution
itself. That conveyance is consistent with the ancient public trust doctrine recognizing that the lands beneath navigable waters
are held in public trust for all to use as common highways of commerce - a principle embodied in American law since at least
as far back as the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. This Court has the final say over whether riverbeds are part of a navigable
waterway, and thus conveyed to the States under the equal footing doctrine. But in reviewing a state court's judgment that rivers
are navigable, there is no basis for the Court to adopt the extraordinary "rule of skepticism" proposed by PPL. Instead, the
Court should approach navigability issues with the same care and respect it reserves for other matters bearing on an essential
attribute of state sovereignty.
II. The Montana Supreme Court properly articulated the "constitutional test" (Pet. i) for navigability in determining whether
Montana took title at statehood to the riverbeds at issue. Indeed, the test framed by the Montana Supreme Court is faithfully
*21 grounded on this Court's navigability decisions going back to The Daniel Ball, which look to whether the river - at the
time of statehood - was used, or susceptible of being used, as a public highway for commerce. PPL itself acknowledges (at 27)
that The Daniel Ball supplies the proper constitutional test. In arguing that the Montana Supreme Court did not abide by that
tes~ PPL really is asking this Court fundamentally to change the test. The test that PPL proposes is at odds not only with more
than a century of this Court's jurisprudence, but with the concept of navigability - and the role of rivers in American life - that
would have been familiar to the Framers at the time the Constitution was adopted.
As to the Missouri and Clark Fork, PPL's overriding complaint is that the Montana Supreme Court did not carve out the Great
Falls and Thompson Falls from the surrounding waters and hold that the riverbeds underlying the falls are non-navigable
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because the falls themselves were not passable by boat. But since as far back as The Montello, this Court - relying on The Daniel
Ball - has held that "obstructions" that preclude "unbroken navigation" do not defeat navigability, where the obstructions were
portaged so that the rivers continued to serve as public highways of commerce. Here, there is undeniable evidence that the Great
Falls and Thompson Falls were portaged so that the rivers continued to serve as public highways for commerce at the time of
statehood. For example, in the 1860s, during the Montana gold rush, gold was transported down the Missouri from Helena to
Fort Benton - and then back East - with the aid of a portage around the Great Falls. Although the falls prevented "unbroken
navigation," they did not *22 stop the rivers from serving as highways of commerce - and thus they do not defeat navigability.
Relying on United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), PPL argues that courts must carve out any non-"de minimis" or
"negligible" interruption as its own segment and analyze that segment separately for navigability-for-title purposes. But Utah
does not support PPL's segmentation rule. Unlike the falls at issue in this case (and the interruptions in The Montello), the
canyon involved in Utah was not fully portaged, so the highway of commerce came to a dead end at the canyon. Nor does
PPL's segmentation rule have much to commend it. PPL does not define what interruptions are "de minimis" or "negligible,"
and its segmentation approach is a recipe for uncertainty and invites litigation by riparian owners seeking to isolate and break
off purportedly "non-navigable" bits and pieces. As The Montello teaches, what matters is not whether a particular interruption
is one mile, 4.35 miles, or 20 miles, but whether the attendant stretch of the river served as a continuous highway of commerce,
notwithstanding the interruption. That test is not only consistent with this Court's precedent, it is consistent with the history
and geography of North America.

As to the Madison, PPL takes aim at the Montana Supreme Court's consideration of post-statehood evidence of use as relevant
to the river's navigability at statehood. But since at least The Daniel Ball it has been settled that navigability may be determined
not only on actual use as a highway for commerce, but susceptibility for use as such. The Montana Supreme Court simply
recognized - as this Court itself has - that post-statehood evidence may be "relevant upon the issue of the susceptibility of the
rivers" when it *23 shows that the rivers were used as highways of commerce at statehood Utah, 283 U.S. at 82. Nor is
there any merit to PPL's objection about the "kind of commerce that counts" (PPL Br. 49 (emphasis added)) in demonstrating
navigability. Log floating was one of the classic commercial uses of rivers in the 19th century, and there is no reason to disregard
commercial recreational uses - like drift boat fishing - where the boats used by present-day river-goers are comparable to the
boats used by those plying and trading on the waters before statehood.
III. Because this Court granted certiorari solely to address whether the Montana Supreme Court articulated the proper
"constitutional test" for navigability (Pet. i), there is no reason for the Court to entertain any record-specific objections to the
grant of summary judgment. Nor is there any reason to tum this state court case into a reprisal of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), on when evidence is sufficient to create a material issue of disputed fact. In any event, contrary to
PPL's objections, there is nothing inherently problematic - or off limits - about granting summary judgment on navigability
issues. Courts and special masters frequently make summary judgment determinations on navigability. PPL's problem is not
that the Montana courts improperly applied the standard for summary judgment. Its problem is that it litigated this case based
on a mistaken understanding of the legal test for navigability. Thus, for example, PPL did not submit any evidence rebutting
the fact that the Great Falls and Thompson Falls were portaged so that the rivers served as continuous highways of commerce.
Properly *24 viewed, the summary judgment record supports the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court.

ARGUMENT

I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED RAISES A CORE ISSUE OF FEDERALISM
Montana's title to the riverbeds at issue in this case "uniquely implicate[s]" its sovereign interests. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997). Indeed, this Court has long recognized that state ownership of"lands underlying navigable
waters" is "an essential attribute of sovereignty." Utah Div. ofState Landsv. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987). Under the
equal footing doctrine, the States' title to such lands is conferred "by the Constitution itself." Idaho, 521 U.S. at 283 (citations
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and internal quotation marks omitted). State ownership over such lands thus represents a core component of federalism. See
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,272 (2001); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544,551 (1981); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,436 (1867); see also Sonia Sotomayor, Note, Statehood
and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case/or Puerto Rican Seabed Rights, 88 Yale L.J. 825, 837 & n.69 (1979) (explaining
that constitutional equal footing doctrine rests upon considerations of" 'dual federalism'").
The equal footing doctrine is grounded on the centuries-old "public trust doctrine," which dates back at least to Ancient Rome
and was adopted by the English Crown in the Magna Carta. See Idaho, 521 U.S. at 284;supra at 4-5. The public trust doctrine
protects" 'the paramount right of public use of navigable waters,' "and recognizes that the sovereign *25 holds the submerged
lands beneath those waters" 'as a public trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for
commerce, trade, and intercourse.'" Illinois Cent. R.R Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,458 (1892) (citation omitted). This principle
was vital to the nation at the time of the founding, and before, when navigable waterways served as the primary arteries for
inland travel and commerce. And it is embodied in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was later enacted into federal law
by the First Congress, and declares that "[t]he navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying
places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free." 11

II

An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio (Northwest Ordinance of 1787)
(adopted by the First Congress in I Stat. 50, 52 (1789)). Because the Northwest Ordinance existed at the time of the founding and
was enacted into law by the First Congress, it is strong evidence of how the Framers viewed the public trust doctrine embodied in
the equal footing doctrine.

Especially in view of the constitutional foundation for the State's title to lands underlying navigable waters and its responsibility
to manage public trust lands, PPL's attack on the motives of the State in seeking to protect the title to the riverbeds at issue
is misguided. This Court generally presumes the good faith of all government actors, including the States. There is no reason
to proceed from any other understanding when a State asserts title to public trust lands. Yet PPL essentially asks this Court to
adopt a constitutional presumption that state claims of navigability are "contriv[ed]," and apply "a particular *26 skepticism
toward navigability determinations made by a State's own courts in the State's favor." PPL Br. 29-30. That approach would
turn upside down cardinal principles of respect for the States, and for the judgments of state courts, that are central to "Our
Federalism" and embedded in the constitutional design. This Court of course has the final say over the validity of a State's
assertion of title over riverbeds under the equal footing doctrine. But in resolving such claims, there is no basis for proceeding
from any premise but that the State has acted in good faith - and on behalf of the public trust it seeks to protect.
Federalism comes into play in another way in this case. To the extent that the riverbeds at issue in this case are held to be nonnavigable, the United States no doubt would claim title to the lion's share of those lands. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S.
64, 75 (1931); U.S. Br. I ("Where the waters were non-navigable at the time of statehood, the United States has asserted its
ownership of the riverbeds ...."). As it turns out, the United States government historically has been adverse to the States in
cases where title to submerged lands is at issue. See, e.g., Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 100 (2005); Utah, 283 U.S.
at 16;United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. I, 15 (1935); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922). Here, the United States
takes the position that the rivers at issue are navigable for federal regulatory purposes, but not for state title purposes - a winwin for the federal government.
Ultimately, the constitutional test ofnavigability advanced by PPL, and fully backed by the United States, would have the effect
of stripping the States of sovereignty over the lands underlying navigable waters by fundamentally narrowing the concept of
*27 navigability long recognized by this Court. At a minimum, the Court ought to approach that far-reaching argument with
the caution it typically exercises in matters impeding state sovereignty.
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II. THE STATE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR NAVIGABILITY IN
DECIDING THIS CASE

PPL challenges the "constitutional test" (Pet. i) articulated by the Montana Supreme Court in deciding whether the rivers at issue
are navigable. As the United States explained in its invitation brief, PPL's attacks on the Montana Supreme Court's decision are
based largely on an "overstate[ment of] the Montana Supreme Court's rationale," U.S. Invitation Br. I 0, and a misreading of
this Court's precedents, see id at I 0-17. Fairly read, the navigability test articulated by the Montana Supreme Court is entirely
consistent with this Court's precedents going back to The Daniel Ball (1870), and with the historical conception of navigability
embodied in the Northwest Ordinance. In the end, it is the constitutional test proposed by PPL - not the one articulated by the
Montana Supreme Court - that dramatically departs from settled law.
Indeed, although PPL acknowledges that the test for navigability is constitutionally grounded, it bases its position on a
conception of the role of rivers - and trade and travel along rivers - that would have been foreign to the Framers. The Framers
lived in a time when rivers provided the major arteries of commerce and travel in North America, and when rivers were regularly
portaged so that trade and commerce could continue along the waters. The Framers would have appreciated that "there are
but few of our fresh-water rivers which did not originally present serious *28 obstacles to an uninterrupted navigation." The
Montello, 87 U.S. at 443. And they would not have conceived of a constitutional test for navigability under which portages
around such obstacles would destroy navigability or require chopping up the nation's great rivers into navigable and nonnavigable pieces based on the presence of such portageable interruptions.
This Court should reject PPL's invitation to adopt such an ahistorical conception of navigability now.

A. The Montana Supreme Court Applied This Court's Constitutional Test

The Montana Supreme Court based its conclusion that the State owns the riverbeds at issue on its determination that the evidence
showed that the Missouri and Clark Fork "provided a channel for commerce at the time of statehood," and that the Madison
was "susceptible of providing a channel for commerce at the time of statehood." Pet. App. 56. That analysis comes right out
of this Court's decisions.
1. More than a century ago, in The Daniel Ball, this Court held that "rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law"
if they "are navigable in fact." 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563. Rivers "are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible
of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water." Id

Four years later, this Court elaborated on that basic test in The Montello, explaining that "the vital and essential point is whether
the natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a channel for useful commerce." 87 U.S. at 441. "If this be so," the Court
held, ''the river is navigable in fact, although its *29 navigation may be encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural
barriers, such as rapids and sandbars." Id The Court rejected "the rule laid down by the district judge as a test ofnavigability,"
under which a river is non-navigable insofar as "obstructions" requiring portage prevent "unbroken navigation." Id at 442. As
the Court explained, the Northwest Ordinance itself had recognized such "carrying-places," where "boats must be partially or
wholly unloaded and their cargoes carried on land," and the district court's test "would exclude many of the great rivers of the
country which were so interrupted by rapids as to require artificial means to enable them to be navigated without break." Id.
at 442-43. "Indeed," the Court continued, "there are but few of our fresh-water rivers which did not originally present serious
obstacles to an uninterrupted navigation." Id. at 443.
Applying The Daniel Ball test, the Court held that the Fox River is navigable, notwithstanding "several rapids and falls" in
its natural state that impeded "unbroken navigation," even with the use of small "Durham boats," and thus required "a few
portages." Id. at 439,441,442. The Court focused on the history of the Fox River as means oftrade - i.e., "highway of commerce"
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- in the region and further explained that its test was consistent with "the purpose of the [Northwest] Ordinance of 1787." Id
at 442, 444. 12

12

The United States asserts (at 25) that "the obstructions to navigation [in The Montello] were removed by artificial navigation (locks
and canals)." That is true - but misleading- because the Court detennined that the Fox River was navigable based on the natural state
of the river "before the navigation of the river was improved." 87 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added).

*30 2. PPL acknowledges (at 27) that The Daniel Ball states the proper test, but claims that the Montana Supreme Court
improperly relied on The Montello and so-called non-title cases. According to PPL, because The Montello did not address "title
navigability," it does not count. PPL Br. 42 (emphasis added). PPL's attempt to sink The Montello is understandable - it answers
PPL's theory that portaged interruptions destroy navigability. But PPL's argument fails.
The Montello Court did not believe that it was doing anything but applying The Daniel Ball test to the Fox River stretch at
issue. The very first sentence of the decision refers to The Daniel Ball; the following sentences set forth the constitutional test
established by The Daniel Ball; and the decision then states that the Court's holding is based on the "[a]ppl[ication]" of that
test. 87 U.S. at 439. Moreover, far from purporting to break new ground, the Court observed that "[t]he views that we have
presented on this subject receive support from the courts of this country that have had occasion to discuss the question of what
is a navigable stream." Id at 443 & n.16 (citing cases).

In the 140 years since they were decided, this Court has consistently relied on The Daniel Ball and The Montello in stating the
constitutional test for state title to submerged lands. The Court did just that in Utah - the "title" case on which PPL and the
United States principally rely. There, the Court drew the "test for navigability" - as "frequently stated by this Court" - directly
from The Daniel Ball and The Montello. Utah, 283 U.S. at 76;see also, e.g., Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891) (relying
on The Daniel Ball); Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 586 (citing The Daniel Ball and The Montello); *31 Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co.
v. UnitedStates, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922) (invoking The Monte/Io's "channel for useful commerce" test); United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926) (citing The Montello); Oregon, 295 U.S. at 15 (relying on The Daniel Ball).
This Court also has observed that courts should be mindful of "the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked
in a particular case." Kaiser Aetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1979). And the Court has adapted The Daniel Ba/land
The Monte/Io's test for navigability in three specific respects depending on the context in which it is invoked: (1) for title cases,
the Court looks to the river's natural state, whereas for regulatory cases it considers the river's natural and improved condition;
(2) for title cases, the Court determines navigability as of the time of statehood, whereas for regulatory cases it considers the
river's condition today; and (3) for title cases, the Court asks whether the river was part of a useful channel for commerce, local
or otherwise, whereas for regulatory cases it requires the river to be part of a channel of interstate commerce. See U.S. Br. 9-10.
But these settled variations are in no way implicated by the decision under review: The Montana Supreme Court considered
navigability at the time of statehood, looked to the rivers' natural state, and considered whether the rivers were part of a useful
channel of commerce. Pet. App. 54-62.
It simply does not follow, as PPL suggests, that navigability cases from one context are categorically inapposite - and should
be rigorously segregated from - cases that arise in other contexts. The inquiries overlap far more than they diverge. That is
why this Court has relied on title and regulatory cases *32 interchangeably, except insofar as the settled distinctions above
are implicated. Indeed, even PPL does not follow its own proposed dichotomy, because it relies affirmatively on regulatory
cases, when it suits its own interests to do so. See PPL Br. 37, 49, 54 (relying on non-title cases); Pet. 21, 24. The dichotomy
that PPL and the United States now try to create between The Daniel Ball and The Montello is completely artificial and out
of step with precedent.
Principles of stare decisis, not to mention the need for "certainty and predictability" that PPL itself touts (at 33 ), counsel strongly
against reconceiving more than a century of this Court's navigability precedents by retroactively holding that this Court's title

W'e.STt.AW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

PPL Montana, LLC v. State of Montana, 2011 WL 5126226 (2011)

and regulatory cases must be rigidly compartmentalized in a way that is completely at odds with this Court's own reliance on
and use of those precedents.

B. The Montana Supreme Court Properly Considered The Stretches That Comprised The Relevant Channels Of
Commerce

PPL argues (at 40) that the Montana Supreme Court erred by taking a" 'whole river' approach" (at 40) to navigability, without
considering navigability on a "segment-by-segment basis" (at 34). That argument is a straw man. The phrase "river as a
whole'' (or anything like it) does not appear in the Montana Supreme Court's decision. And the State has never argued, and the
Montana courts did not hold, that a river that is navigable "as a whole" is necessarily navigable in fact along its entire length. At
the certiorari stage, the United States recognized that PPL's "river as a whole" argument was based on an "overstat [ement of]
the Montana Supreme Court's rationale" (U.S. Invitation Br. 10), though in its merits- *33 stage brief it chooses to perpetuate
that mischaracterization itself(U.S. Br. 11-12, 18).
The Montana Supreme Court analyzed whether the rivers at issue were navigable by looking not to the rivers "as a whole," and
not to natural interruptions in isolation (as PPL proposes), but by considering whether the stretches of the rivers that included
the interruptions on which PPL focuses formed a continuous highway for commerce, notwithstanding the interruptions. Pet.
App. 56. That analysis is perfectly consistent with this Court's precedents.
1. The crux of PPL's challenge to the navigability of the Missouri and Clark Fork is that the Montana Supreme Court should
have focused exclusively on the natural interruptions - on which PPL's power plants generally sit - and should have disregarded
the surrounding stretches of the rivers. See, e.g., PPL Br. 40, 41, 59. As PPL sees it, because "boats ... could not pass the falls
area itself," the riverbeds at issue are not navigable - end of story. Id at 12; see id at 8, 15-16, 46; see also Pet. App. 198
(emphasizing that "there has never been any navigation on the Missouri River in the Great Falls Reach because the physical
characteristics of the falls prevent it") (Emmons); id at 202 (same concerning Thompson Falls). The United States repeats this
refrain. U.S. Br. 22 (emphasizing that the falls themselves were "impassable"). The Montana Supreme Court properly rejected
that line of analysis.
PPL's argument is based almost entirely on Utah, which PPL says (at 36) "exemplifies the segment-by-segment approach."
According to PPL, Utah holds that a court must analyze not just "the specific river sections at issue" but any "stretches within
those sections that [have] distinct topographical *34 characteristics." PPL Br. 37 (emphasis added). Anything but a "de
minimis" or "negligible" obstacle, PPL maintains (at 38), must be analyzed separately - and would almost certainly be deemed
non-navigable in PPL's view, since an obstacle is by definition impassable. That approach finds no footing in Utah.
The Utah Court did not carve up the Colorado River like a Thanksgiving turkey, hacking away at every non-de minimis
portion containing a natural obstacle and considering it in isolation as a new "stretch" with each change in the river's physical
characteristics. Rather, the Court analyzed the head of navigation and concluded that, despite many obstructions in its natural
state, the entire Colorado river was navigable, with the exception of a 36-mile stretch (Cataract Canyon), which had never been
entirely portaged and had geological features making that portage infeasible. The Court therefore concluded that the Colorado
ceased to be navigable at that point. See283 U.S. at 17;see also PPL Supp. Br. App. 10-13.
Cataract Canyon is completely different than the Great Falls and Thompson Falls, and not just because - at 36 miles long Cataract Canyon is more than twice as long as Lewis and Clark's 17-mile portage around the Great Falls. Unlike the Great Falls
and Thompson Falls, Cataract Canyon was "not ... fully portaged." U.S. Br. 23 n.13. Parts of the canyon were portaged. See
PPL Supp. Br. App. 12. But there is no evidence that the canyon was portaged so that the waterway - above and below the canyon
- served as a continuous highway of commerce, or even that the canyon was susceptible to such use. Instead, it was uncontested
that the canyon, and its forbidding terrain (see id), created a dead end. In this case, by contrast, *35 it is undeniable that trade
and travel portaged around the falls in question and that the river stretches served as continuous public highways of commerce.
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PPL also points to Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922), and argues (at 38) that instead of analyzing the entire 1360-mile
Red River the Court considered "the much shorter segment at issue." But that "much shorter segment" was 539 miles long i.e., the entire length of the Red River in the State of Oklahoma. 258 U.S. at 582,585 & n.4. Moreover, the Court considered
that entire 539-mile stretch even though the dispute between Oklahoma and Texas concerned "the proceeds of oil and gas
taken from 43 miles" of the riverbed. Id at 579. Oklahoma thus provides no support for the kind of piecemeal segmentation
approach that PPL advances here, which requires a court to break a river up into navigable and non-navigable segments for
any interruption that is not de minimis. 13

13

The other cases relied upon by PPL for its novel segmentation regime are also inapposite. See U.S. Invitation Br. 12-13 (explaining
that these cases "did not address how to treat non-navigable 'middle section[s] of an otherwise-navigable river'") (quoting Pet. 20)
(alteration in original)).

2. PPL does not define what counts as a "de minimis," or "negligible," interruption for purposes of its Uber-segmentation
approach. But it latches on to Utah's consideration of "the first 4.35 miles of the stretch of the Colorado river" at issue in that
case and argues that that stretch is not de minimis. PPL Br. 38. As the United States explained in its invitation brief(at 11), "Utah
does not stand for the legal proposition that any 4.35-mile interruption in navigability must be treated as a distinct segment."
Indeed, the "4.35-mile *36 segment" relied upon by PPL (at 38) is not an interruption at all. Rather, Utah argued (and this
Court agreed) that those 4.35 river miles properly belonged with the navigable waters upstream (the Green and Grand Rivers,
which came together to form the Colorado), not the Cataract Canyon stretch that everyone agreed was non-navigable. See Utah,
283 U.S. at 89;see also U.S. Invitation Br. 12.
Moreover, elsewhere in Utah the Court made clear that it did not view a distance of 4.35 miles as significant in the context of
a river like the Colorado, calling the 4.35 miles a "short stretch." 283 U.S. at 89. Likewise, the Utah Court saw no problem
with the special master's reference to one stretch of the Grand River as "only six miles in all." Id at 85 (emphasis added).
Characterizing a stretch of several miles as "short" might seem odd in the abstract, but it is not in the context of a river. Cf
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 596 (1945) (referring to "short stretch" of "40-odd miles" of a river). And in the same
vein, to the extent that it has any constitutional relevance to the navigability inquiry here, the stretches at issue in this case are
likewise properly regarded as "short."
But as cases like The Montello teach, what matters in gauging navigability is not whether an interruption is one mile, 4.35
miles, or 20 miles long. What matters is whether the attendant stretch of the river served as a continuous highway of commerce
- notwithstanding the interruption. Supra at 28-30. If PPL's position had been law, then the Court's decision in The Montello
would have simply focused on identifying the impassable segments of the Fox River, isolated those segments from the rest of
the river, and declared them to be non-navigable. That, in essence, is what the *37 district court did in The Montello. See 87
U.S. at 442. But this Court rejected that approach and looked to whether the rivers served as continuous highways of commerce
- despite the obstacles. Id at 442-43.
This does not mean that interruptions cannot defeat navigability. They can - and do. The longer or more severe the interruption,
the more difficult it will likely be to establish navigability. In Utah, for example, it was clear that the highway of commerce
stopped at the 36-mile Cataract Canyon; no one argued that the canyon was portaged to connect a trade route along the river
above and below the canyon. This case is just the opposite. As the Montana Supreme Court explained, on the Missouri the
Great Falls was portaged so that trade flowed from Three Forks to Fort Benton. Pet. App. 61. And on the Clark Fork, Thompson
Falls was portaged to establish a trade route from the confluence of the Flathead River (above the falls) to Lake Pend Oreille
in Idaho. Id; see supra at 9-12.
The focus on whether the pertinent stretches were used as (or are susceptible for use as) a highway of commerce establishes a
workable and time-honored principle grounded on more than a century of case law. By contrast, PPL's hyper-segmentation rule
is highly manipulable and seems designed primarily to aid hydroelectric generators whose plants generally sit on interruptions.
PPL offers little guidance, other than its vague "de minimis" or "negligible part" exception, on what interruptions do not qualify
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for segmentation. PPL's test thus is a recipe for uncertainty in an area in which PPL itself (at 33) demands "predictability,"
and will require courts to go back and carve up waterways that have long been found navigable into "navigable" and "nonnavigable" pieces. After all, "there are but *38 few of our fresh-water rivers which did not originally present serious obstacles
to an uninterrupted navigation." The Montello, 87 U.S. at 443.

C. The Montana Supreme Court Properly Recognized That Portaging Does Not Automatically Defeat Navigability

In a variation on their segmentation argument, PPL and the United States argue that portaged interruptions on a river are not
"themselves navigable for the ... purpose of establishing title." PPL Br. 42; see U.S. Br. 23-27. In other words, according to PPL
and the United States, any non-de minimis interruption requiring portage is non-navigable for title purposes. That position is
inconsistent with the purposes of the public trust and equal footing doctrines as well as more than a hundred years of precedent.
1. As discussed, this Court has recognized since The Montello that falls, rapids, or other interruptions requiring portage do not
destroy navigability - so long as the surrounding stretch of the river served as a useful channel for commerce. Supra at 28-30.
And this Court has repeatedly re%irmed - pointing to The Daniel Ball and The Montello - that "(n]avigability, in the sense of
the law, is not destroyed because the watercourse is interrupted by occasional natural obstructions or portages." Economy Light
& Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 122 (1921); see id at 121-22. Indeed, in Economy Light & Power Company, the
Court confirmed the navigability of a river stretch that included over 24 miles of nearly-consecutive interruptions, including "a
7-mile portage," and a land "transfer of over 11 miles." Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 F. 792, 795-96 (7th
Cir. 1919); 256 U.S. at 124 (affirming); see also *39 St. Anthony FallsWater Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S.
349,359 (1897) (holding river stretch navigable "at all points" including waterfall and surrounding rapids).
Likewise, other federal and state courts - in both the title and regulatory contexts - have recognized that portageable obstacles
do not destroy navigability, and settled expectations have formed based on this rule. 14 To take just one example, it has been
settled for more than 50 years that the riverbeds underlying Niagara Falls, which of course required a portage, are owned by
the State of New York - "even at the point of the falls." Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784 (Sup. Ct.
1945); see also In re State Reservation at Niagara, 3 7 Hun. 53 7, 16 Abb. No. Cas. 395 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1885), appeal dismissed,
7 N.E. 916 (1886). Under PPL's rule, however, the riverbeds underlying the falls would have to be carved out and declared
non-navigable for title purposes.

14

See, e.g., Knott v. FERC, 386 F.3d 368, 372-73 (1st Cir. 2004); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. FERC, 993 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir.
1993); Consolidated Hydro, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491, 493-94
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 123 F.2d 155, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Alaska v. United States, 662 F.
Supp. 455, 466-67 (D. AJaska 1987), affd, Alaska v. Ahtha, 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 27 William Mark McKinney
& Burdett Alberto Rich, Ruling Case Law, Waters,§ 218, at 1310 (1920); see generally John A. Humbach, Public Rights in the
Navigable Streams of New York, 6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 461(1989).

2. PPL tries to tackle The Monte/Io's rule that portaging does not defeat navigability in two different ways. First, it argues
that The Montello "addressed regulatory navigability, not title navigability." PPL Br. 42. But that is beside the point because,
as *40 discussed, this Court has for more than a century relied upon The Montello interchangeably with The Daniel Ball in
describing the constitutional test for navigability - and even did so in Utah, the case that PPL itself holds out as the vanguard
for "title navigability." See supra at 31-32. Second, PPL argues that Utah establishes that "portageable interruptions" do defeat
navigability, pointing to the fact that the Court held that the Cataract Canyon stretch was not navigable. PPL Br. 42. As discussed,
however, Cataract Canyon was not fully portaged and so commerce came to a dead end at the canyon. In that key respect, Utah
is entirely different from The Montello - and this case. Supra at 34-35.
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (AEP), cited by the United States, is not to the contrary.
As the United States itself concedes (at 25), that case did not involve "any obstructions requiring a portage." Moreover, in the
passage relied upon by the government, the Court simply noted differences between the title and regulatory inquiries that are

W~STLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

PPL Montana, LLC v. State of Montana, 2011 WL 5126226 (2011)

not pertinent here - namely, the fact that the regulatory inquiry is not confined to the time of statehood or the rivers' natural
state. See311 U.S. at 407-08. But, as the Montana Supreme Court recognized (Pet. App. 56), the State's assertion of title to
the Missouri and Clark Fork here is based on evidence of actual use of the rivers in their natural state and before statehood.
Supra at 18-19. 15

15

The United States suggests (at 24-25) that this Court should draw a negative inference from Congress•s definition of "navigable
waters" in 16 U.S.C. § 796. This is a 180-degree change from the government's position before this Court in Montana Power Company,
where the Solicitor General told the Court that ''this defmition is in accord with established principles," and specifically invoked the
holding in The Montello. Add. 8a (emphasis added). The United States was right then. Section 796 expands the navigability inquiry
in certain respects for regulatory purposes (natural vs. improved condition and statehood v. present-day use), but not insofar as it
recognizes that portages do not destroy navigability. More important, nothing in§ 796 could narrow the constitutional definition of
navigability for title purposes.

*41 3. As a fallback, PPL suggests (at 42) that "this Court's precedent at most might permit treating a portageable stretch
of an otherwise navigable river as itself navigable for title purposes only if it qualified as a 'short inteITUption' or 'negligible
part' within the meaning of Utah." See U.S. Br. 24. PPL takes this Court•s language out of context and fails to account for
the fact that "short" is a relative term when it comes to describing something like a river. Supra at 36. But in any event, that
standard is unworkable for the same reasons that PPL's "de minimis" or "negligible part" exception to its segmentation rule is
impracticable. See supra at 35-37. And once it is recognized (as this Court has held since The Montello) that portages do not
defeat navigability where the river is used as a continuous highway of commerce, then there is no constitutional or principled
basis for arbitrarily cutting off navigability at a particular mile marker.

PPL argues (at 42) that the 17-mile portage of the Great Falls was too long and "arduous" to qualify under this test. Early
Americans, particularly those who helped settle the West, had a hardier conception of distances than the typical modem day
city slicker. *42 Lewis and Clark, for example, regularly traveled 20 or more miles a day during their expedition. There is
no reason why the Constitution would draw a distinction between a 17-mile portage and a one-, five-, or 10-mile portage. Cf
Economy Light & Power, supra (7-mile portage). Actions speak louder than labels. By definition, any inteITUption that was
in fact portaged to allow the river to continue to serve as a highway of commerce is "short" enough for any constitutionally
relevant navigability purpose.
Moreover, the question for purposes of this case is not how long it took Lewis and Clark to portage the Great Falls - on the
first try by any explorer, in an unknown territory roamed by grizzlies, with a full expedition (and a seriously ill Sacagawea)
in tow. It is whether the falls were portaged at statehood so that the river was used as a highway of commerce. They were.
By the 1860s, the portage was conducted regularly by large numbers of miners under far less "arduous" conditions and in a
fraction of the time. See supra at 10-11. This history conclusively refutes PPL's suggestion (at 41) that the Great Falls portage
was "wholly incompatible with commercial navigation." 16

16

The possibility that a river "could be portaged in theory" does not establish navigability. U.S. Br. 24 (emphasis added). Just as the
application of the "susceptibility for use" prong of The Daniel Balls navigability test must be based on a realistic assessment of
what is susceptible, so too must an assessment of the feasibility of portage. For example, given the history and geography of Cataract
Canyon (see supra at 34), the theoretical possibility that an Ernest Shackleton might fmd a way to portage the canyon is not enough to
establish navigability. Moreover, the key point is not simply whether the river was portaged, but whether it was portaged so that the
river served as a continuous highway of commerce. As discussed, the river stretches here were not simply portageable "in theory";
they were regularly portaged in/act by those using the rivers as public highways of commerce.

*43 4. Finally, PPL's and the United States' position that portage always (or invariably) defeats navigability is out of step with
the history of the nation - and the geography of North America. As The Montello recognizes in discussing the travels of the
likes of Marquette and Joliet (87 U.S. at 440), portaging was a common means of overcoming obstructions along waterways
that indisputably served as key channels of commerce and trade. The many towns and rivers across the country with "portage"
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in their name - like Portage City, Wisconsin (id. at 439) and Portage Creek, Montana - not to mention the reference to the
"canying places" in the Northwest Ordinance, speak volumes about how deeply ingrained the practice of portage was in early
American travel and commerce. Adopting PPL's position would disregard the deeply rooted historical fact that interruptions
necessitating portages did not prevent a river from serving as a public highway of commerce in America

D. The Montana Supreme Court Properly Considered The Madison's Susceptibility For Use As A Highway Of
Commerce

PPL's remaining criticisms of the Montana Supreme Court's decision relate principally to the Madison River and focus on its
articulation of the "susceptible-for-use" prong of the navigability test. Here again, PPL's attacks prove unfounded.
*44 1. PPL acknowledges that The Daniel Ball test considers not only whether a river was actually used as a highway of
commerce at statehood, but whether it is" 'susceptible of being used'" as such. PPL Br. 27 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
at 563 (emphasis added)). But PPL argues that this Court should convert the alternative "susceptibility" prong into a "rare"
exception that can be invoked only when there is "limited or non-existent settlement in the region, and even then only if river
conditions are the same today as at statehood."Jd. at 26; see id. at 43, 45. In other words, without asking this Court to overrule
any precedent, PPL essentially asks this Court to all but scuttle the "susceptibility for use" prong.

The "susceptibility for use" prong has been a fixture of the constitutional test for 140 years. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563;Utah,
283 U.S. at 76;Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56. There is no evidence that it has proved unworkable or ineffectual in screening
navigability claims. To the contrary, the "susceptibility for use" inquiry makes perfect sense in light of the purposes of the
equal footing and public trust doctrines. The Founders no doubt understood that not all navigable rivers in America would have
documented instances of commercial trade at the time of statehood. And although the navigability test is focused on navigability
at the time of statehood, there is no reason to deny States title to rivers that were capable of meeting the navigability test at
statehood.
Under well-settled law, the Montana Supreme Court in no way erred in holding that the Madison was navigable based on its
conclusion that the Madison "was susceptible of providing a channel for commerce at the time of statehood." Pet. App. 56.
*45 2. PPL tries a backdoor attack on the "susceptibility for use" prong by arguing (at 47) that this Court should adopt a
rule that reliance on "modem-day usage" is "strongly disfavored." But there is no reason for this Court to adopt a special
evidentiary rule for navigability determinations. The ordinary rules of evidence, including the rule of relevance (e.g., Mont.
R. Evid. 401), suffice. This Court has long recognized that post-statehood evidence may be "relevant upon the issue of the
susceptibility of the rivers" when it shows that the rivers were used as highways of commerce at the time of statehood. Utah,
283 U.S. at 82;see U.S. Invitation Br. 15 (recognizing that such evidence "may be probative of navigability at statehood"). The
Montana Supreme Court simply recognized that commonsense rule. See Pet. App. 55-56 (given that navigability be based on
actual use or susceptibility for use, "present-day usage of a river may be probative of its status as a navigable river at the time
ofstatehood') (emphasis added).
Nor is there anything suspect about the way in which the Montana Supreme Court consulted post-statehood evidence. PPL
claims (at 48) that the court failed to take into account that the flow of the river was altered by PPL's dams. But the Montana
Supreme Court specifically recognized that the flow of the river had been "altered" by PPL's dams, albeit not in the way PPL
would have liked. Pet. App. 58; see id at 57. As the court - and PPL's own expert - recognized, the dams reduced the flow
of water along the Madison during most of the year. Id; see Pet. App. 210-11 (Schumm). The Montana Supreme Court could
take that asserted change into account and conclude that - since the river would have been only more navigable *46 before the
dams at least part of the year - the evidence of substantial drift boat use on the Madison today was relevant to, and supported,
a finding ofnavigability at statehood. Resp. Mont. S. Ct. Br. 31-32.
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3. PPL's highly restrictive test for the "kind of commerce that counts" (at 49 (emphasis added)) in gauging navigability also
should be rejected. This Court has admonished that navigability for title" 'does not depend on the mode by which commerce is,
or may be, conducted.'" Utah, 283 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added). And the Court has recognized log-floating, in particular, as a
legitimate form of"commerce" for purposes of determining a State's title to navigable waters for at least I 14 years. St. Anthony
Falls Water Power Co., 168 U.S. at 359 (relying on fact that river stretch had been used for floating "logs with chutes that are
artificially prepared" in finding navigability, even though it was asserted that the stretch could not support boat traffic); see
also The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441 (including as navigable "many of the large rivers of the country over which rafts of lumber
ofgreat value are constantly taken to market") (emphasis added).
The West's lumber industry in the late 19th century depended on rivers to transport lumber to market. See Wisconsin Pub. Serv.
Corp. v. FPC, 147 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1945). Logs were as much a commodity on rivers as the load of any steamboat. In line
with this Court's cases, the lower courts have long treated commercial log-driving as a commercial use sufficient to establish
navigability. See, e.g., Consolidated Hydro, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1258,1261 (D.C. Cir. 1992); City of Centralia v. FERC,
851 F.2d 278, 281-82 (9th Cir. 1988); Wisconsin v. FPC, 214 F.2d 334, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1954). In considering evidence oflog
floating to assess *47 the navigability of the Madison, therefore, the Montana Supreme Court took a well-worn path.
There also is no reason categorically to exclude evidence of "recreational" uses of a river - especially when it comes to
recreational uses like drift-boat fishing or rafting with both a substantial commercial and boating component. PPL Br. 49-52.
This Court has recognized that recreational boat use of a river is probative of navigability, because "personal or private use by
boats demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler type of commercial navigation." Appalachian £lee. Power,
311 U.S. at 416 (emphasis added). That is certainly true in the case of the Madison, which is floated in commercial drift boats
by thousands of anglers each year. Opp. App. 63. 17

17

PPL also criticizes (at 22, 54-58) the Montana Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he concept of navigability for title purposes is
very liberally construed by [this Court]." Pet. App. 54. But that statement must be read in context. The very next sentence refers to
the fact that this Court's own precedents compel a finding of navigability not only where a river was actually used as a highway of
commerce at statehood, but where it was susceptible for use as such. Presumably the reason that PPL asks this Court to discard the
susceptibility-for-use test is that it believes the test is expansive. In any event, the rest of its decision makes clear that the Montana
Supreme Court framed the proper constitutional test in deciding the navigability of the rivers at issue. And this Court, of course,
'"reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.' " Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011 ).

*48 ID. THE STATE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ON THE
HEARING RECORD
1. PPL sought certiorari on a purely legal question concerning the "constitutional test" for navigability. Pet. i. It framed the

question in terms of what the "constitutional test" for navigability requires "a trial court" to do. Id (emphasis added). No doubt
appreciating that this Court ordinarily does not second-guess the fact-specific determinations of state courts, PPL did not seek
certiorari on whether the Montana trial court correctly held that summary judgment was proper on the particular record before
it- assuming the court articulated the proper "constitutional test." That issue is outside the question on which this Court granted
certiorari. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 193 (1997) (where the petition asked the Court to decide the legal
rule, we "shall not go beyond the writ's question to reexamine the fact-based rule-application issue that the [petitioners] now
raise"). Thus, if this Court agrees with the State that the Montana Supreme Court framed the correct constitutional test for
navigability, it should affirm.
2. In any event, PPL's argument that the Montana courts improperly granted summary judgment in this case suffers from several
basic methodological flaws. To begin with, PPL has exaggerated the evidence that it properly presented to the Montana trial
court on summary judgment. Supra 18 & n. 9. In addition, PPL erroneously suggests (e.g., PPL Br. 2) that there is something
inherently problematic about granting summary judgment on navigability, or navigability-for-title issues. That suggestion is
refuted by this Court's precedents and widespread practice before the courts *49 and special masters. Trial courts across

WE.SH.AW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

PPL Montana, LLC v. State of Montana, 2011 WL 5126226 (2011)

the country frequently make summary judgment determinations on matters of navigability or the like, as do special masters
appointed by this Court in original actions. 18

18

See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990); Illinois v. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, No. 79 C 5406, 1981 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14165, at *6-7 (N.D. 111. Jan. 9, 1981); Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455,
468 (D. Alaska 1987); United States v. Undenvood, 344 F. Supp. 486,496 (M.D. Fla. 1972).

Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75 (2005), for example, involved a dispute over title to submerged lands that - like this
case - turned in large part on historical materials. And like this case, Alaska was resolved on summary judgment. Special
Master Gregory Maggs explained that despite numerous "genuine disagreements" between the parties, "summary judgment
is an appropriate mechanism" for resolving the underlying title claim because the parties' disagreements were "really over
the interpretation of the available undisputed facts" and the relative legal significance of available documents. Alaska v.
United States, No. 128, original, Special Master's Report at 17-22 (2004), available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/
gmaggs/128orig/summary_ judgment_report.pdf. This Court affirmed the special master's "thorough, commendable report"
and findings. 545 U.S. at 83, 96.
Here, the "genuine disagreements" among the parties relate primarily to the proper legal significance of undisputed, or
indisputable, historic facts. That is especially true for the Missouri and Clark Fork Rivers, where there is indisputable evidence
that Great Falls and Thompson Falls did not prevent the rivers from *SO serving as continuous highways of commerce, with
the aid of portage. See supra at 10-12. PPL did not offer any evidence disputing the historical fact that the falls were portaged so
that the rivers could serve as highways for commerce at statehood. Instead, PPL argued that there was no evidence that anyone
boated the falls themselves. See supra 33. As explained, that legal theory is incorrect. 19

19

As to the Clark Fork, PPL has pointed to a 1910 federal district court decree- a judgment issued two decades after statehood concerning
alleged property rights as between two private parties - that referred in dictum to the Clark Fork generally as "not navigable" without
any underlying findings of fact relevant to that conclusion. See Supp. Pet. App. 11. The Montana Supreme Courts properly concluded
that this statement - which was not binding on the Montana courts or any party in the case - was the epitome of the kind of conclusory
statement that does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Pet. App. 57; see Williams v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 123 P.3d 213,
218 (Mont. 2005) ("[M]ere conclusory ... statements" do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.).

While a closer call, PPL has presented no reason for this Court to overturn the Montana courts' summary judgment determination
as to the Madison either. The State presented evidence that the Madison was susceptible for use as a highway of commerce at
statehood and, indeed, was ideal for log driving. See supra at 14. Even the dissent on the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged
that "the State met its initial burden to prove navigability under the title test." Pet. App. 116. PPL points to a Corps Report that
evaluated - more than 40 years after statehood - the river's potential for improvements for modern-day use. JA 485-86. But that
report has no bearing on *51 whether and to what e>..1ent the river was susceptible for use by the common modes ofnavigation
at statehood. PPL also relies heavily on Schumm's testimony that the flow of the Madison changed after the dams were built.
But, as the State explained (Resp. Mont. S. Ct. Br. 31-32), Schumm's own conclusions on the changes in flow made it more
likely that the Madison was susceptible for use as a highway of commerce for at least part of the year. See Utah, 283 U.S. at
87 (river need not be navigable year-round).
3. Finally, PPL attacks the State's historical evidence, suggesting (at 15) that frontier newspapers and similar historical sources
are somehow off limits in determining navigability. PPL's paid expert Emmons argued below (as he does in this Court, as
"amicus curiae") that these materials are categorically unreliable, because they supposedly rely on sources given to "hyperbole"
or "fabrication." Br. of Professors 20-21. But this Court itself has relied on such sources in determining navigability. See, e.g.,
The Montello, 87 U.S. at 440-42;see also, e.g., Alaska, 545 U.S. at 82, 96 (Special Master Report relies on historical accounts);
Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (relying on advertisements of boat service in contemporary
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Helena newspapers and holding that newspaper accounts "are among the source materials of history"). The Montana Supreme
Court in no way erred in considering such historical materials.

20

20

Paradoxically, Emmons himself has relied heavily on the same frontier newspapers. See, e.g., J A 758 nn. 24-25, 760 n.27, 765 n.32,
791 n.67, 792 n. 68, 797 n.74, 798 n.75, 801 n.78.

*52 Contrary to the caricature of judicial proceedings that PPL tries to paint, the Montana courts carefully considered the
summary judgment record under the constitutional test for navigability established by this Court's precedents and reasonably
concluded that PPL had failed to create a genuine issue of disputed fact precluding summary judgment. There is no reason
for this Court to re-do the summary judgment determination for the Montana courts. The Court should address the question
presented and affirm.

*****
Adoption of PPL's novel constitutional test for navigability would have the immediate practical effect of stripping Montana and Montanans - of the title that they gained to the riverbeds at issue upon admission into the Union in 1889. That includes title
to the Great Falls of Montana - a symbol of Montana since territorial times. 21 But the impact of such a ruling would extend
much further. PPL's test would call into question the navigability of rivers throughout the United States - at least in any place
where there exists (or existed) a non-de minimis interruption. At a minimum, that test is a recipe for confusion and litigation
over title to submerged lands throughout the country. And worse, the test is likely to result in the balkanization of rivers, like
the Missouri, that always have been regarded as navigable, into bits and pieces of navigable and non-navigable "segments."
That result almost certainly would interfere with the management of fish and wildlife along such waterways and hinder *53
public access to the waters for fishing. And it could scarcely be more at odds with the public trust doctrine - embodied in
the constitutional equal footing doctrine - which sought to ensure that America's great rivers and waterways would remain
"common highways, and forever free," for the benefit of the people. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. at 52.

21

For the history of the Great Seal of the State of Montana, see http://sos.mt.gov/about_office/State_Seal.asp.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana should be affirmed.
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2613
*3a No. 518

October Term 1950
The Montana Power Company, a corporation, petitioner
V.

Federal Power Commission
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION IN OPPOSITION
***

STATEMENT
***
Actual Use: For the steamboats which came up the River from St. Louis, the Great. Falls presented a natural banier (R. 65). As
a result, Fort Benton was sometimes labelled [sic] the "head of navigation," and until 1888, when the advent of the railroads
curtailed the demand for water transportation, steamboat traffic up to Fort Benton flourished (R. 64-65, 543-558, 1014-15,
1434). The record shows, however, that three steamboats from Fort Benton successfully navigated the River to points more
than 30 miles upstream from *4a Fort Benton and back (R. 65, 215-216, 1013, 1141-1142, 1207, 1450). Similarly, steamboats
operating above the Great Falls were confined there, portages being made around the Falls only with smaller craft; for this upper
part of the River, the "foot ofnavigation" was sometimes placed just above the Falls (R. 1207; Ex. 17(a) (1880), p, 1474).
Before 1900, there was considerable use of the 263-mile reach of the River above Fort Benton, the Falls always requiring a
portage around them. A number of exploratory and Government survey trips were made in manually-powered crafts of various
sizes, notably the 1805 expedition under Lewis and Clark, whose party made a successful ascent to Three Forks and beyond
(R. 64-65, 1357-1383, 1549-1575). In 1872, Thomas P. Roberts, an engineer for the Northern Pacific Railroad, in the course
of a survey of this part of the River, descended the River from Three Forks to Fort Benton in a skiff (R. 66, 1147-1208). 7 In
addition, Hubert Howe Bancroft's (1890) "History of the Pacific States" records the use of the River between Stubbs Ferry (mile
2390), about 85 miles below Three Forks, and Fort Benton for the transportation of large numbers of miners returning to the
States following the 1864 discovery of gold where Helena is now located; according to Bancroft, a stage line was established to
carry passengers from Helena to a point *Sa on the River whence was operated a line of mackinaw boats carrying passengers
to Fort Benton, portaging around the Falls (R. 66-67,1415-1419). 8 This use of the River apparently started soon after the 1864
discovery of gold in Helena, probably diminished soon after 1868 when most of the gold had been extracted, and ceased around
1870 when the placers were exhausted; clearly, however, the business was lively around 1866-1867 (R. 67). 9

7

8

Roberts concluded that the River above Fort Benton could be relied upon for navigation without improvement and his report supported
a plan for a steamboat link between Fort Benton and lbree Forks, trans-shipping freight around the Falls (R 66, 1195-99). The
Roberts' report was regarded as so useful that the Secretary of War approved its publication for use of the Army Engineers (R. 1147).
Although no description of those boats is available, it seems certain that they were manually-powered and probably were large
sharpended bateaux (R 67).
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9

Bancroft's account is confumed (1) by advertisements of the boat service in contemporary Helena newspapers (R 67, 1417,
1139-1141, 1210), and (2) by an 1867 legislative grant of an exclusive privilege for a portage-toll road to the Missouri River Falls
Wagon Road Company (Mont Laws, Territory, 1867, 4th Reg. Sess., p. 109.) (R. 67)

Between 1867 and 1900, there was extensive intrastate use of the River between Stubbs Ferry and Great Falls for the downstream
transportation of loose logs and large rafts of lumber (R. 66, 417-418, 1142-1146, 1209, 1224-1228, 1263-1265, 1328-1329).
Also, several small steamboats were placed on the River above the Falls, for the most part in the period after the close of the
navigation era below Benton (R. 66). This operation continued around 1900 and was confined principally to the 55-mile stretch
known as "Long Pool," located immediately above the Great Falls (R. 66, 391-397, 563-564, 1313-1315, 1323-1327, 1343,
1354, Ex. 17(b) ( 1892) p. 1906, (1895) p. 2227, ( 1898) p. 1850). Some steamboats were engaged in the local, *6a commercial
carrying of freight and passengers (R. 66). IO

IO

The Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for the Year 1901 (Ex. 17 (b)) combining figures for traffic between Great Falls and
Cascade with those for traffic between Cascade and Stubbs Ferry shows a total of2,528 tons of freight and 11,175 passengers carried
(p. 2394).

***

ARGUMENT
***
[ 1.] (b) The Company claims that since the Great Falls preclude literal through use of the River and thus prevent it from fonning
an unbroken highway, the portion of the River here involved could not be a "navigable water" of the United States (Pet. 3, 22).
But while no stream can by itself constitute an unbroken highway if at any point a land carriage or portage is necessary, such a
condition is not a prerequisite to a finding of navigability. This is clear from the Act's definition of "navigable waters" which
expressly includes "all falls, shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage" where the stream is used or suitable for use despite
such interruptions between the navigable parts. And this definition is in accord with established principles. In The Montello, 20
Wall. 430, this Court rejected the lower court holding that the Fox River was not navigable by reason of "several rapids and
falls" and concluded that it had always been navigable in fact, saying (20 Wall, at 442-443):
the rule laid down by the district judge as a test of navigability cannot be adopted, for it would exclude
many of the great rivers of the country *7a which were so interrupted by rapids as to require artificial
means to enable them to be navigated without break. Indeed, there are but few of our fresh-water rivers
which did not originally present serious obstructions to an uninterrupted navigation.

In the Economy Light Co. case, the Court stated that (256 U.S. at 122):
navigability, in the sense of the law, is not destroyed because the watercourse is interrupted by occasional
natural obstructions or portages***.

And the Appalachian case declares that (311 U.S. at 408-9) "There never has been doubt that the navigability referred to in the
cases was navigability despite the obstruction of falls, rapids, sand bars, carries, or shifting currents."
In the instant case, the interrupting Falls cover a 17-mile section, never navigated in fact, and require a portage of about 18 miles
(R. 69). But, as shown supra, pp. 7-8, many trips along the River were made via portage around the Falls. Such an interruption
does not sever the upper 214 miles of the Missourri from the lower 2,244, but rather is merely an obstruction notwithstanding
which the River was used as a continued highway in interstate commerce at least as far upstream as Stubbs Ferry. Cf. The Daniel
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Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563;Pennsylvania Water&: Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123 F.2d 155, 161 (C.A.D.C.),
certiorari denied, 315 U.S. 806. It follows that the presence of the Falls does not destroy the *Sa River's status as a navigable
water of the United States. 20

20

Even if the Act's definition of navigable waters does not fully correspond with established judicial criteria, Congress clearly has
the power, and the legislative history plainly indicates that it intended to exercise it (H. Rep. No. 910, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7),
to regulate waters in such an interrupting reach of a navigable stream. Otherwise, its admitted power to regulate lower navigable
portions of the stream could be destroyed through the location of obstructions in the interrupting reach.

***
Respectfully submitted,
Philip B. Perlman,

Solicitor General.
Newell A. Clapp,

Acting Assistant
Attorney General.
Paul A. Sweeney,
Melvin Richter,
Hennan Marcuse,

Attorneys.

Bradford Ross,
General Counsel.

Willard W. Gatchell,
Assistant General Counsel.

Bernard A. Foster, Jr.,
Special Counsel,
Federal Power Commission

FEBRUARY, 1951.
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*9A BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR RESPONDENT
No.10200
The Montana Power Company, petitioner
V.
Federal Power Commission, respondent

ON PETITION TO REVIEW ORDERS OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION

***
ARGUMENT

***
The historic actual use of the .Missouri River in Interstate and Intrastate Commerce. - The Missouri River is formed by
the confluence of the Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin Rivers at Three Forks in southwestern Montana. Generally, it flows
northeastward to a point approximately 30 miles beyond Fort Benton and thence in an easterly and southeasterly direction to
its junction with the Mississippi River about 17 miles above St. Louis, Missouri. Between its headwaters and its mouth the
Missouri flows across or along seven States. In round figures its length is 2,475 miJes; its drainage basin 529,000 square miles;
and its fall 3,630 feet.
*lOa The Commission noted several facts with respect to the past actual use of the river from its mouth to Fort Benton
(App. 64, 65). These facts seemingly have not been controverted by the Petitioner and the Commission's determination that
the Missouri River from its mouth to Fort Benton is a navigable water of the United States is not questioned (Pet. Br. 15).
Petitioner has made one contention, however, with respect to this stretch of the river which may be related to the Commission's
over-all finding. That contention is that Congress by its authorization and construction of the Fort Peck Dam has abandoned
"navigability" insofar as the exercise of its jurisdiction is concerned from the site of the dam upstream (Pet. Br. 18, 19; 96-102).
This particular contention is discussed infra, p. 33.
The facts in the record with respect to the St. Louis-Fort Benton section of the river establish so completely that this part of the
river was used both in its natural and improved condition for the transportation of persons and property in interstate commerce
that the Commission gave only brief mention of that evidence in its opinion (App. 64-65). The opinion notes that in this socalled lower section steamboat traffic flourished from 1819 until 1888 and that this traffic between Fort Benton and points on
the Missouri River downstream therefrom involved millions of dollars worth of freight and thousands of passengers.
The record in this case is clear as to the reasons for the decline of the steamboat traffic in the lower section. The Commission
obseJVed that in 1859, the very year the Missouri River steamboat reached its perfection, the railroad invasion began (App. 65).
With each *Ila westward step of the rails steamboat traffic was sharply curtailed (App. 1014). SeJVice to Fort Benton ceased
in 1888. During the period of heavy use of the lower section for navigation the river above Fort Benton was not used to any
extent comparable to the use made of the lower section. The upstream terminal oflarge steamboats was Fort Benton (App. 64).
The real controversy in this case is related to the section of the river between Fort Benton and Three Forks. This section of the
river is about 263 miles long. All of the Petitioner's hydroelectric installations on the Missouri River are located in this stretch.
Beginning about 3 2 miles above Fort Benton is a series of rapids and sheer falls descending about 520 feet in 17 miles known
as the Great Falls of the Missouri. It has been recognized by all throughout the proceeding before the Commission that the
Great Falls presented a natural barrier to steamboat traffic originating at points below. Fort Benton was sometimes labeled the
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"head ofnavigation" (App. 1008, 1013, 1448) although the record shows that three steamboats from Fort Benton successfully
navigated the river to and from points more than 30 miles upstream from Fort Benton (App. 215,216, 1450; 1141). Similarly,
steamboats operating above the Great Falls were confined there, portages being made around the Falls only with smaller craft.
For this upper part of the river, therefore, the "foot of navigation" was sometimes placed just above the Falls (App. 1207).
Before 1900 there was considerable use of this 263-mile reach between Fort Benton and Three Forks, the Great Falls always
requiring a portage around them. In this section a number of exploratory and Government survey trips were made in manually
*12a powered craft of various sizes. The 1805 trip under the famous explorers Lewis and Clark is perhaps the best known trip
of exploration (App. 1357, 1549, 1577). These explorers with their party made a successful ascent with crude handpowered craft
to Three Forks and beyond. There are only two rapids above the Falls section which have ever presented difficulty in continous
[sic] navigation. These are known as Half-Breed Rapids (mile 2327) and Beartooth Rapids (mile 2365). The "Journals of Lewis
and Clark" are quite detailed, particularly with respect to the difficulties encountered on this 1805 trip. The two rapids sections,
however, received only casual mention.
In 1872 Thomas P. Roberts, an engineer for the Northern Pacific Railroad, made a detailed and informative survey of the 263mile section of the stream (App. 1181 ). Roberts' purpose was to provide his employer with information so that plans might be
laid by the railroad company for a combination boat and rail route through this area. Roberts considered his report so important
that he sent it to the Chief of Engineers of the U. S. Anny for the information of that officer, who in tum regarded it as so
significant that it was published under the auspices of the War Department. Roberts descended the river from Three Forks to
Fort Benton in a skiff. He concluded that the Missouri in the section that he had examined could be relied upon for navigation
without improvement and he set forth in his report a tentative plan for utilization of this upper portion of the river with a rail
link for transshipping freight around the Falls (App. 1197, 1198).
In the period from 1867 until around 1900 there was extensive intrastate use of the river between Stubbs Ferry (mile 2390),
which is 85 miles below Three Forks, *13a and the City of Great Falls (mile 2260) for the downstream transportation of
loose logs and large rafts of lumber. (App. 1142, 1210, 1256, 1264-5, 1283, 1297, 1308, 1311, 1313, 1355, 414 et seq., 385
et seq., 398 et seq., 225 et seq., 236 et seq.). Also, several small steamboats were placed on the river above the Falls. These
boats were operated in the period after the close of the navigation era below Fort Benton and continued until around 1900 (Ex.
17-B, lodged). Most of the steamboat traffic in the upper section of the Missouri River took place within a 55-mile stretch
known as the "Long Pool'' located just above the Great Falls. This traffic consisted of a local commercial carrying of freight
and passengers. One steamboat operated for a relatively long period in a scenic section of the river known as the "Gates of the
Mountains." This boat was used for the purpose of carrying excursion passengers on a sightseeing trip. The vessel could and
did operate over a larger section, however (App. 392, 397, 1435, 1436, 1444).
The uses of the river above Fort Benton for navigation were, for the most part, either intrastate or noncommercial in
character. However, the record shows that the river between Stubbs Ferry and Fort Benton served as an artery for downstream
transportation in interstate commerce of large numbers of miners following the 1864 discovery of gold where Helena is now
located.
Hubert Howe Bancroft's History of the Paci.fie States, published in 1890, records such use of this part of the river for the
transportation of miners returning to the States (App. 1415, 1139, 1140). A stage line was established to carry passengers from
Helena to a point on the Missouri River whence Kennedy & Company *14a operated a line of mackinaw boats carrying
passengers to Fort Benton, portaging around the Falls (App. 1140, 1417). From its general study of the navigation of the area,
the Commission, in the absence of a specific description of these boats, concluded that they were probably manually powered
and probably were large sharp-ended bateaux. The Commission noted in its opinion that it was not possible to fix the beginning
and ending of this particular use of the river. From its study of the general historical facts relating to the area, the Commission
estimated that it started soon after the 1864 discovery of gold at Helena and that it diminished soon after 1868 when most of the
gold had been extracted. It assumed that any transportation of this kind must have ceased around 1870 because history records
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that the placers were exhausted at about that date. The evidence in the record established satisfactorily to the Commission,
however, that the business was most lively in the years 1866 and 1867 (App. 1417).
Petitioner has attacked this aspect of the Commission's findings of fact particularly and claims that this use of the river has
not been established as a fact (Pet. Br. 74-8). The primary source of the information upon which the Commission relied is the
historical writings of Hubert Howe Bancroft, generally acknowledged to be the foremost historian of the northwestern part
of the United States as of the time his works were published. His books are considered today, by modem historians, to be an
invaluable source of historical information {App. 204, 212).

It has been the use of this information derived from the Bancroft volume which has disturbed the Petitioner most, and in its
briefs both before the *15a Commission and this Court, Petitioner has made an attempt to relate this material entirely to what
it considers an improper use by the Commission of newspaper accounts as evidence. It suggests that the only real evidence
of actual use of the upper section of the river in conjunction with the lower section for purposes of interstate commerce is
this data respecting the movement of gold miners. It is clear from the record that the Commission did not rely solely upon the
newspaper remarks and advertisements in arriving at its findings of fact. The Bancroft volume of history was the primary source
of the information used by the Commission, and this Bancroft material was corroborated by information from contemporary
newspapers of the period. It is noted further that an expert witness who was acknowledged by Petitioner to be a specialist in
historical research found the Bancroft data and the newspaper material to be acceptable for purposes of historical research and
so testified {App. 212). Attention will be given to the legal aspect of the claims of the Petitioner with respect to the character of
the evidence used by the Commission in this proceeding in a later section of this brief, infra, p. 30. However, it is submitted, that
the evidence of the interstate movement of the gold miners as used by the Commission is not evidence based upon conjecture,
speculation, or uncorroborated hearsay. Any historical evidence respecting the movement of persons and property nearly a
century ago is necessarily "hearsay" from a technical standpoint. The use by an administrative fact-finding agency of probative
hearsay has never been proscribed.
The evidence of actual use of the upper section of the Missouri River, as summarized in its opinion {App. *16a 65-6-7), led
the Commission to the conclusion that this stream is a navigable water of the United States and within the meaning of Sec.
3 (8) of the Act.

***
Comparison With Other Rivers Established as Navigable Waters. - Petitioner points out in its brief that the Commission in its
opinion did not discuss the physical characteristics of the streams held navigable in any of the cases it cited or the evidence of
use or suitability for use found in any of them; nor did the Commission make any comparison between facts in any of those
cases and the facts in this case (Pet. Br. 55). The absence in the Commission's opinion of such comparisons does not mean, of
course, that such comparisons were not made by the Commission in arriving at its decision. This Missouri River case is but one
of many cases of its same type which have been heard and decided by the Commission. Thorough treatment of the comparable
physical characteristics of the Missouri River and adjudicated streams was furnished to the Commission by its staff in the briefs
filed. Comparisons between the Missouri River and the Fox River and the New River were presented to the Commission in this
proceeding during an oral argument heard by it prior to its final determination.
The Missouri River between Fort Benton and Three Forks compares favorably with the New River held navigable in United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., supra, with the Fox River held navigable in The Montello, supra, with the DesPlaines
River, held navigable in Economy Light and Power Company v. United States, supra, and with some parts of the Colorado River,
held navigable in United States *17a v. Utah, supra. The space permitted in this brief will not allow a detailed presentation
with respect to these other rivers, but a few of the salient facts relating to the physical characteristics of the rivers named, and
the navigation which had taken place will be given.

W~-SiL.4.W
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(A) The New River
The fall between Allisonia and Hinton was established by a sutvey to average about 4.5 feet per mile. Comparative slope profiles
of portions of the New River, held navigable by the Supreme Court in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company,
supra, and the portions of the Missouri River here in question have been included in this Brief as Appendix B.

(B) The Fox River
The portion of the Fox River involved in The Montello, supra, was 37 miles in length, the upper 18 miles of which in their
natural condition had an average fall of approximately 8 feet per mile. Within this reach the maximum fall was 29.5 feet within
a distance of only three-fourths ofa mile, while within another portion of2.5 miles there was a fall of 38 feet. (Annual Report
of the ChiefofEngineers, 1876, p. 235; I, p.204.) Continuous navigation by boats of shallow depth was not possible because of
the obstruction by shoals, rapids and falls which made portages necessary. For this reason the trial court held the entire lower
Fox River nonnavigable; but the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. Prior to its improvement by locks and dams such
commerce as existed was by Durham boats propelled by animal power. These Durham boats, in size, draft and capacity, were
not unlike the mackinaws used by the gold miners on the upper Missouri. A reproduction of the only available profile *18a
of the Fox River in the portion in question has been included in this Brief as Appendix A.

(C) The DesPlaines River
The portion of the DesPlaines River in controversy in the Economy case, supra, was only 45 miles in length, 60 percent of
which was pool water and 40 percent shoal water. The discharge was as much as 600 c. f. s. during an average of only 73.2
days per year. This amazing deficiency in stream flow, as computed from gage [sic] readings made daily over a 20-year period,
rendered it incapable of floating a boat through 40 percent of its length during an average of 175 days per year, while lengthy
portages, either of the entire cargo or parts thereof, were required during an average of 248 days per year. With the exception
of an average period of 4.3 days per year, the controlling depths over the rapids were never more than 15 inches, and such
controlling depths were found only during an average period of 116.2 days per year. At all other times the controlling depths
were 12 inches or less, and a number of portages were required, totalling [sic] in excess of 12 miles, and consisting either of
part of the cargo, the entire cargo, or both cargo and boat. During a period of 175 days it was necessary to portage not only
the entire cargo, but also the boat, over 40 percent of the entire distance from Riverside to the mouth of the river, a distance
of approximately 18 miles (256 F. 792, 795-6).

(D) The Colorado River
The case of United States v. Utah, supra, came to the Supreme Court as the court of original jurisdiction, and a Special Master
was appointed to hear the evidence and submit findings and conclusions. The Special Master found that the Colorado River
from *19a mile 176 above Lees Ferry south to the Utah-Arizona boundary was navigable. His findings were sustained by
the Supreme Court (283 U.S. 64, 80-1, 82-3). This case did not involve a determination of whether the Colorado River was a
"navigable water of the United States," but the same tests ofnavigability were used, and the Special Master stated unequivocably
[sic] that he had utilized the Federal rule.

***
End of Document

© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

WESTt.AW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

No. 10-218

Jn 'Qtbt

&uprtmt QCourt of tbt mnittb &tatt~
----♦----

PPL MONTANA, LLC,

Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent.
----♦----

On Writ Of Certiorari To The
Supreme Court Of Montana
----♦----

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE
FEDERATION; THE NATURE CONSERVANCY;
DELAWARE NATURE SOCIETY; ENVIRONMENTAL
LEAGUE OF MASSACHUSETTS; INDIANA
WILDLIFE FEDERATION; LOUISIANA WILDLIFE
FEDERATION; MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION;
NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL OF MAINE;
NORTH CAROLINA WILDLIFE FEDERATION;
NORTH DAKOTA WILDLIFE FEDERATION;
CITIZENS FOR PENNSYLVANIA'S FUTURE; SOUTH
CAROLINA WILDLIFE FEDERATION; SOUTH
DAKOTA WILDLIFE FEDERATION; TENNESSEE
WILDLIFE FEDERATION; VERMONT NATURAL
RESOURCES COUNCIL; WEST VffiGINIA RIVERS
COALITION; WISCONSIN WILDLIFE FEDERATION;
MONTANA TROUT UNLIMITED; OREGON COUNCIL
TROUT UNLIMITED; RIVER MANAGEMENT
SOCIBTY; UTAH STREAM ACCESS COALITION
AND WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
----♦----

NEIL KAGAN
NATIONAL Wrr...oLlFE FEDERATION

SEAN H. DONAHUE*
DONAHUE & GoLDBERG, UP

Great Lakes Regional Center
213 W. Liberty St., Suite 200
Ann Arbor, MI 48104

2000 L St., NW, Suite 808
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 277-7085
sean@donahuegoldberg.com
*Counsel of Record

[Additional Counsel Listed On Inside Cover]

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PHILIP TABAS
General Counsel
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY
4245 North Fairfax Dr.,
Suite 100
Arlington, VA 22203
DAVID T. GOLDBERG
DONAHUE & GoLDBERG, LLP
99 Hudson St., 8th Floor
New York, NY 10013

Attorneys for the
Nature Conservancy
BART MILLER
2260 Baseline Road, Suite 200
Boulder, CO 80302
JORO WALKER
150 South 600 East, Suite 2A
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Attorneys for Western
Resource Advocates
DAVID J. RYAN
RYAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
234 East Pine St.
Missoula, MT 59802

Attorney for the River
Management Society

W. CULLEN BATILE
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C.
215 South State St.,
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
CRAIG C. COBURN
KALLIE A. SMITH
RICHARDS BRANDT
MILLER NELSON
Wells Fargo Center,
15th Floor
299 South Main St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Attorneys for Utah
Stream Access Coalition
LAURA ZIEMER
STAN BRADSHAW
PATRICK BYORTH
TROUT UNLIMITED
321 East Main St.,
Suite 411
Bozeman, MT 59715

Attorneys for Montana
Trout Unlimited and
Oregon Council Trout
Unlimited

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities .................................................. iii
Interest of Amici ......................................................... 1
Introduction and Summary of Argument ................. 4
ARGUMENT ............................................................. 7
I. THE RULE THAT STATES OWN
NAVIGABLE WATERS AND THE
LANDS BENEATH THEM IS
DEEPLY ROOTED AND SERVES
VITAL SOVEREIGN AND PUBLIC
INTERESTS ........................................................ 7
A. State Ownership of Navigable Waters
and the Lands beneath Them is
Central to State Sovereignty ........................... 7
B. Sovereign Title to Navigable Waters
Derives from their Vital Public
Benefits ............................................................. 9

II. PPL'S PROPOSED TEST IS
INCONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT ............ 13
III. A FRAGMENTED ANALYSIS OF
NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE WOULD
INTERFERE WITH THE PUBLIC TRUST
AND IMPAIR STATES' ABILITY TO
MANAGE NATURALRESOURCES ................. 19

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

IV.

PPL'S OTHER ATTACKS ON THE
MONTANA SUPREME COURT'S
LEGAL ANALYSIS ARE
UNFOUNDED ......................................... 25

A. The Montana Supreme Court Properly
Relied upon Evidence of Log Drives
as Evidence of Navigability ........................... 25
B. Evidence of Post-Statehood Recreational
Uses Can Support Navigability in Fact
at Statehood ................................................... 28
Conclusion ................................................................ 34

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455
(D. Alaska 1987), aff'd sub nom. Alaska
v. Ah.tna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989) .. 29,30
Arkansas v. Mcilroy, 595 S. W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980) . 12
Barney v. Keoliuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876) .................... 10
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 77 (1922) ................................................ 17
Canal Comm 'n v. People ex rel. Tibbits,
5 Wend. 423 (N.Y.1830) .................................. 10,18
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P .3d 722
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) ............................................ 31
Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1906) .......... 33
Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261 (2001) ....................................... passim
Idaho Northern R. Co. v. Post Falls
Lumber & Mfg.,119 P. 1098 (Idaho 1911) ........... 27
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892) ........................................... 9, 10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/'~\

~

lV

In re Water Use Permit Applications,
9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) ........................................ 11

Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845) ... 8,23
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367 (1842) ... 7,8
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,
683 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984) ............................. 12,27

National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,
658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) .................................... 11

North American Dredging Co. of Nevada v.
Mintzer, 245 F .297 (9th Cir. 1917) ...................... 33
North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch.
Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271
(8th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Block v. N.D., 461 U.S. 273 (1983) ...... 31,33
N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands v.
United States, 972 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1992) .... 30,32
Northwest Steelheaders Ass'n, Inc. v. Simantel,
112 P.3d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) .................... 12,31

Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922) ................ 17
Oregon Div. State Lands v. Riverfront Protection
Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792 (9 th Cir. 1982) ........................ 27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

V

Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) ............... 9
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469 (1988) ................................................. 9

St. Anthony Falls Water Power v. St. Paul
Water Commn 's, 168 U.S. 349 (1897) .................. 15
State v. Aucoin, 20 So. 2d 136 (La. 1944) ............... 34
State v. Bunlwwski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972) ..... 27
Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett,
88 S.W. 2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ............ 33,34

The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871) ................ passim
The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 439 (1874) .............. passim
The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) .............................. 10

United Plainsmen Ass 'n v. N.D. State Water
Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d. 457
(N.D. 1976) ......................................................... 11

United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 u.

s. 49 (1926)

........................................... 8,28

United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935) ....... 31,32

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Vl

United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931) ....... passim
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,
482 U.S. 193 (1987). ............................................. 7

Statutes and Regulations:
43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(l) ............................................. 10
Northwest Ord., Art IV, 1 Stat. 52 (1789). ....... 10,27
Mont. Code Ann.§ 1-1-501 ...................................... 23
General Laws of Colorado, § 1856 (1872) ............... 27
33 CFR § 329.6 ......................................................... 27
Miscellaneous:
Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to
Watershed Protection, 25 Envtl. L. 973
(1995) ..................................................................... 21
J.D. Allan, Landscapes and Riverscapes: The

Infl,uence of Land Use On Stream Ecosystems,
35 Ann. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 257 (2004) ......... 21
Robert E. Beck, et al., eds., Waters and Water
Rights § 30.02(a) (2010) ................................ 11,28
Timothy J. Beechie, et al., Process Based

Principles for Restoring River Ecosystems,
60 Bioscience 209 (2010) .................................... 22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Vll

Earl E. Brown, Commerce on Early American
Waterways (2010) ................................................. 26
Bureau of Land Managment, Land Exchange
Handbook, H-2200-01 (Aug. 31, 2005) ............. 24
Norman L. Christensen, et al., The Report of
the Ecological Society of America on the
Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management,
6 Ecological Applications 665 (1996) ................. 21
Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the
Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights,
and State Summaries, 16 Penn. State Envtl.
L. Rev. 1 (2008) ................................................... 12
Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to
the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines:
Public Values, Private Rights, and the
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37 Ecology Law Q. 53 (March 2010) ....... 12
Gregory C. Crampton, et al., The Navigational
History of Bear River- Wyoming, Idaho,
Utah (U. of Utah 1975) ...................................... 26
Kurt D. Fausch, et al., Landscapes to
Riverscapes; Bridging the Gap Between
Research and Conservation of Stream
Fishes, 52 Bioscience 483 (2002) ....................... 21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Vlll

Burchard H. Heede, et al., Hydrodynamic and
Fluvial Geomorphological Processes:
Implications for Fisheries Management
and Research, 10 N. Am. J. Fisheries
Mgmt. 249 (1990) ............................................... 22
Heritage Research Center, Montana Navigable
Water Study (submitted to Montana Dept. of
State Lands, December 1986) ............................ 26
Lawrence L. Master, et al., eds., Rivers of
Life: Critical Watersheds for Protecting
Freshwater Biodiversity (TNC 1998) ................. 20
Clint C. Muhl.fold, et al., Seasonal Movement
and Habitat Use by Subadult Bull Trout in
the Upper Flathead River System, Montana,
25 N. Am. J. of Fisheries Mgmt., 797 (2005) .... 23

Timothy M. Mulvaney, Instream Flows and
the Public Trust, 22 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 315
(2009) ................................................................. 11
John Copeland Nagle, et al., The Law of
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management
(2d ed. 2006) ....................................................... 22
Charles S. Peterson, et al., A History of the
of the Wasatch-Cache National Forest
(report to U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 1980) ........ 26
Robert E. Pike, Tall Trees, Tough Men (2000) ...... 26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lX

N. Leroy Poff, et al., The Natural Flow Regime:
A Paradigm for River Conservation and
Restoration, 4 7 Bioscience 769 (1997) .............. 21
Karen A. Poiani, et al., Biodiversity
Conservation at Multiple Scales: Functional
Sites, Landscapes, and Networks,
50 Bioscience 133 (2000) .................................... 21
Malcolm Rosholt, The Wisconsin Logging Book
(1980) .................................................................. 21

J. A. Stanford, et al., Ecological Connectivity
in Alluvial River Ecosystems and its
Disruption by Flow Regulation, 11
Regulated Rivers: Research &
Mgt. 105 (1995) .................................................. 21
Melanie Tang, SNPLMA, FLTFA, and the
Future of Public Land Exchanges, 9 Hastings
W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 55 (2002) ............. 24
A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Water Rights
and Resources (2011) .................................... 11,12
U.S. Census Office, Abstract of Census Legislation
of the United States, 1790 to 1850 Inclusive
(1953) ................................................................... 14
U.S. Census Office, Report on Population of the
United States at the Eleventh Census, Part I
(1895) .................................................................. 14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

X

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, et al., National
Survey of Fishing, Hunting and WildlifeAssociated Recreation (2006) .............................. 20
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the
Public Trust: Some of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989) ..................... 27
William H. Wroten, The Railroad Tie Industry
in the Central Rocky Mountain Region:
1867-1900 (Ph.D. thesis, U. Colo. 1956) .......... 26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INTEREST OF AMICI*
Amici are organizations dedicated to the
protection of natural resources and activities that
depend on those resources.
Amici represent
members who comprise a substantial number of
America's conservationists, paddlers, anglers, and
hunters.
All of amici have a strong and
demonstrated interest in the ability of states, in their
sovereign capacity, to protect water resources.
The National Wildlife Federation ("NWF") is a
national, non-profit corporation working to protect
the ecosystems that are most critical to native
wildlife in order to ensure a healthy wildlife legacy
for future generations. Founded in 1936, NWF is
headquartered in Virginia and has regional offices
across the country. NWF has approximately four
million members and supporters nationwide. N\:vF
members fish, hunt, and observe wildlife, and use
wetlands, streams, rivers, and lakes for recreation
and aesthetic enjoyment.
The Nature Conservancy ("TNC") is a non-profit
corporation founded in 1951 whose mission is to
preserve the plants, animals and natural
communities that represent the diversity of life on
Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need
to survive. TNC is the largest private owner of
conservation land in the United States - over 2.6
million acres - much of which includes riparian
lands. Through ownership of riparian lands or in
• The parties have filed letters with the Clerk indicating
blanket consent to the filing of amicus briefs. No counsel for
any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person
or entity other than above-named amici curiae and their
counsel made a monetacy contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

partnership with others, TNC has protected over
5,000 river miles. TNC's nearly 4,000 staff members
work in 50 states and 39 countries. Because of its
scientific expertise and wide-ranging strategic
partnerships, TNC is considered the leading global
freshwater conservation organization.
The Delaware Nature Society; Environmental
League of Massachusetts; Indiana Wildlife
Federation; Louisiana Wildlife Federation; Montana
Wildlife Federation; Natural Resources Council of
Maine; North Carolina Wildlife Federation; North
Dakota
Wildlife
Federation;
Citizens
for
Pennsylvania's Future (PennFuture), South Carolina
Wildlife Federation; South Dakota Wildlife
Federation; Tennessee Wildlife Federation; Vermont
Natural Resources Council; West Virginia Rivers
Coalition and Wisconsin Wildlife Federation are
state-based non-profit organizations affiliated with
the National Wildlife Federation. All are dedicated to
the conservation of fish and wildlife and their habitat
including, in particular, the rivers and lakes upon
which fish and wildlife depend. They are committed
to a science-based, watershed approach to
management of fish, wildlife, and water resources,
and to preserving opportunities for recreation in and
on the waters subject to the public trust.
Montana Trout Unlimited ("MTU'') and Oregon
Council Trout Unlimited ("OCTU'') are affiliates of
Trout Unlimited, a national non-profit corporation
founded over 50 years ago with more than 140,000
volunteers organized into about 400 chapters from
Maine to Alaska. OCTU has 2,836 members in five
chapters, each formed around a watershed; MTU has
thirteen river-based chapters, comprised of
approximately 3,400 volunteer members. MTU's and
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OCTU's members are avid anglers dedicated to the
conservation, protection, and restoration of wild and
native trout and salmon in their watersheds.
The River Management Society ("RMS") is a
national non-profit professional organization. The
mission of the Society is to support professionals who
study, protect, and manage North American rivers.
Dedicated to holistic river management, its diverse
membership includes federal, state, and local agency
employees, educators, researchers, consultants,
organizations and citizens. The objective of RMS is
to advance the profession of river management by
providing managers, researchers, educators and
others a forum for sharing information about the
appropriate use and management of river resources.
RMS builds its organization with a broad base of
expertise in all aspects of river management and
stewardship including an ecosystem approach to
recreation, water quality, riparian health, and
watershed management.
The Utah Stream Access Coalition ("the
Coalition") is a Utah non-profit corporation with over
1,000 members. The Coalition's mission includes
restoring and preserving the public's right to use
Utah's public waters for recreational and other
lawful purposes, and securing recognition that the
title to the beds of all navigable waters is in the state
of Utah in trust for the people. The Coalition is
currently involved in litigation in the Utah state
courts seeking a determination that the Weber River,
the site of commercial log drives in the late 1800s
and early 1900s, meets the federal navigability for
title test.
Western Resource Advocates ('WRA") is a
regional organization dedicated to protecting the
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West's land, air and water. Founded in 1989, and
headquartered in Boulder, Colorado, WRA works in
eight states of the interior West (Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and
Wyoming). Core program areas include creating a
clean energy future and curtailing climate change,
defending public lands and iconic landscapes from
the impact of energy development, and protecting
rivers and water supplies. WRA staff, members, and
supporters rely on western rivers for working,
fishing, recreating, researching, and aesthetic
enjoyment.

INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This CoU1·t granted certiorari to address the
proper test for determining navigability for title,
which governs whether a state holds title to waters
and submerged lands under the Equal Footing
doctrine. See Pet. i; 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011).
The case presents issues of great importance to
amici and their members. As this Court's decisions
emphasize, ownership of navigable waters and the
lands beneath them has traditionally been regarded
as a central aspect of state sovereignty because these
resources serve vital public interests. Long before the
founding of the United States, public trust principles
have protected citizens' rights to engage in commerce
and enjoy fisheries in navigable waters. The basic
premise of the Equal Footing doctrine is that
ownership of navigable waters and their submerged
lands is an essential attribute of statehood; a state
deprived of that ownership would not share fully in
what it means in our constitutional system to be a
state.
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In many states, the public trust extends beyond
commerce, navigation, and fisheries to a variety of
other public values such as protecting natural
ecosystems and providing opportunities for
recreation.
State
governments'
ability
and
responsibility to protect these values, and the
public's ability to enjoy them, depend upon a stable
and rational test for determining navigability for
title.
The rule advocated by petitioner PPL Montana,
LLC ("PPL"), which affirmatively promotes highly
fragmented ownership of rivers and other
waterbodies, would interfere with consistent
resource management and likely impair the public's
interests in the management and protection of these
valuable resources.
Amici fully recognize that
neither federal ownership nor private ownership of
river resources is inherently incompatible with
protecting river resources; but a rule of
fragmentation like that urged here is certain to harm
public interests and interfere with the practical
needs of river management.
As we explain below, the test urged by PPL which would eliminate state ownership of river
segments that had to be portaged at statehood - is
inconsistent with longstanding precedent and would
destabilize title to rivers and their beds that has long
been considered soundly vested in the states.
Fragmenting ownership in this way would impair
the states' ability to protect fisheries and river
ecosystems and provide public access for recreation.
Contrary to PPL's rendition, the Montana
Supreme Court correctly applied this Court's
decisions setting forth the test for navigability for
title. It is instead PPL and its supporters that urge
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the Court to abandon its traditional inquiry whether a waterbody serves as a highway for
commerce - and embrace instead a new test that
would be difficult to administer and would invite
piecemeal challenges that would fragment state
ownership of navigable waters.
As we demonstrate below, the Montana Supreme
Court's consideration of evidence of log drives was
consistent with settled precedent, which recognizes
that such activities were a central mode of commerce
thi·oughout much of the country at the time many
states were admitted to the Union, and can establish
that a river served as a "channel of useful commerce"
at statehood.
The Montana court also properly considered poststatehood recreational use as evidence of a river's
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce at
statehood. Allowing such proof of "susceptibility" is
particularly
important
to
enforcing
the
Constitution's Equal Footing doctrine, given the
sparse populations and undeveloped economies of
many states upon their entry into the Union, as well
as the evolution of commerce since that time.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE RULE THAT STATES OWN THE
NAVIGABLE WATERS AND THE LANDS
BENEATH THEM IS DEEPLY ROOTED AND
SERVES VITAL SOVEREIGN AND PUBLIC
INTERESTS

A. State Ownership of Navigable Waters and
the Lands beneath Them Is Central to State
Sovereignty
PPL discusses the Equal Footing doctrine as if it
were a disfavored common-law technicality or a
historical relic, to be applied grudgingly, without
regard to the doctrine's purposes or history. But
state ownership of navigable rivers and riverbeds is
deeply ingrained in both state and federal law. This
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the doctrine
serves state and public interests of the highest order,
and the Court has rejected narrow and restrictive
approaches similar to those advocated by PPL here.
This Court has explained that
lands underlying navigable waters have
historically been considered "sovereign lands."
State ownership of them has been "considered an
essential attribute of sovereignty." Utah Div. of
State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195
The Court from an early date has
(1987).
acknowledged that the people of each of the
Thirteen Colonies at the time of independence
''became themselves sovereign; and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters and the soils under them for
their own common use, subject only to the rights
since surrendered by the Constitution to the
general government." Martin u. Lessee of Waddell,
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16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842). Then, in Lessee of Pollard
v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), the Court concluded
that States entering the Union after 1789 did so
on an "equal footing" with the original States and
so have similar ownership over these "sovereign
lands." Id., at 228-229.

Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283
(2001). Thus, states' title to navigable waters and
the lands submerged beneath them "is 'conferred ...
by the Constitution itself."'
Oregon ex rel. State
Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 374 (1977). See also Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
at 230 ("To give to the United States the right to
transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the
soils under the navigable waters, would be placing in
their hands a weapon which might be wielded
greatly to the injury of state sovereignty, and deprive
the states of the power to exercise a numerous and
important class of police powers.").
The Equal Footing doctrine extends to waters
that were navigable in fact at the time of a state's
admission to the Union. See United States v. Utah,
283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931). Rivers are "navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel in water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557, 563 (1871). Navigability does not depend on the
particular mode of use of a waterway, but instead on
whether "the stream in its natural and ordinary
condition affords a channel for useful commerce."
Utah, 283 U.S. at 76 (quoting United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 56 (1926)). In Utah, for
example, the Court accepted statehood-era evidence
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of navigation on various stretches of the Green and
Colorado Rivers by timber rafts, rowboats, flatboats,
steamboats, motorboats, barges and scows, "some
being used for exploration, some for pleasure, some
to carry passengers and supplies, and others in
connection with prospecting, surveying, and mining
operations." Id. at 79, 82.
B. Sovereign Title to Navigable Waters Derives
from their Vital Public Benefits
The Equal Footing doctrine flows from the
recognition that navigable waters and their
submerged lands implicate exceptionally important
public interests, and that that states are trustees of
these resources for the benefit of their citizens. As
early as 1842, the Court held that the "public trust
doctrine" - the "absolute right," vested in the people
of the new republic, to "to all their navigable waters,
and the soils under them" - defeated an oyster
harvester's claim to own the land below the high
water mark of Raritan Bay. Martin v. Lessee of
Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842). This Court's
elaboration of the Equal Footing doctrine in Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894), followed from the
longstanding public trust character of submerged
lands. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484
U.S. 469, 4 73 (1988) (referring to Shively as the
"seminal
case
in
American
public
trust
jurisprudence") (citation omitted).
The states hold title to navigable waters and the
lands under them in their sovereign capacity "in
trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from
the obstruction or interference of private parties."
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Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
While the public character of submerged lands
dated back to English common law and earlier,
American law "enhanced and extended" that
principle - by, among other things, extending
sovereign title to navigable streams and lakes not
subject to the tides. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at
284. The interests of the sovereign and the public in
navigable waters were especially acute here because
of inland waterways' central place in the growth and
commerce of the young nation and in the survival of
its people. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338
(1876) ("[P]ublic authorities ought to have entire
control of the great passageways of commerce and
navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage
and convenience."); The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); Canal
Comm 'n v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 Wend. 423, 460
(N.Y.1830) ("Had the common law originated on this
continent we should never have heard of the doctrine
that fresh water rivers are not navigable above the
flow of the tide"). 1
States' public trust doctrines, and state statutes
effectuating public trust principles, continue to
safeguard the uses historically protected
commerce, navigation and the fishery - as well as
See also 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(l) (Submerged Lands Act
provision declaring it to be "in the public interest that (1) title
to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within
the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural
resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and
power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said
lands and natural resources" be confirmed and vested in the
states).
1
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rights of public access. Many state judicial decisions
have held that the public trust embraces protection
of other public values, such as water conservation,
protection of aquatic ecosystems, and recreation. 2
Because state ownership of navigable waters and
their submerged lands carries with it a variety of
protections for the public interest in water resources,
the navigability for title question has significant
implications for the public at large.
A ruling for PPL here could have repercussions
even beyond unsettling state titles, insofar as a
number of states have adopted the navigability for
title test to determine the right to recreational uses
of rivers. State ownership of streambeds under the
navigability for title test is often a critical element of
state law regarding public recreational rights to
rivers and streams. See 4 Water and Water Rights,
§30.0l(a) ("The public right to use water in place
frequently is founded upon state sovereign
ownership of navigable waters and the land beneath
them."); see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Water
Rights and Resources, at 494 (2011); Robin K. Craig,
A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust

See 4 Waters and Water Rights§ 30.02(a) (Robert E. Beck,
et al., eds .. 2010) (overview of the public trust doctrine); James
R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public Trust Takings,
69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 331, 379 (1998) (describing trust protection
for recreational and ecological values associated with navigable
waters); Timothy M. Mulvaney, lnstream Fwws and the Public
Trust, 22 Tul. Envtl L.J. 315, 377 (2009); see al.so In re Water
Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000); National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983);
United Plainsmen Ass 'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation
Comm 'n, 247 N.W.2d. 457 (N.D. 1976).
2
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Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights,
and State Summaries, 16 Penn. State Envtl. L.J. 1
(2008); Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an
Ecological Public Trust, 3 7 Ecology Law Q. 53
(March 2010); Arlwnsas v. Mcllroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595
S.W.2d 659 (1980). 3
Particularly in states where the federal
navigability for title test directly governs public
recreational rights, a federal standard that segments
rivers into "navigable" and "non-navigable" according
to what obstacles may have existed on a river is to
place fishermen and boaters in the untenable
position of having to decide when, in a given
circumstance, a river is open to use and when it is
not. See Northwest Steelheaders Ass'n v. Simantel,
112 P .3d 383 (Ore. App. 2005) (rejecting criminal
trespass claims against anglers who had fished on
section of John Day River on which navigability and
state ownership were disputed), review denied, 12
P.3d 65 (Ore. 2005). The likely result will be

3 In other states, including Montana, navigability for title
does not determine the public's right to access rivers for fishing
and boating; that right is governed by a more liberal standard.
See Montana Coalitwn for Stream Access v. Curran, 683 P.2d
163, 170 (Mont. 1984). It is, of course, well within a state's
authority to determine its citizens' recreational access to the
state's waterways. See id. ("Navigability for use is a matter
governed by state law. It is a separate concept from the federal
question of determining navigability for title purposes."). But
even in such states, losing ownership of sections of rivers and
their submerged lands would work a significant restriction in
state authority and the loss of statutory protections and public
trust obligations uniquely applicable to state-owned lands.
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escalating conflict between members of the public
and the purported "owners" of the river.
II. PPL'S PROPOSED TEST IS INCONSISTENT
WITH PRECEDENT

PPL's central submission is that a proper
understanding of the navigability for title test would
have focused only on the natural obstructions on the
:Missouri and Clark Fork Rivers and denied
navigability because those segments themselves
were not navigated by vessels - despite the
acknowledged fact that pre-statehood travelers and
traders portaged around these obstructions to
continue their progress along the river. See PPL Br.
15-16, 40, 41. The United States, as amicus, urges
that the obstructed reaches (including the Great
Falls themselves) and any other river obstacles that
needed to be portaged, must be excised from the title
that passes to the state under the Equal Footing
doctrine. See U.S. Br. at 7 ("Although portaging may
connect navigable segments into a continuous
highway for commerce, portaging around a nonnavigable segment does not make that segment
navigable for title purposes.") (emphasis in original).
The path-marking decisions of this Court do not
point PPL's way. Navigability for title is governed by
the "navigability in fact" test articulated in The
Daniel Ball, and consistently applied in Equal
Footing doctrine cases. Under that test,
[t]hose rivers must be regarded as public
navigable rivers in law which are navigable in
fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce,
over which trade and travel are or may be
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conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.
77 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added). The Daniel Ball
test is uncongenial to PPL's segmentation argument
here; for under the test articulated by the Court,
what becomes "public" or state-owned is the river,
not segments of the river.
This Court's decisions have been marked by
practical recognition of the widely varying conditions
under which different states entered the Union and
the inequity of diminishing a state's sovereign
entitlement because it was sparsely populated or
economically undeveloped at statehood. 4 Thus, the
Court has made clear that it suffices if a river was
susceptible to serving as a channel of commerce, see
Utah, 283 U.S. at 76, and has refused to impose rigid
limits on the types of activity that can establish that
a river served as a useful channel of commerce, see
id.; St. Anthony Falls Water Power v. St. Paul Water
4 Census figures suggest how extraordinarily sparsely
populated the Western territories were on the eve of statehood.
The 1890 Census, conducted the year Idaho and Wyoming
joined the Union, and the year after Montana did, reported the
following populations for these enormous states (each one of
which covers an area far larger than all of New England):
Idaho - 84,385; Montana - 132,159; Wyoming - 60,705. U.S.
Census Office, Report on Population of the United States at the
Eleventh Census, Part I, !xviii (1895). The population density
for the three states was 1.0, 0.91, and 0.62 persons per square
mile, respectively, see id. at xx.xv, a tiny fraction of the density
of most of the original states a century earlier. The census for
1850, conducted a year after California became a state, tallied
92,597 (not counting Native Americans), yielding a population
density of 0.49 persons per square mile. U.S. Census Office,
Abstract of Census Legislation of the United States, 1790 to
1850 Inclusive xxxiii (1853).
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Comm'rs,

168 U.S. 349, 359 (1897) (finding
navigability based on evidence of floating "logs with
shutes that are artificially prepared" even though it
was argued that the stretch was not navigable ''by
boat"); infra, pp. 28-32.
This Court elaborated upon the navigability in
fact test in The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 439, 442-43
(187 4), where it found Wisconsin's Fox River had
been navigable in fact in its natural state even
though the river in that condition was obstructed by
several rapids and falls, necessitating portages. The
Court rejected the lower court's decision against
navigability, which was based "chiefly on the ground
that there were, before the river was improved,
obstructions to an unbroken navigation." Id. at 442.
The Court acknowledged that these obstructions
made navigation difficult, but noted that even with
these difficulties, "commerce was successfully carried
on." Id. As the Court explained:
[T]he rule laid down by the district judge as a test
of navigability cannot be adopted, for it would
exclude many of the great rivers of the country

which were so interrupted by rapids as to require
artificial means to enable them to be navigated
without break. Indeed, there are but few of our
fresh-water rivers which did not originally
present serious obstructions to an uninterrupted
navigation. In some cases, like the Fox River,
they may be so great while they last as to prevent
the use of the best instrumentalities for carrying
on commerce, but the vital and essential point is

whether the natural navigation of the river is such
that it affords a channel for useful commerce. If
this be so the river is navigable in fact, although
its navigation may be encompassed with
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difficulties by reason of natural barriers, such as
rapids and sand-bars.

Id. at 443 (emphases added).
The Montello disposes of PPL's segmentation
argument, because it establishes that the need to
portage around an obstacle does not defeat
navigability. See Montana Br. 28-31. The United
States (Br. 25) attempts to dismiss The Montello on
the ground that it was not a title case, but the
Montello Court explicitly held, based on The Daniel
Ball test that the United States concedes (Br. 9)
governs navigability for title purposes, that the Fox
River "has always been navigable in fact." The
Montello, 87 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added). And this
Court and lower courts have repeatedly cited The
Montello as stating the law for purposes of
navigability for title. See Montana Br. 30-31.
PPL bases its arguments for segmentation and
excision primarily upon United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64 (1931), which it says authorizes denying
navigability when there is a non-trivial obstacle to
vessel passage. But this reading of the case is itself
improperly segmented; it takes out of context a few
passages that, read in context, are entirely
unsupportive of PPL's position.
As Montana
explains at length, the portion of the Colorado River
found non-navigable in Utah - the impassable
reach within Cataract Canyon - undisputedly
represented a "dead end" (Montana Br. 31) to trade
navigation - no one passing upriver or downriver
could or did portage the canyon to engage in
continued commerce on the river. See 283 U.S. at 77.
Thus, under the settled Daniel Ball/Montello test
(which the Court applied to all of the disputed
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reaches in the case), the river ceased to be a useful
channel or highway for commerce at that point. 5
In contrast to the dead-end obstacle in Utah,
there was no dead end at either the Missouri River's
Great Falls or the Clark Fork's Thompson Falls; to
the contrary, both were regularly portaged, and both
rivers served as highways for commerce both above
and below the respective falls. See Montana Br. 3435. Neither Utah, nor any other authority, provides
for a denial of navigability in such circumstances. 6
PPL's and the United States' theory that river
reaches that required a portage must be excised from
state sovereign title would mean that states'
ownership of navigable rivers is shot through with
interruptions. Each falls, rapid, riffle, or obstacle
significant enough to have required a portage would
be separated out from state ownership of all of the
5 The Utah op1ruon bears little resemblance to PPL's
rendition of it as establishing a grudging and demanding
standard:
The Court applied The Montello; it sustained
navigability over numerous exceptions by the United States,
including that sand bars precluded a finding of navigability;
and it emphasized that susceptibility for use in commerce is
sufficient, specifically, various vessels plied the segments for
exploration; pleasure; the transport of passengers and supplies;
and prospecting, surveying, and mining operations. 283 U.S. at
67, 82, 87.

As Montana explains (Br. 35), Oklahoma v. Texas, 258
U.S. 574 (1922), does not support PPL's proposed rule. Nor
does Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77
(1922) (cited at PPL Br. 35; US Br. 14, 18), authorize
considering a river segment in isolation; the Court there found
that the navigational head of the Arkansas River was
downstream of the reservation lands in question, 260 U.S. at
86. Thus, the upstream, non-navigable portion was not part of
a highway for commerce under the Daniel Ball test.
6
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portions of the river that statehood-era boats did
pass through. Given that most navigable rivers were
marked by "serious obstacles to uninterrupted
navigation," The Montello, 87 U.S. at 443, this rule
would make a patchwork pattern of state and nonstate ownership of rivers extremely common.
But, as Montana points out, the extreme
segmentation of ownership that PPL's rule would
produce - thousands of federal or private inholdings
along the beds of navigable rivers - does not in fact
prevail. See Montana Br. 39 & n. 14; Canal Comm 'n,
5 Wend. 423, at 464 (holding that private claimant
failed to show title to a waterfall in the Mohawk
River).
To be sure, as Utah illustrates, a natural obstacle
may destroy the practical utility of a river for
commerce - rendering the river non-navigable
upstream or downstream of the obstacle. But the
navigability inquiry requires consideration of the
relationship of that interruption to commerce along
the river; when commerce passed around the
obstacle by portage or otherwise, and continued
along the river above or below the obstacle, the river
is navigable, and there is no excision of the
obstructed segment from the State's ownership. A
"segment" of river is only non-navigable if it is not
part of a useful channel for commerce. See The
Montello, 87 U.S. at 442-43.
Contrary to PPL's contentions, the Montana
Supreme Court carefully examined, and adhered to,
the precedents of this Court. See 53a-62a. It did not,
as PPL charges, adopt a casual "whole river" test
that would find navigability whenever any part of
the river supported commerce. And aspersions on
the state court's motives are as unwarranted here as
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such aspersions would be against a federal court
adjudicating a claim of ownership by the United
States. 7

III.

PPL'S FRAGMENTED ANALYSIS OF
NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE WOULD
INTERFERE WITH THE PUBLIC TRUST
AND IMPAIR STATES' ABILITY TO
MANAGE NATURAL RESOURCES

In addition to being inconsistent with this Court's
precedents, PPL's proposed approach would be
highly problematic for the public interests the Equal
Footing doctrine is intended to safeguard. PPL
tellingly makes no serious attempt to explain its
favored segmentation approach in terms of the
purposes and policies of the Equal Footing doctrine.
The Equal Footing doctrine is built upon a
recognition that navigable waters serve vital public
interests, particularly commerce, navigation, and
fisheries, that state governments exist to protect.
While rivers may lack the unrivalled economic
importance they had in 18th- and much of 19thcentury America, rivers' economic importance
remains great - and includes not only transportation
of persons and goods from point to point, but also
enormously valuable uses such as sport fishing,
whitewater rafting, canoeing and a host of other

Skepticism about state courts' ability to resolve
submerged lands claims is hard to square with Coeur d:4lene
Tribe, which required a federally recognized Indian Tribe to go
to Idaho state court to resolve its federal law-based claims of
ownership to a lakebed. 521 U.S. at 288.
7
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recreational activities. 8 Moreover, scientific study
has only broadened our understanding of the critical
roles rivers play in sustaining entire ecosystems - a
function that has prompted a further set of state
laws and programs to protect these public resources. 9
A rule that chopped up sovereign title to rivers
wherever waterfalls, rapids, sand bars, vegetation, or
myriad other natural obstacles required Statehoodera travelers to portage would directly undermine
those interests. It would invite third-party "owners"
(and claimants) to engage in activities in rivers
without regard to the public interest in these
resources and fragment the trust responsibility over
the river.
It would be hard to design a rule more inimical to
effective river resource management than one that
extracted from state ownership every place along a
river that 19th -century navigators had to portage. It
is now widely understood that fragmented
management authority can seriously frustrate efforts
to protect fisheries, aquatic ecosystems, water
In 2006, anglers in the United States spent $26.3 billion
on freshwater fishing trips and equipment. See U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service & U.S. Census Bureau, National Survey of
Fishing, Hunting and Wildlife-Associated Recreation 10 (2006).
8

See, e.g., Lawrence L. Master, et al., eds., Rivers of Life:
Critical Watersheds for Protecting Freshwater Biodiversity 1415 (TNC 1998) (''Freshwater habitats provide for many of our
fundamental needs: water for drinking and irrigation, food in
the form of fishes and waterfowl; and in-stream services such as
flood control, transportation, recreation and water quality
protection. Health river systems retain water and buffer the
effects of storms, reducing the loss of life and property to
floods. Naturally vegetated streamside riparian zones help trap
sediments and break down nonpoint source pollutants.").
9
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quality, and other natural resources and amenities. 10
A large body of scientific literature supports the
proposition that, to the extent possible, ecosystems
should be managed in a holistic, landscape-scale
manner, and administrative fragmentation should be
avoided. 11
The extreme fragmentation resulting
from the approach PPL and its amici propose would
impede effective natural resource management.
Excising from state ownership river reaches that
at statehood contained waterfalls, rapids, sandbars
and other obstacles is all the more problematic
because such features often have exceptional
importance in terms of public trust values. For
example, reaches punctuated by navigational
10 See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to
Watershed Protection, 25 Envtl. L. 973, 981-1003 (1995)
(discussing imperatives for watershed-based approaches to
river management); J. A Stanford, et al., Ecological
Connectivity in Alluvial River Ecosystems and its Disruption by
Flow Regulation, 11 Regulated Rivers: Research & Mgt. 105,
116 (1995) ("Resource managers must become 'conservators of
ecological connectivity"'); N. Leroy Poff, et al., The Natural F7ow
Regime: A Paradigm for River Conservation and Restoration,
47 Bioscience 769, 769-70 (1997) (explaining that water
resources management has suffered from "fragmented
responsibility," making it "difficult, if not impossible, to manage
the entire river ecosystem").

Karen A Poiani, et al., Biodiversity Conservation at
Multipl,e Scaks: Functional Sites, Landscapes, and Networks,
50 Bioscience 133, 134 (2000) ("a growing appreciation of the
enormous complexity and dynamic nature of ecological systems
led to the concept of ecosystem management, wherein success is
best assured by conserving and managing the ecosystem as a
whole"); Norman L. Christensen, et al., The Report of the
Ecological Society of America on the Scientific Basis for
Ecosystem Management, 6 Ecological Applications 665, 669
(1996); John Copeland Nagle, et al., The Law of Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Management (2d ed. 2006).
11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
obstructions such as boulders, sandbars or logjams
that may have made boat passage hazardous or
impossible often create the pools, riffles and other
geomorphic areas that are vital habitats for fish and
other species. See J .D. Allan, Landscapes and
Riverscapes: The Infl,uence of Land Use On Stream
Ecosystems, 35 Ann. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 257, 260
(2004); Kurt D. Fausch, et al., Landscapes to
Riverscapes; Bridging the Gap Between Research and
Conservation of Stream Fishes, 52 Bioscience 483,
483 (2002). 12
These features are critical to the
maintenance of river ecosystems, and they are
especially important to the health of aquatic
species. 13
Moreover, reaches that might have
required portage at statehood may be especially
important for recreation and scenic enjoyment. See
Montana Br. 39 (citing example of Niagara Falls);
12 See also Timothy J. Beechie, et al., Process Based
Principles for &storing River Ecosystems, 60 Bioscience 209,
209-211 (2010) (noting that fish are highly adapted to natural,
dynamic processes such as erosion, channel migration, and
recruitment of woody debris); Burchard H. Heede, et al.,
Hydrodynamic and Pluvial Geomorphological Processes:
Implications for Fisheries Management and Research, IO N.
Am. J. Fisheries Mgmt. 249 (1990).

An example is the bull trout, which occurs in the Clark
Fork and is listed as a threatened species by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service. Bull trout need deep runs with unembedded
boulder and cobble substrates, and pools with large woody
debris. Scientists advocate maintaining natural connections
and a diversity of complex habitats over a large spatial scale to
maintain dispersal of bull trout populations. C.C. Muhlfeld, et
al., Seasonal Movement and Habitat Use by Subadult Bull
Trout in the Upper Flathead River System, Montana, 25 N. Am.
J. of Fisheries Mgmt. 797, 797 (2005). These management
approaches may be taken to scale to benefit not just the bull
trout but an entire ecosystem.
13
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Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-501 (depiction of Great Falls
on Montana's state seal). Thus, quite apart from its
dissonance with this Court's precedents, PPL's rule
is a particularly undesirable one from the
perspective of states' sovereign ability to pursue a
rational natural resources policy. Cf. Pollard, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) at 230 (emphasizing importance of
ownership of navigable rivers to "numerous and
important" state powers).
A rule that fragmented ownership and
management authority over navigable rivers among
states, the federal government, and private parties
would be likely to create jurisdictional and policy
conflicts. Fish and wildlife, of course, move freely
across property lines and jurisdictional boundaries,
but a patchwork of management regimes is likely to
disserve
even
shared
management
goals.
Furthermore, managing fragmented lands is
expensive and inefficient - a point that federal
agencies frequently make when they pursue policies
designed to minimize fragmentation. 14
Finally, there is real irony in PPL's efforts to
invoke interests in stability of title and settled
expectations. See, e.g., PPL Br. 4 7, 57; Br. of
Creekside Coalition, et al. 11-12, 24-27. For it is PPL
14 See Melanie Tang, SNPLMA, FLTFA, and the Future of
Public Land Exchanges, 9 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L &
Pol'y 55, 59 (2002) ("Increasingly since 1981, both the [Bureau
of Land Management (BL.M)] and the [U.S. Forest Service] have
'used exchanges to dispose of fragmented parcels of land to
consolidate land ownership patterns to promote more efficient
management of land and resources."') (citation omitted); ELM:,
Land Exchange Handbook H-2200-01 at 1-1 (characterizing
land exchanges as an "important tool to consolidate ownership
for more effective management") (Aug. 31, 2005); id. at 11-1 to
11-2 (discussing assembled land exchanges).
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that seeks an abrupt change in the law of
navigability. A rule inviting challenges to state title
whenever intermittent obstacles required Statehoodera travelers and traders to portage would impose
massive burdens on states to defend titles long
thought to be settled. As noted above, such a rule
would invite conflicts between public users of
navigable rivers and riparian owners who believe
that a waterfall, rapid, or riffle along the shore ousts
public ownership of portions of the river passing
their land.
Such a new rule would present serious problems
of proof - especially daunting if, as PPL insists, it
would be the State's burden to show that a particular
reach was not portaged in statehood days. See PPL
Br. 54; but cf. U.S. Br. 20 n. 11. Whether trappers or
traders portaged around a particular rocky reach of
river more than a century ago is likely to be
extremely difficult and costly to determine. Evidence
whether travelers ran or portaged a particular river
segment is likely to become even sparser over time.
Because of these difficulties, and the sheer
volume of property at issue, PPL's proposed test
would
impose
massive
burdens
on state
governments, and would divert state resources
toward defending title to isolated pieces of their
sovereign lands.
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IV.

PPL'S OTHER ATTACKS ON THE
MONTANA SUPREME COURT'S LEGAL
ANALYSIS ARE UNFOUNDED

Although most of its attention is devoted to
advocating the segmentation theory, PPL also
challenges certain other features of the Montana
Supreme Court's decision, including its reliance on
evidence concerning log drives and evidence of poststatehood
recreational
use
to
demonstrate
navigability for title. But these arguments are
similarly mistaken.

A. The Montana Supreme Court Properly
Relied upon Evidence of Log Drives as
Evidence of Navigability
The Montana Supreme Court was well within the
mainstream of settled legal opinion when it relied on
evidence of log drives, an especially important
commercial use of rivers in nineteenth century
America, in considering the navigability of the
Madison and Clark Fork Rivers.
From the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, many
rivers across the northern half of the Nation served
as vital highways of commerce for the logging
industry. See Robert E. Pike, Tall Trees, Tough Men
(2000) (New England); Earl E. Brown, Commerce on
Early American Waterways (2010) (]Mid-Atlantic);
Malcolm Rosholt, The · Wisconsin Logging Book,
Palmer Publications (1980) (Midwest); William H.
Wroten, The Railroad Tie Industry in the Central
Rocky Mountain Region: 1867-1900 (Ph. D. thesis,
U. Colo. 1956) (Rocky Mountains); Heritage Research
Center, Montana Navigable Water Study (submitted
to Montana Department of State Lands December
1986); Montana Br. 12-13.
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Log drives arrived in the Rocky Mountains in the
1860s with the construction of the transcontinental
railroad, which needed 2,400 wooden "ties" for every
mile of track. Wroten, supra. Log drives were also
vital to the mining industry in the West, supplying
prop timbers for mine shafts and tunnels, and
cordwood to make charcoal for ore smelters. See
Charles S. Peterson, et al., A History of the
Wasatch-Cache National Forest (report submitted to
the U.S. Dept of Agriculture 1980); Gregory C.
Crampton, et al., The Navigational History of Bear
River- Wyoming, Idaho, Utah (U. of Utah 1975).
This country abolished the European practice of
allowing riparian landowners and local authorities to
extract tolls and duties from loggers driving the
river. Brown, supra. Beginning as early as 1771,
laws declared many eastern American rivers to be
"public highways." Id. This principle extended into
the Midwest by virtue of the Northwest Ordinance
which declared that "[t]he navigable waters leading
into the Mississippi and the Saint Lawrence, and the
carrying places between, shall be common highways,
and forever free, ... without any tax, impost, or duty
therefor." Northwest Ordinance, Art IV (adopted
1787), 1 Stat. 52 (1789). In the 1800s, Western
territories adopted laws recognizing rivers as public
highways, often for the specific purpose of protecting
public log driving rights. For example, in 1872 the
Colorado Territory adopted a law stating that "it
shall be lawful for any person ... to float and all
kinds of timber ... down any of the streams of this
Territory .... " Colo. Gen. L. § 1856 (1872). See also
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVrL. L.
425, 431-38 (1989). Early case law in the West also
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recognized this public right. See Idaho Northern R.
Co. v. Post Falls Lumber & Mfg., 119 P. 1098, 1101
(Idaho 1911) ("Any stream in which logs will go by
the force of water is navigable.") (quoting and
endorsing standard from Oregon decisions).
When Montana and the other Rocky Mountain
states entered the Union in the late 1800s, log
driving was not just a common commercial use of the
waterways; it was vital to the Nation's development.
Not surprisingly, modern state and federal court
decisions in the West have relied on a history of log
drives to find that rivers meet the federal
navigability for title test. See Oregon Div. State
Lands v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792
(9th Cir. 1982) (M:cKenzie River in Oregon); State v.
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972) (Carson River
in Nevada); Montana Coalition for Stream Access,
682 P .2d 163 (Dearborn River in Montana,
ultimately decided on state law grounds); see also 33
CFR § 329.6 (regulatory definition of navigability
includes commercial log drives). The leading modern
treatise discussion of navigability for title concludes
that "[t]he use of water to drive logs to market
qualifies." 4 Waters and Water Rights, §
30.0 l(d)(3)(C).
B. Evidence of Post-Statehood Recreational
Uses Can Support Navigability in Fact at
Statehood.
Since title to the lands beneath navigable waters
passes to a State upon its admittance to the Union,
the navigability of a State's rivers must be
determined as of that date. Utah, 283 U.S. at 75.
PPL has challenged the Montana Supreme Court's
use of post-statehood evidence, claiming that such
evidence 1s only permissible under narrow
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circumstances, namely, when "conditions of
exploration and settlement explain the infrequency
or limited nature of [actual] use." Br. at 45 (quoting
Utah, 283 U.S. at 82). PPL's assertion, however,
ignores key language in the opinion. Nor has any
subsequent court read the language PPL quoted to
limit post-statehood evidence in the way PPL
advocates.
In Utah, the Court confirmed that rivers are
navigable in fact "when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water." 283 U.S. at 76
(quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 and citing
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56) (emphasis added);
accord The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441 ("[T]he true test
of the navigability of a stream does not depend on
the mode by which commerce is, or may be,
conducted") (emphasis added).
Neither in The
Daniel Ball nor in Holt State Bank did the Court
limit the "susceptible of being used" phrase in the
manner PPL claims.

Utah did not hold that "[e]vidence of
'susceptibility to use' . . . is rarely relevant to
whether a river was navigable at statehood," PPL Br.
at 43, or that such evidence is "irrelevant □ outside
the context of remote and undeveloped rivers." Id.
Rather, the Court held that "[t]he extent of existing
commerce is not the test." 283 U.S. at 82. In the
section of the opinion PPL relies upon, the Court did
not prescribe a general limitation on the
consideration of a river's susceptibility to use, but
confirmed the appropriateness of considering

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
susceptibility in the circumstances of the case at
hand:
In view of past conditions, the government
urges that the consideration of future commerce
is too speculative to be entertained. Rather is it
true that, as the title of a state depends upon the
issue, the possibilities of growth and future
profitable use are not to be ignored. . . . The
question remains one of fact as to the capacity of
the rivers in their ordinary condition to meet the
needs of commerce as these may arise in
connection with the growth of the population, the
multiplication of activities, and the development
of natural resources. And this capacity may be
shown
by
physical
characteristics
and
experimentation as well as by the uses to which
the streams have been put.
283 U.S. at 83 (emphasis added). Utah makes clear
that the navigability inquiry is not confined to the
specific kinds of activities or vessels that were
present at statehood. See also Alaska v. United
States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Alaska 1987), aff'd
sub nom. Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1989). Courts determining navigability for title
after Utah have not construed the phrase
"susceptible of use" narrowly. See, e.g., Ahtna, 891
F.2d at 1405.
The only limitations on consideration of poststatehood evidence
are that the physical
characteristics of the body of water must be similar
to those present at statehood, and the vessels
employed in post-statehood uses must be comparable
to vessels available at the time of statehood. When
physical characteristics have changed since
statehood to make river more amenable to
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navigation, i.e., to enable post-statehood uses that
would not have been possible at statehood, evidence
of those post-statehood uses ordinarily will not
support a finding of title navigability. N.D. ex rel.
Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands v. United States, 972
F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding river nonnavigable
because
of
changed
physical
characteristics of river, in spite of evidence of modern
use of canoes comparable to boats in use at
statehood); see also Ahtna, 891 F.2d at 1405 (finding
river navigable based on modern uses where parties
had stipulated that physical conditions of the river
had not changed since statehood). Courts have also
considered the characteristics of the post-statehood
watercraft, specifically, their draft (hull depth in
water) and their weight-bearing capacity.
Id.
(finding weight-bearing capacity of contemporary
boats comparable to those used at time of statehood).
PPL also maintains that recreational use may not
be considered as evidence supporting a finding of
navigability. Br. at 49. There is no merit to that
proposition, however, and courts have frequently
accepted evidence of recreational use of a body of
water in determining navigability for title purposes.
See U.S. Br. at 31 & n.16 (acknowledging this point).
Contrary to PPL's claim that the Court in Utah v.
United States "went out of its way to avoid placing
any weight on recreational use," Br. at 51, the Court
in that 1971 decision expressly cited an "excursion
boat" in its survey of the evidence supporting a
finding of navigability, 403 U.S. at 12; accord Utah,
283 U.S. at 82 (characterizing evidence of poststatehood activity of boats, including "some [used] for
pleasure," as "properly received" by the special
master and as "relevant upon the issue of the
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susceptibility of the rivers to use as highways of
commerce" at the time of statehood); Ahtna, 891 F.2d
at 1405 (finding that guided fishing and sightseeing
trips qualify as commercial activity for purposes of
establishing navigability for title); North Dakota ex
rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d
271, 278 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding evidence of uses
including modern recreational canoe use to support
title navigability because such use was a "viable
means of transporting people and goods" at the time
of statehood), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Block
v. N.D., 461 U.S. 273 (1983); Northwest Steelheaders
Ass'n, 112 P.3d at 391-92 (finding navigability for
title based in part by recreational use); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P .3d 722, 734-35 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001).
Where courts have found waters non-navigable in
spite of evidence of recreational uses, the reason has
not been that the uses were recreational, but that
they were "demonstrably ineffective," United States
v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 23 (1935), or that they
occurred in river conditions that differed
significantly from those present at the time of
statehood. North Dakota, 972 F.2d at 240 (finding
river non-navigable because river's physical
characteristics changed, in spite of evidence of
modern use of canoes comparable to boats in use at
statehood).
In United States v. Oregon, the Court determined
the navigability in fact of three small lakes and the
two waters that connected them, finding that all but
one "disappear completely or become negligible
during a dry season." 295 U.S. at 16. The fifth
measured less than two feet in depth over half its
area and in the summer was largely "made up of
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small lakes or ponds, separated by mud or dry land."
Id. at 17. Most of the areas covered by water were
also covered with thick vegetation. Id. Based on
these conditions, the Court found "impracticable" the
two activities offered as evidence of navigability,
trapping and boating. Id. at 20-22. Trappers had to
operate largely by wading, and boaters had to get out
and pull their craft frequently, encountering
"impenetrable" vegetation and a "labyrinth of
channels" that they had to mark with flags to return
safely. Id. Thus, the Court did not reject evidence of
uses because of their "recreational" character, as
PPL maintains, Br. at 50, but because the physical
characteristics of the waters could not support those
uses. Of course, in the territories, activities such as
fishing, hunting, rafting, and canoeing, which are
primarily recreational today, were often essential for
subsistence and basic commerce.
Likewise, the remaining cases PPL cites do not
support the claim that "courts have routinely found
evidence of recreational use insufficient to establish
title navigability." Id. In the first of the two earlytwentieth century appellate decisions PPL invokes,
the court found Big Lake non-navigable despite the
use of "canoes, skiffs, and dugouts." Harrison v. Fite,
148 F. 781, 786 (8th Cir. 1906). The cOln·t made this
finding, however, not because these uses were
recreational,
but because of the physical
characteristics of the lake and the river: the lake was
"largely a tangled jungle, choked with willows,
aquatic growth, and dead trees and stumps," and
during most of the year the lake bed was visible and
used as pasture. Id. The water body at issue in
North American Dredging Co. of Nevada v. Mintzer,
245 F.297, 299 (9th Cir. 1917), was a channel cutting
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through a tidal salt marsh; the court emphasized
that the bottom of the channel was "practically
exposed" at low tide, rendering navigation of any sort
possible only during times of high water. Neither
decision, then, rested on the "recreational" character
of the uses.
Further, Harrison and American Dredging predate the Court's key decisions on navigability for
title, United States v. Utah and Utah v. United
States, as well as more recent decisions within the
same circuits that expressly upheld the relevance of
recreational use to title navigability determinations.
North Dakota, 671 F.2d at 278; Ahtna, 891 F.2d at
1405. Harrison and American Dredging, then, and
not Ahtna, 891 F.2d at 1405, are best understood as
"outliers," Br. for Petitioner at 52, and do not support
the contention that recreational uses may not
provide evidence of navigability for title. 15
In sum, evidence of recreational use is sanctioned,
not forbidden, by previous court decisions. Where
courts have found waters non-navigable, it was not
because the uses were recreational, but because the
physical characteristics of those waters rendered any
navigation impracticable. Recreational uses may
support a finding of navigability for title, and post15 In addition to Harrison and American Dredging, PPL
cites to two state court cases. In both cases, the courts focused
on the inland lakes' lack of any connection with any other body
of water. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W. 2d 127,
129-30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); State v. Aucoin, 20 So. 2d 136, 160
(La. 1944). Furthermore, in Aucoin the physical characteristics
of the lake made navigation impracticable. 20 So. 2d at 160
(finding that boats often became bogged down and had to be
dragged through the mud of lake "surrounded by cypress
swamps and impassable prairie").
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statehood recreational uses such as sport fishing,
whitewater rafting, and canoeing are properly
considered as evidence of a waterway's navigability.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Montana Supreme Court
should be affirmed.
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